Cutting young citizens' political participation into context: an analysis of the role of socioeconomic and political context factors by Bousbah, Karima








Cutting young citizens’ political participation into context: an analysis of
the role of socioeconomic and political context factors
Bousbah, Karima





Bousbah, Karima. Cutting young citizens’ political participation into context: an analysis of the role of




Putting young citizens' political participation into context 
 




Thesis (cumulative thesis) 
 
 
presented to the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences 
of the University of Zurich 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
by Karima Seraina Bousbah 
 
 
Accepted in the fall semester 2016 
on the recommendation of the doctoral committee: 
Prof. Dr. Daniel Bochsler (main supervisor) 








This dissertation examines how socioeconomic and political context factors shape differences in the 
political participation of young citizens in European democracies. The thesis takes a comparative 
perspective on young citizens’ political participation and combines individual (European Social 
Survey) and context level data. In a first step, the thesis models differences in electoral participation 
on varying levels of labour market integration and welfare system generosity. Inclusive labour 
markets appeared to promote participation while more generous welfare systems only partially did. 
In a second step, based on an original descriptive representation dataset, the thesis found young 
citizens’ electoral participation to be susceptible to and driven by the presence of young candidates 
and parliament members. In a third step, modelling differences in the political repertoire of young 
citizens on different levels of descriptive representation revealed that young citizens strategically 
employ electoral and non-electoral participation forms to elicit responsiveness from the political 
system. Faced with unresponsive parliaments young citizens turn to non-electoral participation forms 
to complement or substitute for electoral ones. 
 
Diese Dissertation untersucht, inwiefern soziökonomische und politische Kontextfaktoren 
Unterschiede in der politischen Partizipation junger Bürgerinnen und Bürger in europäischen 
Demokratien beeinflussen. Die Dissertation untersucht Partizipationsunterschiede aus einer 
vergleichenden Perspektive und kombiniert Individual- (European Social Survey) und Kontextdaten. 
Unterschiede in der elektoralen Partizipation werden in einem ersten Schritt in Hinblick auf die 
Arbeitsmarktintegration und die Wohlfahrtsstaatsgrosszügigkeit untersucht. Inklusive Arbeitsmärkte 
wirkten fördernd auf die Wahlteilnahme junger Bürgerinnen und Bürger, grosszügige 
Wohlfahrtsstaaten erzielten dies nur in bedingtem Masse. Aufbauend auf einem neuen Datensatz zu 
deskriptiver Repräsentation, stellte die Dissertation in einem zweiten Schritt einen positiven Einfluss 
junger Kandidaten und Parlamentarierinnen auf die Wahlteilnahme junger Bürgerinnen und Bürger 
fest. Drittens untersuchte die Dissertation den Zusammenhang zwischen deskriptiver Repräsentation 
und dem politischen Repertoire junger Menschen. Die Untersuchung stellte einen strategischen 
Einsatz nicht-elektoraler Partizipationsformen bei geringer deskriptiver Repräsentation fest. 
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1. Introduction  
Heirs to today’s democracy, young citizens appear reluctant to participate in politics. 
Portending a generation at odds with democracy, young citizens’ low participation has raised 
concerns about the legitimacy and functioning of the democratic political system.  
On the one hand, political participation constitutes the very fundament upon which democratic 
political systems are built. Political participation is the key element in the functioning of the 
democratic process, it lends legitimacy to the decision making system as a whole (Dalton 2008: 
32), and democratic governance without it is unheard of (Lijphart 1997: 1). On the other hand, 
younger and older citizens find themselves on opposing sides in many political decisions (Berry 
2014). Their interests are at odds on a wide range of topics, e.g. pensions, education, 
unemployment, and are bound to diverge even further as large parts of the population, i.e. Baby 
Boomers and Generation X, (eventually) reach retirement age. The “Brexit” referendum on the 
United Kingdom’s stay in the European Union provides only the latest example of young citizens’ 
reluctance to take part in political decisions of significant import for their own future. At first 
glance, young citizens’ political participation appears generally low, yet substantial differences 
occur between countries and elections (Garcia-Albacete 2014; Milner 2010; Phelps 2004; Smets 
2015; Wattenberg 2002), a fact which contradicts the first assessment and calls for a closer 
examination of this puzzle.  
This dissertation project takes a comparative perspective on young citizens’ political 
participation and its puzzling trends. It examines its causes and assesses the contribution of context 
factors to the differences in the electoral and non-electoral participation of young citizens in 
European democracies. The theoretical-normative implications and political-practical 
consequences of the low participation among young citizens motivate this research project.  
From a theoretical-normative perspective, political participation serves democracy best when it 
enables citizens to participate equally in the political process (Abromeit 2004: 78); a goal best 
achieved by high participation rates (Lijphart 1997). Because of the low participation among 
young citizens, political participation in established democracies fails to meet the normative 
expectations of political equality (Abromeit 2004; Dahl 2006; Lijphart 1977; Verba 2003). At its 
core, political equality entails the equal treatment of all citizens in the democratic decision making 
process (Dahl 2006) and rests on two assumptions: equality in rights and duties (intrinsic equality) 
and the belief that nobody is a priori better qualified to govern (civic competence). Conversely, it 
demands equal responsiveness from institutions to the political needs and interests of the citizenry 
(Christiano 2004: 269). In practice, political equality goes beyond the de jure (formal) guarantee 
of political rights and calls for de facto equality, namely equality in chances and opportunities 
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(substantive equality) to participate in politics. While the last few decades have witnessed 
substantial advancement in de jure equality (Lutz 2006: 64), the factors that would enable young 
citizens to participate are distributed unfairly among the electorate (Beitz 1989: 17; Teorell et al. 
2007: 386). This unfairness stands in stark contrast to the endowments insensitivity and ambition 
sensitivity required for political participation (Dworkin 1981: 311). Accordingly, participation in 
the political process should not be determined by circumstantial natural and social endowments 
but rather by the ambition to express political preferences and to be heard by the appointed political 
representatives (Kymlicka 1990: 70).  
From a political-practical perspective, young citizens’ low participation leaves political elites and 
the legislative process deaf to the voice of the young whilst rendering them overly sensitive to the 
opinions of older citizens. Decisions taken by such a political system will be overly sympathetic 
and biased towards the latter. Furthermore, the absence of young citizens may eventually lead to 
an endless vicious cycle of exclusion, unmatched interests and needs, and to lower political 
leverage and claim on public resources (Willets 2010). 
State of the art 
To date, research efforts have interpreted young citizens’ lower participation in politics within the 
frameworks of the life cycle and generational explanations.  
The former research approach attributes their low participation to start-up problems, which fade 
as individuals grow older (Campbell et al. 1960; Milbrath 1965; Nie et al. 1974). The latter 
research approach identifies political socialization, which is specific to each generation, as the 
cause of young citizens’ lower participation in politics (Franklin et al. 2004; Miller and Shanks 
1996; Wass 2007). With respect to the consequences of young citizens’ lower engagement in 
politics, previous research has followed two divergent paths. On the one hand, one research strand 
has painted a grim picture for electoral participation because it does not expect to see a future 
increase in turnout among young citizens (Blais 2007; Wattenberg 2002, 2006 among others). On 
the other hand, a competing research strand claims that young citizens have merely changed their 
participation style (Marien et al. 2010; O’Toole et al. 2003; Stolle and Hooghe 2011 among others) 
and portrays democracy’s future in brighter colours than the first.  
While contributing substantially to the study of young citizens’ political participation, 
previous research efforts have failed to take at least three other aspects into consideration.  
First, they have approached the low political participation of young citizens as a homogenous and 
aggregate phenomenon. A closer look at young citizens’ political participation, however, 
highlights significant differences in their political participation. On the one hand, the participation 
level differs from one country setting to the other, and from one election the other. In the early 
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2000s, in Sweden, 81 percent of young citizens reported having voted while only 18 percent 
declared having done so in Switzerland (Milner 2010). Furthermore, the gap between young and 
older citizens also varies between countries (Fieldhouse et al. 2007; Wattenberg 2002). What is 
more, differences in political participation also occur between different sub-groups of young 
citizens because of differences in employment, education, and political trust levels. For instance, 
while in one country unemployed young citizens do not participate in politics, they increasingly 
do so in other countries (see Chapter 2 of this thesis).  
Second, in their approach on the effect of age on political participation, previous research has 
predominantly focused on individual level characteristics and failed to consider context factors 
which shape political participation and contribute to the differences in participation discussed 
above. Belgium and Luxembourg, for instance, apply and enforce compulsory voting, while other 
countries do neither. Beyond institutions, socioeconomic and political context factors also 
determine young citizens’ political participation because they control the access to and 
redistribution of socioeconomic resources (DiPrete et al. 2001; Gangl 2003; Pixely 1993; 
Plougmann 2002; Saar et al. 2008), and the relationship between young citizens and the political 
system (Kimberlee 2002). 
Third, in their assessment of political participation, previous research has focused mainly on 
electoral forms of participation, e.g. voting, and less frequently on non-electoral forms of 
participation, e.g. protest. In doing so, theoretical and analytical research efforts have addressed 
these two participation forms as separate participation modes, while ignoring that they share a 
common addressee, namely the government (Van Deth 2014). Young citizens might not be as 
apolitical as assumed so far, but instead are expanding their political participation to include non-
electoral forms, or are solely relying on the latter. Both explanations, however, call for a closer 
analysis of young citizens’ motives for turning to non-electoral participation forms rather than 
electoral ones.  
Contribution of the thesis 
This dissertation thesis contributes both theoretically and empirically to the political participation 
literature by addressing the research gaps described above, and by developing a micro-macro 
model of young citizens’ political participation. This micro-macro model focuses on differences 
in political participation and investigates the origins of age-related political inequality.  
This dissertation thesis project has two main analytical goals. First, it aims to explain differences 
in political participation occurring between countries, elections, and sub-groups of young citizens. 
To this end, I applied the civic participation model developed by Brady et al. (1995) to young 
citizens and identified socioeconomic and political exclusion as the driving forces behind the 
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differences in political participation. The degree of socioeconomic and political exclusion, in turn, 
depend on context level factors characterising the framework within which political participation 
takes place. The micro-macro approach focuses on two socioeconomic – the labour market and 
the welfare system – and one political context factor – descriptive representation – shaping young 
citizens’ electoral and non-electoral participation. Second, it aims to explain the puzzle of the use 
of electoral and non-electoral participation forms by modelling young citizens’ participation 
repertoire on different levels of descriptive representation.  
Empirically, the thesis has two goals. First, I collected original data on the descriptive 
representation of young citizens among candidates and members of parliament in national 
legislative elections in European countries between 2001 and 2012. Second, I established a dataset 
of secondary data on labour market and welfare system characteristics. Combining this data with 
individual level information provided by the European Social Survey (2013), and applying 
hierarchical models allowed me to investigate the direct and indirect effects of the socioeconomic 
and political context on young citizens’ electoral and non-electoral political participation. 
In addition, this research project identifies key determinants of political participation of practical 
relevance to political actors and policy makers. Thus, I devise potential policy measures to bring 
young citizens back to the ballot boxes and to boost the quality of political participation and 
democracy.  
The remainder of this introductory chapter delves into the specificities of young citizens, identifies 
socioeconomic and political exclusion as driving forces, presents the context factors – the labour 
market, the welfare system, and descriptive representation – at the centre of the micro-macro 
model, and summarises the empirical results and their implications.  
2. Young citizens' political participation  
The relationship between age and political participation is well-established in the literature (Blais 
2000, 2007, Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980 among others). Extensive research has found that it 
follows a curvilinear path. Political participation increases with age but declines after reaching its 
peak around the ages of 40-50 (Campbell et al. 1960; Milbrath 1965; Nie et al. 1974). Lower 
participation rates among young citizens have become increasingly relevant with the coming-of-
political-age of younger cohorts, especially so-called Millenials (Blais et al. 2002; Phelps 2004; 
Pirie and Worcester 1998).1  
                                                                        
1  The term Millennials, also dubbed as the Millennial Generation or Generation Y, refers loosely to individuals born 
in the period spanning from the early 1980s to the early 2000s. As opposed to persons born between 1963 and 
1980 (Generation X) and individuals born between 1946 and 1963 (Baby Boomers) (Howe and Strauss 2000; Pirie 
and Worcester 1998). 
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Previous research on the effect of age has assessed its linear impact on political participation. Yet, 
focussing only on young citizens will yield a clear assessment of their political participation and 
place the spotlight on the differences in kind rather than in degree. To this end, I focused on the 
group that is young citizens and, based on Plutzer (2002), defined them as those enfranchised 
citizens who are 30 years or younger.2,3,4 Furthermore, because ultimately they aim at influencing 
the same addressee, i.e. government (Van Deth 2014), I consider both electoral and non-electoral 
forms of political participation. Specifically, I analyse young citizens’ participation in elections 
(voting, electoral participation) and outside the electoral arena (protesting, non-electoral 
participation), as well as the relationship between the two forms.5  
In a first step, I analyse the electoral participation of young citizens and its differences between 
countries and elections, and sub-groups (section 3.2 Not all abstainers are created equal) and 
relate it to socioeconomic and political context factors (sections 3.2.1 Socioeconomic exclusion 
and 3.2.2 Political exclusion, respectively). In a second step, I relate the non-participation in 
elections to the use of non-electoral participation forms (section 3.3 Not all abstainers abstain).  
The descriptive analysis of young citizens’ political participation corroborates previous research 
findings. Figure 1 depicts voting in the last national elections (electoral participation) and 
protesting (non-electoral participation) for the two age groups (over and under the age of 30) as 
reported by the respondents of six waves of the European Social Survey (2013).67 Age groups 
differed in the use of voting. Young citizens were less likely to vote than their older counterparts. 
Among respondents over the age of 30, 81.8 percent reported having voted, while only 65 percent 
of respondents aged 30 or less claimed to have done so. On average, young citizens appeared to 
report a voting rate just shy of 17 percent (16.9 %) lower than their counterparts. The opposite 
trend was true for non-electoral participation forms, i.e. protest. While only 5.7 percent of older 
                                                                        
2  Plutzer (2002) suggests that citizens establish the habit of voting within the first three voting occasions. Assuming 
an average electoral term of four years and an enfranchisement age of 18, I considered citizens as young until the 
age of 30. 
3  Austria lowered the enfranchisement age from 18 to 16 in 2007 (Bundeskanzleramt Österreich 2007). Austrian 
citizens between the ages of 16 and 30 were considered in the elections after the 2007 decision.  
4  Throughout this dissertation, the term young citizens refers to enfranchised citizens aged 30 or younger, while the 
term older citizens refers to enfranchised citizens aged over 30. The two terms have a purely descriptive and 
practical value and do not express a judgment towards these groups.  
5  Throughout this dissertation, the terms voting and electoral participation will be used synonymously, as will pro-
testing and non-electoral participation. 
6  Percentages based on pooled responses for participants in the six waves of the European Social Survey conducted 
biannually since 2002. 
7  For the summary statistics and the operationalization of the variables, please consult Table A. 1 and Table A. 2 in 
the Appendix. 
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citizens had protested in the last year, it was twice as popular (9.1 percent) among young citizens, 
in line with previous research (Marien et al. 2010).  
 
Figure 1: Voted in last national election and protested by age group (%)  
In spite of the entrenched relationship between age and political participation, theoretical 
disagreement persists in political participation research about the roots, causes, and consequences 
of young citizens’ lower political participation.  
Research so far has painted two divergent pictures of young citizens' involvement in politics and 
the low and declining rate at which younger cohorts take part in elections. The first research strand, 
focused on electoral participation, has painted a rather grim picture of young citizens' engagement. 
This research strand ascribes the age-related turnout differences to the increasing political apathy 
among youngsters in Western democracies (Blais et al. 2002; Fieldhouse et al. 2007; Franklin 
2004; Rubenson et al. 2004; Wattenberg 2002). Conversely, the second research strand claims that 
far from being apathetic, young citizens increasingly use non-electoral, instead of electoral, forms 
of political participation because of political alienation, e.g. protests or boycotts (Gamson 1968; 
Hooghe and Marien 2013).  
Previous theoretical efforts also provide two different arguments for the low and declining 
electoral turnout among young citizens: the life-cycle and the generational explanation. Proponents 
of the life-cycle explanation link political participation to the acquisition of adult roles and 
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young citizens' involvement in politics increases as they grow older and fades again after reaching 
its peak around the ages of 40-50. In contrast, according to the arguments of the generational 
explanation, value orientations and current socio-political events dominant during the political 
socialization period establish and consolidate participation patterns (Franklin 2004; Miller and 
Shanks 1996; Wass 2007). Different frame conditions bring about generation specific patterns of 
political behaviour and participation patterns that are immune to the aging process (Dassonneville 
2013). Following these two accounts, the decline in turnout is either the result of changed patterns 
of, and delayed transition to, adulthood and maturation (life-cycle explanation), or a consequence 
of generational differences in value orientations, issue preferences, political participation, and the 
political system's inability to address them (Dassonneville 2013; Garcia-Albacete 2014; 
Konzelmann et al. 2012; Smets 2010). Initial evidence suggests that recent cohorts of young 
citizens increasingly make use of political participation forms outside the electoral process 
(O’Toole et al. 2003), and that generational effects are mainly responsible for differences in young 
citizens' participation (Blais et al. 2004; Franklin 2004; Phelps 2004).  
The two accounts predict different consequences for young citizens' involvement in politics. On 
the one hand, life-cycle explanations locate the reason for young citizens' absence from voting in 
their "start-up problems". As they move along the life-cycle – acquiring adult roles and 
socioeconomic resources – young citizens are expected to automatically become more inclined to 
participate in politics. On the other hand, the generational account’s stance does not allow for a 
similar recovery because the participation patterns acquired during the political socialisation 
period have life-long consequences. Common to the two research strands – life-cycle and 
generational explanations – is their strict focus on individual level determinants of political 
participation. In their efforts to explain political participation, life-cycle and generational 
explanations turn to adult roles, socioeconomic resources, political attitudes and value orientations 
to explain both participation (or lack thereof), and the more recent decline in turnout among young 
citizens.  
Previous research, so far, has considered young citizens’ political participation as a homogenous 
phenomenon. In doing so, it has failed to consider differences in political participation on at least 
three accounts. First, young citizens' political participation varies significantly between countries, 
both with respect to electoral participation (Bühlmann and Freitag 2006; Garcia-Albacete 2014; 
Milner 2010) and non-electoral participation (Marien et al. 2010; Vrablikova 2014). This suggests 
that the socio-political context affects young citizens' political participation and calls for a closer 
examination of the role played by context factors. Second, although to date considered as 
homogenous group, young citizens themselves actually differ in their political participation along 
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the lines of education, occupational status, and political attitudes. Third, previous research has 
argued that young citizens increasingly use non-electoral forms of participation. In researching 
this, however, the focus has lain exclusively on non-electoral participation, and has failed to 
consider the addressee shared by both electoral and non-electoral participation forms, and the 
trade-off between the two forms.  
3. Contextualising young citizens’ political participation - A primer on the role 
of context factors  
In this section, I proceed to uncover the differences in electoral and non-electoral participation 
existing between the two age groups – young and older citizens – and between young citizens 
themselves.  
3.1 Differences in young citizens’ political participation 
Age-based differences are more evident when comparing the electoral participation of young 
citizens and their counterparts over countries and elections. Figure 2 depicts the turnout among 
young citizens (y-axis) pitted against the turnout of older citizens (x-axis), as reported by the 
respondents of the European Social Survey (2013) in different elections. 
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The self-reported participation in 92 national elections (Figure 2) shows that, with only two 
exceptions (Belgium in 2010 and Luxembourg in 2004), young citizens have always voted less 
than their counterparts.8 All but one observation (Belgium 2010) are located below the line of 
equal participation. Lithuania and the Czech Republic showed the lowest overall turnout. In 
contrast to previous research, the thesis here focuses on the dispersion, rather than merely the 
location, of the observation points. A small dispersion indicates that age affects political 
participation in a similar way in all countries and elections. Instead, a larger dispersion, conversely, 
indicates that context factors influence the political participation of young citizens. Figure 2 
reveals that at any given turnout rate of older citizens, young citizens turned out with a percentage 
of up to 35 points lower. Given a turnout of about 75 percent among older citizens, the participation 
of Swiss and British young people was much lower than it was the case in Slovakia in 2010. 
Similarly, the differences were more pronounced in Ireland (2002) and in Norway (2001) than 
they were in Italy (2013) and in Sweden (2002).9 Focusing only on young citizens’ electoral 
participation proves the existence of substantial differences between peers over countries and 
elections (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Voting among young citizens over countries and elections (%) 
                                                                        
8  In Belgium and Luxembourg, compulsory voting applies. 
9  Figure A. 1 in the Appendix reports the detailed differences in turnout between the two age groups, as per own 
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Figure 3 locates the participation of young citizens over national elections in Europe grouped by 
country. Young Lithuanians showed the lowest overall participation in elections, while young 
Belgians and Luxembourgers, mobilized by compulsory voting, had the highest. Among the non-
compulsory voting countries, Denmark displayed consistently high participation rates among its 
young citizens. Other countries, e.g. the Czech Republic and Switzerland, reported lower and less 
stable turnout rates, whilst other countries – Sweden, Greece, and the Netherlands – exhibited less 
constant but comparatively high turnout rates. In the middle ground, Romania and Spain are 
examples of countries with average but more volatile turnout among young citizens.  
Turning to non-electoral participation, substantial differences also became apparent in the use of 
protest (Figure 4). Overall, plotting young and older citizens’ use of non-electoral participation 
forms, i.e. protest, against each other reflects the overall trend observed in Figure 1: young citizens 
had a stronger proclivity for protest than older citizens.  
 
Figure 4: Age-related participatory inequalities in protesting (%) 
The overwhelming majority of country-election observations in Figure 4 are located above the line 
of participation equality between age groups. However, similarly to the case of voting, differences 
were more or less pronounced depending on the country-election considered. All observations on 
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in 2008, display young people who were 10 or more percent more likely than their counterparts to 
use protest forms. In Iceland (2009), the opposite trend was true, older citizens’ proclivity to 
protest was higher than that of the young. Lithuania (2012), on the other hand, is an example of a 
country with a fair balance in protesting between the two age groups.  
Focussing only on young people’s non-electoral participation, differences in proclivity were 
evident over units of observations (Figure 5). Young citizens in the Czech Republic were 
consistently less likely to protest, while the highest, although less consistent, use of non-electoral 
participation forms was reported in Spain, France, and Italy. Comparing Figure 3 and Figure 5 
suggests that differences in the electoral participation are more consistent than those occurring for 
non-electoral participation forms, namely protesting. 
 
Figure 5: Protesting among young citizens over countries and elections (%) 
The existence of these differences and the trends in young citizens’ political participation 
presented above confront researchers with two salient questions. First, what are the factors 
influencing their political participation and leading them to participate less and/or differently than 
their counterparts? Second, what are the context factors fostering or depressing young citizens’ 
participation and fuelling differences between countries and elections? To tackle these questions, 
I apply the civic voluntarism model proposed by Brady et al. (1995) to young citizens to identify 
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3.2 Not all abstainers are created equal 
In their influential essay, Brady et al. (1995) identified three families of individual level factors 
affecting political participation: socioeconomic resources, political attitudes, and group forces 
(Dalton 2008: 57–59). Socioeconomic resources refer to assets that enable individuals to 
participate politically. The availability of resources such as social status and time, as well as some 
personal characteristics such as gender, activate individuals’ political participation. Thereby, 
higher education and income, employment patters, along with being male and older lead to a higher 
participation in politics (Brady et al. 1995: 271; Dalton 2008: 58). Political attitudes also play a 
role in motivating individuals’ political participation. Accordingly, citizens who emphasize their 
contribution to the political system and are satisfied with how politics work, have a higher 
proclivity to participate (Dalton 2008: 58–59). Group forces refer to psychological and social 
pressures arising from a person’s involvement in and identification with specific politically 
relevant groups, e.g. political parties, social and identity groups (Brady et al. 1995; Putnam 2000). 
Accordingly, the question raised on to the causes of young citizens’ divergent political 
participation can be answered by the negative of the three factors: “because they can’t, because 
they don’t want to, or because nobody asked” (Brady et al. 1995: 271). 
At the context level, I identify two dimension of exclusion responsible for young citizens’ 
divergent political participation, and two corresponding sets of context level factors – 
socioeconomic and political context factors – shaping the differences in young citizens’ 
participation between countries and elections. This implies that young citizens are less likely to 
participate in politics because they experience two types of exclusion, one socioeconomic and one 
political. 
3.2.1 Socioeconomic exclusion 
The first type of exclusion relates young citizens’ political participation to their segregation from 
pivotal social and economic dimensions of society, e.g. the labour market. This exclusion reaches 
beyond age groups and endows young citizens from different countries and elections with different 
levels of socioeconomic resources. For instance, young citizens’ economic status is not fully 
developed and their integration in social and work related networks not yet fully achieved (Garcia-
Albacete 2014; Smets 2008; Spannring 2008). Citizens still in education or not integrated in the 
labour market find themselves outside the reach of politics due to missing resources and the 
exclusion from social networks (Robson 2008; Sandell Pacheco and Plutzer 2008). To investigate 
this claim, I analysed markers of socioeconomic integration and exclusion (income, 
unemployment, educational attainment, type of contract, and union membership) over countries 
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and elections. Figure 6 shows the frequency of each socioeconomic marker among young citizens 
over the elections covered by the European Social Survey (2013). Each box informs on the median, 
the mean (black solid line), and the first and third quartile of each socioeconomic markers’ 
percentage among young citizens.  
 
Figure 6: Socioeconomic exclusion among young citizens over countries and elections (%) 
Figure 6 shows striking differences in the availability of socioeconomic resources to young 
citizens over countries and elections. For instance, the lowest unemployment rate was short of zero 
percentage points, whereas the highest level of unemployment touched 38 percentage points. 
Moreover, the frequency of regular contracts (unlimited contract) among young citizens ranged 
between approximately 25 and 80 percentage points. While previous research has blamed young 
citizens’ life-cycle position, their delayed transition to adulthood, globalization and modernization 
phenomena, and the more recent economic crisis for their lower socioeconomic resources (Garcia-
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Differences in political participation between countries and elections occur because of differences 
in the socioeconomic context within which elections take place. In the first paper of my dissertation 
(Chapter 2), I examine the contribution of two socioeconomic context factors – the labour market 
and the welfare system – in explaining differences in the electoral participation of young citizens. 
Building on the insider-outsider theory of employment (Lindbeck and Snower 1986, 2001), I argue 
that the characteristics of the labour market shape young citizens’ electoral participation by 
influencing their chances of acquiring socioeconomic resources and involving them in relevant 
and mobilizing social networks. Three dimensions of the labour market – employment protection 
legislation, the degree of involvement of external actors (state, unions) in wage setting, and the 
specificity of the insider-outsider divide to young citizens – were expected to influence how likely 
young citizens are to be labour market insiders and, thus, to have an advantage over outsiders in 
electoral participation. Labour market outsiders, e.g. unemployed, would profit from more flexible 
and open labour market characteristics, and would be able to participate similarly to labour market 
insiders if generous and accessible welfare system provisions balance out their socioeconomic 
resources deficiency (Esping-Andersen 1990; Lee 2010; Makszin and Schneider 2010; Plougmann 
2002; Schneider and Makszin 2011 among others). To empirically test these claims, I collected 
data on the employment protection of regular (EPR) and temporary (EPT) contracts, the degree of 
intervention in wage setting by the state and other actors (unions), and the specificity of the labour 
market divide in terms of unemployment and temporary contracts to young citizens.10 For instance, 
the protection of employment affects the safety of a current job or determines the perceived 
chances of re-entering the labour market during a spell of unemployment. Furthermore, I collected 
data on the overall generosity of the welfare system towards young citizens – expenditures in social 
protection programmes mainly devoted to young citizens, e.g. education, unemployment. Parallel 
to this information, I focused on the generosity and accessibility of unemployment benefit 
programmes.11  
Figure 7 displays the regulation of employment in European countries at the time of different 
elections, as proposed by the OECD (2014, 2016). Higher values represent higher firing costs and 
                                                                        
10  For further details on the characteristics of the labour market and the protection of employment, please consult 
Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
11  The generosity of unemployment benefits relies on information about the duration of unemployment benefits, the 
net replacement rate, the waiting period required before receiving unemployment benefits, and the percentage of 
GDP devoted to active labour market policies. The information was compiled from EUROSTAT (2016), OECD 
(2016b, 2016c), Social Security Administration (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014), and Van Vliet and 
Caminada (2012). Access to unemployment benefits was measured based on the employment and contribution 
required by a country at any given time. Higher values represent higher contribution times. Information is from 
OECD (2016c) and the Social Security Administration (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014). For further 
details, please consult Chapter 2 of the thesis.  
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a higher level of protection for regular (x-axis) and temporary contracts (y-axis). The institutional 
provisions for employment protection and their combination vary substantially between countries. 
For instance, workers in the United Kingdom generally only profit from low employment 
protection, while that of Portuguese workers is high. In Norway and Finland, temporary workers 
enjoy comparatively higher protection than employees with a fixed contract do. In contrast, 
regularly employed workers enjoy higher protection than temporarily employed persons in the 
Czech Republic did in 2002.  
 
Figure 7: Employment protection legislation – Regular and temporary contracts 
Unemployed young citizens face different schemes in different countries (see Figure 8 below). 
The differences run along both the unemployment generosity dimension and the ease of access to 
unemployment benefits. While some countries choose to provide easily and accessible generous 
unemployment benefits (e.g. Denmark in 2001), other countries restrict access to unemployment 
benefits (Belgium, Portugal) or have less generous benefit schemes (Hungary, Czech Republic). 
Yet other countries, e.g. Ireland, follow a more restrictive approach on both dimensions: they limit 
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Figure 8: Generosity and accessibility of unemployment benefits over countries and elections 
The empirical analysis shows that more protective employment legislations foster electoral 
participation among young citizens. Labour market insiders profit the most from highly protected 
(regular) jobs, while the higher security and employability of fixed-term contracts alleviate the 
labour market exclusion of young unemployed citizens and foster their electoral participation. 
Labour market outsiders mobilize more in cases of a clear and far-reaching labour market divides 
between insiders and outsiders. Generous and easily accessible arrangements of the welfare 
system, on the other hand, led young citizens into an “unemployment trap”. With their needs 
catered to by generous and easily accessible unemployment benefits, young citizens are less 
inclined to participate in elections. Only by increasing the employment and contribution 
requirements to access unemployment services, while holding the generosity of unemployment 
benefits high, can governments succeed in mobilizing young outsiders, namely unemployed young 
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3.2.2 Political exclusion 
The second type of exclusion, defined in political-institutional terms, focuses on the relationship 
between young citizens and the political system. Political exclusion refers to the attitudinal and 
psychological relationship with the political system and its actors. Accordingly, young citizens’ 
political abstention stems from an underlying dissatisfaction with, a lack of interest in, and a 
psychological disengagement with the political system (Mannarini et al. 2008; Sloam 2007, 2012). 
To investigate the degree of political exclusion among young citizens, I analyse eight markers: 
trust in the national parliament and in politicians, satisfaction with the national government and 
democracy, political interest and closeness to political parties, as well as individuals’ ability to 
make up their minds about political matters, and their appraisal of politics’ degree of 
complicatedness.  
 
Figure 9: Political exclusion among young citizens over countries and elections (%) 
Figure 9 depicts the percentages of young respondents in the European Social Survey (2013) 
positively answering the eight markers. Striking differences between observation units indicate 
that political context factors constrain the relationship between young citizens and politics. In the 
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young citizens and examine the contribution of descriptive representation in explaining differences 
in the electoral participation of young citizens. Building on the contextual cue theory and the 
political empowerment hypothesis (Atkeson and Carrillo 2007; Atkeson 2003; Banducci et al. 
2004; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Karp and Banducci 2008 among others) and seminal work on 
political representation (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995, 1998; Pitkin 1967), I argue that 
descriptive representation shapes the relationship between young citizens and the political system. 
Its effect rests on the similarity between young citizens and political actors and the contextual cues 
descriptive representation delivers. Active mobilization efforts by political actors, e.g. canvassing, 
and passive mobilization effects – empowerment, information, and responsiveness – propel young 
citizens to vote. Higher levels of descriptive representation offer young citizens a valid clue for 
assessing the responsiveness of the political system and encourages their political participation 
(Atkeson 2003; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen 
1993; Uhlaner 2012). To examine this claim empirically, I collected original data on the 
descriptive representation of young citizens among members of parliament and candidates running 
for legislative election in European countries over time (2001-2013) (see Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10: The descriptive representation of young citizens among candidates (t) and members of 
parliament (MPs) (t-1) (%) 
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The visual inspection of the descriptive representation of young citizens among political actors 
shows substantial differences between elections (see Figure 10). 12 While only average in proposing 
young candidates, Denmark fairs quite well in getting young citizens elected. On the other hand, 
a high level of young candidates does not always ensure their election, as is the case in the Swiss 
elections. More specifically, I analyse the effect of two dimensions of descriptive representation – 
among candidates running for election and among members of the out-going parliament – on the 
electoral participation of young citizens in 44 elections between 2001 and 2013 (see Chapter 3 of 
this thesis). The analyses indicate that the two aspects of descriptive representation shape the 
political participation of young citizens. After considering the two dimensions separately, only the 
representation among candidates was revealed to have a standalone effect on the level of electoral 
participation among young citizens. Counter to theoretical expectations, higher levels of 
descriptive representation among candidates depressed the electoral participation of young 
citizens. However, this negative effect was determined by a previously low level of representation 
among members of parliament. This suggests that young citizens opted out of voting in countries 
in which grey-haired citizens had occupied the overwhelming majority of parliamentary seats 
during the previous legislative term. Confronted with an outgoing parliament made up mainly of 
older citizens, young citizens had no grounds for believing in the possibility of change, even if a 
large number of peers were currently running for election. Descriptive representation, however, 
mobilized the sub-group of young citizens that had previously abstained because of a 
comparatively lower education level, or lower political awareness. Young candidates succeeded 
in mobilizing their peers with lower education while young members of parliaments did so for 
their peers who were less aware of politics, i.e. not interested in politics or unable to identify with 
a political party.  
3.3 Not all abstainers abstain 
So far, the discussion has solely focused on differences in the electoral participation of young 
citizens. Yet, previous research has observed an increase in non-electoral participation parallel to 
the decline in electoral participation (Marien et al. 2010; O’Toole et al. 2003; Quintelier 2007). 
This trend suggests that the unattractiveness of elections, rather than young citizens’ political 
apathy plays a role in keeping them away from voting polls (Kimberlee 2002). To this day, 
research has considered these two trends as separate entities. I propose to consider them as two 
                                                                        
12  Data on descriptive representation is from an original dataset compiled by the author on the presence of candidates 
and members of parliament under the age of 30 in national legislative elections in European countries between 
1999 and 2012. For further details, please consult Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
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styles of participation united by their common addressee, the government. I argue that young 
citizens resort to non-electoral forms of participation and thereby expand their participation 
repertoire, whenever the responsiveness of the political system to their needs and preferences is 
low. 
 
Figure 11: Young citizens‘ participation repertoire over countries and elections (%) 
Figure 11 illustrates the participation repertoire of young citizens over different elections. It 
compares the turnout of young citizens with the level of participation in protests, and it informs on 
the combination of electoral and non-electoral forms of political participation. Lithuania showed 
a combination of both low electoral (x-axis) and non-electoral participation (y-axis). Spain (2004) 
and Luxembourg (2004) saw high engagement of young citizens in both electoral and non-
electoral participation. Belgium (2010) and Spain (2000) are examples of a mixture between the 
two forms. While young Belgians have a higher election turnout, their commitment in non-
electoral forms is quite low. Conversely, young Spanish citizens, readily engage in protest, but 
their election participation is only average. In addition, the participation repertoire of young 
citizens differs significantly from that of older citizens. Figure 12 below depicts the differences 
between the two age groups participation repertoire by pinning the differences in voting (y-axis) 
against the differences in protesting (x-axis). If the two age groups shared a common approach to 
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Figure 12 shows that this is rarely the case. The overwhelming majority of observations are located 
to the left of the x-reference line and above the y-reference line, which means that young citizens 
are both more likely to protest and less likely to vote than their older counterparts. 
 
Figure 12: Differences in voting and protesting between young and older citizens over countries and 
elections (%) 
In Luxembourg, for instance, the two age groups mainly differed in their tendency to protest, while 
in Switzerland the opposite is true. Spain and Austria exhibit differences on both dimensions, while 
Sweden and Slovakia show only comparatively small differences. Belgium (2010), with the 
observation closest to the intersection between the two reference lines, shows a remarkably 
balanced participation repertoire.  
To address young citizens’ repertoire and the differences found between countries and elections, 
the third paper of this thesis (Chapter 4) developed a fourfold typology of young citizens – 
uninterested, involved, critical, and disaffected young citizens. I argue that based on their internal 
and external efficacy, young citizens employ electoral and/or non-electoral forms of participation 
strategically to affect government. Descriptive representation, in turn, influences young citizens’ 
perception of the responsiveness and openness of the political system to their needs and interests. 
By engendering higher levels of responsiveness, different levels of descriptive representation give 
rise to differences in the political repertoire of young citizens.  
To sum up, the micro-macro model claims that higher levels of perceived responsiveness on the 
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to use non-electoral forms of political participation, e.g. protest. Conversely, the absence of young 
political actors leaves young citizens disaffected or alienated, thus increasing their use of non-
electoral participation forms or refraining from participating in any form of political participation, 
be it electoral or non-electoral.  
Consistent with theoretical expectations, the analysis finds perceived responsiveness (external 
efficacy) and descriptive representation to drive young citizens’ use of protest (non-electoral 
participation) as a complement, or as an alternative to, voting (electoral participation). Young 
citizens are both less likely to abstain and less likely to use protest as a complement (participation 
mode “both”) or as a substitute (participation mode “protest”) in countries whose parliaments were 
fairly representative of young citizens. Descriptive representation plays an important role in 
shaping young citizens’ participation repertoire, because it carries information and cues about the 
openness and responsiveness of the political system to their needs and interests. 
4. Conclusions and research outlook 
Concerns about the legitimacy and functioning of the democratic political system have encouraged 
academic research on the relationship between age and political participation. Low participation 
levels among young citizens have raised criticism about their political apathy and lack of interest 
(Fieldhouse et al. 2007 among others). Gloomy visions of ever-falling turnout rates have prompted 
researchers to investigate the sources of the phenomenon. Focusing on life-cycle and generational 
explanations (Campbell et al. 1960; Franklin et al. 2004; Milbrath 1965; Miller and Shanks 1996 
among others), previous research has focused on individual level determinants of political 
participation, the acquisition of resources and adulthood roles, and changing citizenship norms as 
well as political attitudes and affinities.  
These accounts, however, have fallen short in explaining differences in political participation 
occurring between countries and elections, and between different sub-groups of young citizens. 
Analysing the context within which participation takes place promises to contribute substantially 
to a better understanding of young citizens’ political participation and to identify concrete political 
measurers to target young citizens and foster their political engagement. 
To this end, I investigated the effect of socioeconomic – the labour market and the welfare system 
– and political – descriptive representation – context factors on the electoral and non-electoral 
participation of young citizens in European countries and elections covered by the European Social 
Survey (2013).  
In the first paper, I focused on the relationship between labour market and welfare system 
characteristics and young citizens’ electoral participation. The micro-macro model proposed 
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interpreted differences in the political participation of young citizens in terms of the labour market 
divide between insiders and outsiders. The protection of employment, the specificity of the labour 
market divide, and the degree of intervention by external actors in wage bargaining were expected 
to shape the differences in voting among young citizens. The empirical results showed that labour 
market insiders profit from the higher protection offered by regular contracts, while the possibility 
of employing young citizens on a temporary basis fosters the political participation of labour 
market outsiders, i.e. unemployed young citizens. In a deeper look at into the political participation 
of labour market outsiders, the generosity and accessibility of the welfare system and 
unemployment benefits were tested on their mobilizing effect on young unemployed citizens. In a 
similar fashion to previous research, easily accessible and generous unemployment benefit 
frameworks were found to hinder young citizens’ political participation. In conclusion, the 
empirical results of the first paper identify labour market characteristics as a key ingredient to 
young citizens’ electoral participation, and warn political actors of easily accessible and generous 
unemployment schemes, which might retain young citizens in an “unemployment trap”. 
In the second paper, I focused on the political exclusion of young citizens, and analysed the effect 
descriptive representation has on their electoral participation. Based on the original dataset of 
descriptive representation (see Chapter 3), the empirical results show support for the theoretical 
claim assigning mobilization and cueing effects to descriptive representation. The paper 
innovatively, and in an explorative way, analysed and compared two dimensions of descriptive 
representation – among candidates and among members of parliament. This approach allowed the 
different effects of descriptive representation on sub-groups of young citizens to be distinguished. 
The presence of young candidates was especially effective in mobilizing young citizens who had 
previously abstained because of lower education levels, while politically less aware citizens 
profited from the presence of young political actors in parliament.  
Descriptive representation’s role also came to the fore in the third paper of this thesis (Chapter 4). 
In order to address the use of electoral and non-electoral forms of political participation, I used 
different levels of descriptive representation to explain differences in the political repertoire of 
young citizens. I analysed voting and protest as expressions of a common participation repertoire, 
strategically employed to elicit responsiveness from the political system and its actors. Faced with 
unresponsive parliaments, i.e. low levels of descriptive representation, alienated young citizens 
turn to non-electoral forms to complement or substitute electoral forms of participation.  
The results from the second and third paper demonstrated the role played by the relationship 
between young citizens and the political system and its political actors. The failure to vote and the 
increased engagement in non-electoral participation forms signal a dissatisfaction among young 
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citizens with the political system. Increasing the presence of young citizens in the ranks of political 
actors might not only prove effective in mobilizing unaware and less resourceful young citizens 
but also in bringing back to the polls young citizens disaffected by the political system’s inability 
to address and respond to their needs and interests.  
The research project found young citizens’ political participation to depend heavily on the 
socioeconomic and political context. Thus, efforts to increase their political participation should 
be aimed at increasing their involvement in the labour market and to having young citizens elected 
into parliament. 
5. Outline of the dissertation 
Chapter 2 - Paper 1: Levelling the odds. Labour markets, welfare systems, and 
young citizens’ electoral participation 
This paper bridges individual and context levels to explain differences in the electoral participation 
of young citizens between countries and elections. Building on the resource model of political 
participation and the insider-outsider theory of employment, the micro-macro model investigates 
the participatory consequences of socioeconomic exclusion and the role of two socioeconomic 
context factors – the labour market and the welfare system – in shaping young citizens’ electoral 
participation. Labour market arrangements promote labour market insiders’ and antagonize labour 
market outsiders’ political participation. Conversely, accessible and generous welfare regimes 
counterbalance labour market outsiders’ socioeconomic exclusion by redistributing politically 
relevant socioeconomic resources. Combining individual level data from the European Social 
Survey (ESS) with data on the characteristics of the labour market and the welfare system for 70 
national elections in European countries between 2001 and 2012, the empirical analysis assesses 
the effect of the two context factors in a hierarchical setting. The empirical results lend support to 
the role of labour market arrangements in shaping the political participation of labour market 
insiders and outsiders. Generous welfare system arrangements, i.e. unemployment benefits, 
fostered electoral participation among labour market outsiders only in combination with stricter 
access rules. 
Chapter 3 - Paper 2: Someone like me. Descriptive representation and young 
citizens’ electoral participation 
This paper examines the role of descriptive representation in shaping young citizens’ electoral 
participation in a comparative and hierarchical perspective. The micro-macro theoretical approach 
models the differences in electoral participation between countries and elections on different levels 
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of descriptive representation. Building on the contextual cue theory and the empowerment 
hypothesis, this paper argues that descriptive representation among political actors – members of 
parliament and candidates running for election – has the potential to mobilize young citizens by 
means of active mobilization efforts and passive mobilization effects. Because of the likeness 
between represented and representatives, the presence of young political actors sends three types 
of cues to young citizens – empowerment, information, and responsiveness – and mobilizes them 
to participate in politics. Differences in the political participation of young citizens are, thus, a 
function of different levels of young citizens’ representation among the actors of the political 
system. The empirical analysis combines original data on the descriptive representation of young 
citizens among candidates and elected members of parliament (MPs) with individual level data 
from the European Social Survey. The multilevel analysis of the electoral participation of young 
citizens in 44 national legislative elections between 2001 and 2013 reveals that descriptive 
representation affects the electoral participation of young citizens. Furthermore, the two 
dimensions of descriptive representation – members of parliament and candidates – affected sub-
groups of young citizens differently. The presence of young candidates promotes the participation 
of comparatively lower educated young citizens, while the presence of young MPs fosteres the 
participation of politically uninterested and politically less involved young citizens.  
Chapter 4 - Paper 3: To vote or to protest? Descriptive representation and young 
citizens’ participation repertoire 
The last few decades bore witness to two opposing trends in young citizens’ political participation. 
Their absence from ballot boxes stood opposed to their increased involvement in non-electoral 
participation forms, e.g. protest. The paper reconciled these two trends by investigating the role of 
political efficacy, the responsiveness of the political system, and descriptive representation in 
shaping young citizens’ participation repertoire. Expanding on the contextual cue theory and the 
empowerment hypothesis, descriptive representation was expected to encourage the use of 
electoral over non-electoral forms of political participation. Based on individual level data from 
four waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) and an original dataset on the descriptive 
representation of young citizens among members of parliament in 19 European countries and 36 
national elections (1999-2008), the multilevel multinomial analysis revealed that higher levels of 
descriptive representation foster the use of electoral over non-electoral participation forms. 
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Table A. 1: Summary statistics, overall, young, and older citizens 
 Overall Young citizens Old citizens 
 Mean St. dev. Min Max N Mean St. 
dev. 





Voted in the last national election (Voted) 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00 262992 0.82 0.39 0.00 1.00 219628 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 43364 
Taken part in lawful demonstration 
(Protest) 
0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 262119 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 218905 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00 43214 
High income 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 198014 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 167688 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 30326 
Unemployed 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 261484 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 218327 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 43157 
Tertiary education 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 262301 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 219061 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 43240 
Unlimited contract 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 207992 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00 174882 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 33110 
Union membership 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 258582 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 215985 0.21 0.40 0.00 1.00 42597 
Trust parliament 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 257615 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 215332 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 42283 
Trust politicians 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 259223 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 216510 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 42713 
Satisfaction with national government 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 254136 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 212502 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 41634 
Satisfaction with democracy 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 254162 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 212172 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 41990 
Making up mind about politics is difficult 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 154398 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 128019 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 26379 
Close to a political party 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 258017 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 215420 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 42597 
Political interest 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 262265 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 219026 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 43239 
Politics is complicated 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 155109 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 128629 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 26480 
Young citizens 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 262992           
Countries/Elections 31/92    31/92    31/92    
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Table A. 2: Operationalisation of variables and corresponding questions and coding in the European Social Surveys13 
Variable Description Indicator coding ESS variable/rounds ESS Question ESS coding 
Age group Age group dummy for young 
and old enfranchised citizens 
0: Old citizens (31- ) 
1: Young citizens 
(16/18-30) 
agea Age of responded, calculated Continuous measure of age 
in years 
Political participation 
Vote Voted in the last national 
election (dummy variable) 
0: Not voted 
(abstained)  
vote Some people don't vote nowadays for 
one reason or another. Did you vote in 
the last [country] national election in 
[month/year]? 
2: No 
1: Voted 1: Yes  
Protest Having participated in a legal 
demonstration (in the last 12 
months) 
0: No  pbldmn There are different ways of trying to 
improve things in [country] or help 
prevent things from going wrong. 
During the last 12 months, have you 
done any of the following? Firstly ... 
Taken part in a lawful public 
demonstration 
2: No 
1: Yes 1: Yes  
Socioeconomic dimension 
High income High household income 0: No  hinctnt (ESS 1-3) 
hinctnta (ESS 4-7) 
 
Using this card, if you add up the 
income from all sources, which letter 
describes your household's total net 
income? If you don't know the exact 
figure, please give an estimate. Use 
the part of the card that you know 
best: weekly, monthly or annual 
income. 
10/12 answer categories  
upper three/four categories 
coded as high income 
 
1: Yes 
Unemployed Being currently unemployed 0: No  mnactic Main activity, last 7 days. All 
respondents. Post coded 
1: Paid work    
2: Education 5 Permanently 
sick or disabled  
6: Retired    
7: Community or military 
service   
8: Housework, looking after 
children, others    
9: Other  
                                                                        
13  Categories not reported in the ESS coding column, e.g. refusal or not applicable, were recoded to missing and, hence, not considered in the analysis. Further, all information 
pertains on enfranchised individuals in a specific country. Source: ESS (2013). 
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1: Yes  3: Unemployed, looking for 
job  
4: Unemployed, not looking 
for job 
Tertiary education Having a universitary degree 
or similar 
0: No  edulvla (ESS 1-3) 
edulvlb (ESS 4-7) 
What is the highest level of education 
you have achieved? 
1: Less than lower secondary 
education (ISCED 0-1)  
2: Lower secondary 
education completed 
(ISCED 2)  
3: Upper secondary 
education completed 
(ISCED 3)  
4: Post-secondary non-
tertiary education completed 
(ISCED 4)  
1: Yes 5: Tertiary education 
completed (ISCED 5-6) 
Unlimited contract Being employed on the basis 
of an unlimited contract 
0: No  wrkctr (ESS 1) 
wrkctra (ESS 2-6) 
Do/did you have a work contract of 
...nature 
2: Limited  
1: Yes 1: Unlimited 
Union membership Being or having been 
member of a trade union 
0: No  mbtru Are you or have you ever been a 
member of a trade union or similar 
organisation? 
1: Yes, currently   
2: Yes, previously  
1: Yes 3: No 
Political dimension 
Trust in parliament High trust in parliament 0: No  trstprl please tell me on a score of 0-10 how 
much you personally trust [country]’ 
parliament 
0: No trust at all  
1-6 
1: Yes 7-9 
10: Complete trust 
Trust in politicians High trust in politicians 0: No  trstplt please tell me on a score of 0-10 how 
much you personally trust politicians 
0: No trust at all  
1-6 
1: Yes 7-9 
10: Complete trust 
Satisfaction with national government Being satisfied with the 
national government 
0: No  stfdem Now thinking about the [country] 
government, how satisfied are you 
with the way it is doing its job? 
0: Extremely dissatisfied 
1-6 
1: Yes 7-9 
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10: Extremely satisfied 
Satisfaction with democracy Being satisfied with 
democracy 
0: No  stfdem And on the whole, how satisfied are 
you with the way democracy works in 
[country]? 
0: Extremely dissatisfied 
1-6 
1: Yes 7-9 
10: Extremely satisfied 
Political interest Being interested in politics 0: No  polintr How interested would you say you are 
in politics ? 
Hardly interested (3) 
Not at all interested (4) 
1: Yes Very interested (1) 
Quite interested (2)  
Close to a political party Feeling close to a political 
party 
0: No  clsprty Is there a particular political party you 
feel closer to than all the other parties? 
2: No 
1: Yes 1: Yes 
Make up mind about politics Feeling it difficult to make 
up one’s mind about politics 
0: No  poldcs How difficult or easy do you find it to 
make your mind up about political 
issues? 
3 Neither difficult nor easy  
4 Easy     
5 Very easy 
1: Yes 1 Very difficult    
2 Difficult 
Politics is complicated Feeling that politics is too 
complicated to understand 
0: No  polcmpl How often does politics seem so 
complicated that you can't really 
understand what is going on? 
1: Never     
2: Seldom  
3: Occasionally  
1: Yes 4: Regularly  
5: Frequently 
Citizenship  0: No  ctzcntr Are you a citizen of [country]? 2: No 
1: Yes 1: Yes 
Identifying variables  
Countries   cntry Country Country name 
Election years Year of election Year  Day/Month/Year of the interview Based on administrative 
variables: 
Day of month of interview 
(inwdds/inwdde/inwdd) 
Month of interview 
(inwmms/inwmme/inwmm) 
Year of interview 
(inwyys/inwyye/inwyr) 
 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ESS 1-6 (2013), own calculations












Levelling the odds 
 
Labour markets, welfare systems, and 
young citizens’ electoral participation 
  




Young citizens’ electoral participation has been identified as the principal component of the 
downward trend in turnout (Blais 2007; Franklin 2004; Wattenberg 2006). Differences in turnout, 
however, persist between countries and elections, and call for an assessment of the role of context 
factors.  
Young citizens’ low electoral participation directly hampers the functioning, and reduces the 
legitimacy, of the democratic political system (Lijphart 1997), and clashes with the democratic 
principle and requirements of political equality (Christiano 2004; Dahl 2006; Dworkin 1981; Verba 
2003). Young citizens’ absence in elections translates into a transmission of preferences skewed in 
favour of older citizens. Furthermore, failing to establish the habit of voting at a young age could 
result in a life-long absence from ballot boxes (Fieldhouse, Tranmer, and Russell 2007; Konzelmann, 
Wagner, and Rattinger 2012; Plutzer 2002), and strongly curtail the political leverage and claim on 
political resources of young citizens, as they will be increasingly outnumbered by older cohorts, i.e. 
Baby Boomers and Generation X (Pirie and Worcester 1998; Willets 2010).  
Previous research has found the comparatively lower endowment with socioeconomic resources and 
deficient social inclusion as drivers of young citizens’ political participation (Kimberlee 2002; 
Spannring 2008; Teorell, Sum, and Tobiasen 2007). Their socioeconomic exclusion has gained 
momentum in the last decades due to delayed transitions to adulthood, the phenomena of globalization 
and modernisation, and, more recently, the economic crisis, which hit the young particularly hard 
(Eurofond 2012; Garcia-Albacete 2014; Spannring 2008). The resulting lack of resources and 
socioeconomic exclusion has curtailed young citizens’ ability to participate in politics. 
While low endowment in socioeconomic resources and social exclusion are key components of 
political abstention, only context factors can explain the striking differences in turnout between 
countries and elections. In spite of this, context factors and turnout differences have largely remained 
absent from the academic research focus. This paper addresses this research gap by developing a 
micro-macro model of young citizens’ electoral participation. It argues that two main factors at the 
context level control the access to, and redistribution of, socioeconomic resources (DiPrete et al. 
2001; Gangl 2001; Saar, Unt, and Kogan 2008), as well as the integration into social networks and 
connections (Coleman 2000; Field 2003; Pixely 1993; Plougmann 2002; Putnam 2000; Spannring 
2008): the labour market and the welfare system. 
Building on the resource theory of political participation (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995) and 
the insider-outsider theory of employment (Lindbeck and Snower 1986, 2001), this paper argues that 
more accessible, inclusive, and generous labour markets and welfare systems foster young citizens’ 
Chapter 2 Levelling the odds Karima S. Bousbah 
39 
 
electoral participation. For instance, labour market arrangements foster the electoral participation of 
insiders while outsiders are mobilized by more generous and accessible welfare systems. The 
objective of the paper is to assess to what extent labour markets and welfare systems directly and 
indirectly affect young citizens’ electoral participation.  
This paper contributes theoretically and empirically to the field of young citizens’ political 
participation. The focus on differences in electoral participation among young citizens widens the 
theoretical focus to include context factors. By bridging the gap between the individual (resource 
theory of political participation) and the context level (insider-outsider theory of employment), this 
paper takes an innovative and comparative look at the participatory consequences of socioeconomic 
exclusion and context level arrangements. Methodologically, the multilevel approach allows for the 
analysis of direct and indirect effects of labour market and welfare system arrangements on electoral 
participation. Empirically, this paper contributes by compiling an extensive dataset of secondary data 
on the characteristics of labour markets and welfare systems. 
The following structure informs the remainder of the paper. The second section presents the 
theoretical framework combining the resource theory of political participation and the insider-
outsider theory of employment to build a micro-macro model of young citizens’ political 
participation. The third section presents the research design, the operationalization, and the 
methodology employed in the empirical analyses. The following section reports the empirical results, 
while the concluding section critically discusses the results. 
2. Theoretical framework 
In the wake of the resource theory of political participation, many studies have advocated the 
centrality of resources for political participation (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995). The low 
participation levels of young citizens appear symptomatic of a comparatively lower endowment with 
politically relevant resources. The persistence of turnout differences between countries and elections, 
however, calls for an extension of the theoretical horizon beyond mere individual accounts of the 
relationship between resources and political participation. To this end, this paper proposes a micro-
macro model of young citizens’ political participation by bringing together individual – the resource 
model of political participation – and context level – the outsider-insider theory of employment – 
accounts of the relevance and distribution of socioeconomic resources between countries and 
elections. More precisely, the theoretical framework singles out two context factors – the labour 
market and the welfare system – whose (institutional) arrangements control the distribution and 
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redistribution of, and level disparities in, resources between outsiders and insiders whilst promoting 
electoral participation.  
2.1 A resource theory of young citizens’ electoral participation 
Informed by the resource model of political participation, young citizens’ low turnout, has been linked 
to their comparatively lower endowment with resources facilitating coordinated action (Brady, Verba, 
and Schlozman 1995; Putnam 1993, 2000; Teorell, Sum, and Tobiasen 2007; Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady 1995). This strand of literature has focused predominantly on socioeconomic resources 
encompassing human, social, and physical forms of capital. The former refers to cognitive skills 
acquired mainly through education, while the latter two include social skills, material resources, 
social networks and relationships, and social connections facilitating coordinated actions (Coleman 
1988, 2000; Field 2003; Putnam 1993, 2000). According to the resource model of political 
participation, the availability of these socioeconomic resources promotes political participation 
because it enables individuals to become informed and to better address the complexities posed by 
the political system and the electoral proceedings, while simultaneously bringing them closer to 
situations of political relevance and social networks which mobilize them into political action (Brady, 
Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Marien, Hooghe, and Quintelier 2010).  
Nowadays, individuals derive their sustenance primarily from being included in the labour market 
(Betcherman 2012; Pixely 1993).1 The acquisition of resources and social integration, thus, is linked 
with employment (Lorenzini and Giugni 2012), which in turn positively affects political participation. 
Thus, labour market inclusion has positive spill-over effects on political participation (Emmenegger, 
Marx, and Schraff 2015; Pateman 1970; Schur 2003). Conversely, labour market exclusion and 
economic hardship strain political participation (Sandell Pacheco and Plutzer 2008). The linkage 
between (un-)employment and political participation rests on the negative spill-over effects stemming 
from an exclusion from the labour market, i.e. precluding chances of acquiring socioeconomic 
resources and entering social networks (Adman 2008; Pateman 1970 among others). 
The availability of resources and socioeconomic inclusion are pivotal factors in young citizens’ 
political participation because they find themselves in a disadvantageous position. In terms of 
resources availability, their position in the life cycle conditions the availability of specific 
socioeconomic resources, and thereby their participation in politics (Campbell et al. 1960; Lane 1959; 
Milbrath 1965; Nie et al. 1974). Among the current cohorts of young citizens, resources scarcity has 
been exacerbated by globalization trends and by a more general delay in the transition to adulthood, 
which has postponed young people’s entry into the labour market (Garcia-Albacete 2014; Smets 
                                                          
1
  Education, however, is primarily achieved before entering the labour market. 
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2008, 4; Spannring 2008, 34–35). These phenomena have left today's young people in a position of 
comparatively lower socioeconomic integration which in turn negatively affects their electoral 
participation.  
In terms of labour market integration, young individuals are traditionally confronted with a more 
difficult entry into, and easier exclusion from, the labour market, which affects their political 
participation (Eurofond 2012, 83; Robson 2008). The arduous inclusion of young individuals can be 
explained in the terms of the insider-outsider theory of employment. 
2.2 Labour market insiders and outsiders – Levelling the odds 
Two tenets of the insider-outsider  theory of employment introduced by Lindbeck and Snower (1986, 
2001) inform on young citizens’ situation and inclusion in the labour market.  
The first tenet of the insider-outsider theory of employment focuses on the individual level and relates 
the socioeconomic and labour market position of a young citizen with her electoral participation. It 
claims that the work force is divided into insiders and outsiders. Labour market insiders are defined 
by their highly protected jobs, while outsiders do not hold a job (unemployed) or only a minimally 
protected one, e.g. part-time or temporary contracts (Lindbeck and Snower 1986; Lindvall and Rueda 
2014; Rueda 2005; Van der Velden, Welters, and Wolbers 2001). The insider-outsider divide has 
concrete consequences for political participation. For instance, outsiders are more vulnerable to 
unemployment than insiders, which in turn leaves their political participation devoid of key resources 
and mechanisms of political inclusion which form the basis of electoral participation (Almond and 
Verba 1963; Rosenstone 1982; Schur 2003). Besides providing socioeconomic resources central to 
political participation, inclusion in the labour market is also believed to provide pseudo-political 
experiences by means of positive experiences, (political) discussion and mobilization by unions, and 
by taking part in decision making processes in the work place. Furthermore, being active in the labour 
market places individuals closer to, and renders them better aware of political decisions affecting 
them, thereby activating their stakes in politics.  
Inclusion in the labour market, as well as its advantages, are distributed unequally. Thus, the positive 
spill-over effects stemming from labour market and socioeconomic inclusion are also distributed 
unequally over labour (Emmenegger, Marx, and Schraff 2015; Rueda 2005). Young citizens are 
regarded as outsiders who compete for entrance to the labour market with older individuals who are 
already integrated (insiders). Young citizens' disadvantage stems primarily from their lack of work 
experience (Eurofond 2012, 4), but also from their only partial integration into the labour market: 
they are overrepresented among holders of temporary and part-time contracts (Eurofond 2012, 14–
17; OECD 2010). 
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The second tenet of the insider-outsider theory relates the socioeconomic and labour market position 
of an individual to labour market characteristics. It holds institutional arrangements of the labour 
market accountable for the discontinuity of labour market disadvantages (Rueda 2005; Saint-Paul, 
Bean, and Bertola 1996). Different labour market arrangements generate different incentives and 
possibilities for individuals to become active, integrated in the labour market, and, hence, to resources 
(Esping-Andersen 2001; Makszin and Schneider 2010; Saint-Paul 1996). Context factors, 
accordingly, control socioeconomic integration and the availability of resources (DiPrete et al. 2001; 
Gangl 2001; Saar, Unt, and Kogan 2008), meaning that young citizens' labour market integration 
varies between countries and over time as a function of the openness of the labour market towards 
them (Eurofond 2012; Spannring 2008, 34–35) 
In light of these observations, I argue that institutional and practical arrangements guaranteeing a 
more equal access to resources foster electoral participation among younger citizens. More precisely, 
the paper singles out two context factors whose institutional arrangements control the distribution and 
redistribution of resources: the labour market and the welfare system. Both are expected to level 
disparities in resources but at different points in time. Integration into the labour market can be 
conceived of as the primary source of sustenance (Betcherman 2012; Makszin and Schneider 2010; 
Pixely 1993), while the welfare system functions as a supplement (secondary source of sustenance) 
when the vital integration into the labour market has failed (Andersen and Jensen 2002; Bergh 2005; 
Hammer 2002; Pixely 1993; Plougmann 2002). 
2.3 Levelling the odds – The labour market  
Three aspects and mechanisms of the labour market affect young citizens’ socioeconomic inclusion 
and their political participation.  
The first aspect of the labour market focuses on the legal provisions regulating the access to, 
and the security and protection of employment in a specific country.  
Employment protection regulations affect the socioeconomic resources at young citizens’ disposal 
because they affect their entry in the labour market and re-entry after an unemployment spell. 
Employment protection legislation determines the costs for employers of hiring and firing (potential) 
employees. Moreover, it influences the objective and perceived chances young citizens have of (re-
)entering the labour market. Previous research on the effects of employment protection has focused 
mainly on the overall legislation protection and job security (Messacar 2014; Rueda 2006; Schneider 
and Makszin 2011; Schwander and Hausermann 2013 among others). With regard to young citizens, 
it is vital to distinguish between two types of employment, regular and temporary contracts, as these 
employment statuses differ in their assessment of employment protection. Young citizens 
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increasingly fall into the latter category of employment arrangement, namely temporary contracts 
(Baranowska and Gebel 2010; Noelke 2011). Regular contracts are standard types of employment 
arrangements retaining employees on an unlimited time basis, as opposed to the fixed-term basis 
characteristic of non-standard employment arrangements, such as temporary contracts (Kalleberg 
2000).  
High regulation levels for regular contracts ensure a high job security and fortify the socioeconomic 
position of employees because they reduce the chances of being laid off. Labour market insiders, 
thus, profit from higher levels of legislative protection. In contrast, labour market outsiders 
experience backlash from higher levels of employment regulations because it diminishes their 
chances of being hired. Faced with higher firing costs, employers will be less inclined to employ new 
personnel or to fire current employees (Van der Velden, Welters, and Wolbers 2001). 
Fairly common among young citizens, temporary contracts offer more flexible employment 
arrangements for employers. Temporary contracts have two antithetical implications for young 
citizens. On the one hand, because of their flexibility, they allow an easier entry into the labour market 
or re-entry after an unemployment spell. On the other hand, the socioeconomic conditions offered by 
temporary contracts are sub-optimal from a political participation perspective because they move 
young people towards fixed-term jobs, and induce the labour market to stall (Gangl 2003; Gregg and 
Mannig 1997). 
Accordingly, I expect higher levels of employment protection to foster the overall electoral 
participation among young citizens: 
H1a: Higher levels of employment protection foster the electoral participation of young citizens.  
However, I expect young labour market insiders and outsiders to react differently to different labour 
market arrangements: 
H1b: Restrictive labour market arrangements depress the electoral participation of young 
outsiders.  
H1c: Restrictive labour market arrangements foster the electoral participation of young insiders.  
The second mechanism influencing young citizens’ inclusion in the labour market focuses on 
the degree of intervention in wage bargaining and setting, and the market power of labour market 
insiders (Lindbeck and Snower 2001). The degree of intervention in wage bargaining and setting is 
affected by the distribution of market power among the employers (firms), insiders, outsiders, and 
other external actors. Three factors determine the degree of intervention in the labour market and 
market power of insiders. First, to the extent that the bargaining of wages takes place within a 
decentralized system – firms deciding on their own – newcomers will be systematically excluded 
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from the bargain and prevented from entering the labour market (Van der Velden, Welters, and 
Wolbers 2001). Second, when government plays only a small role in setting wages, chances of young 
people’s integration decrease (Schneider and Makszin 2011) because governmental forces are less 
likely to intervene and introduce policies favourable to young citizens. Third, labour market insiders 
profit from the intervention of unions as they primarily promote the interests of their members 
(Lindbeck and Snower 2001). Thus, high levels of union membership may discourage employers 
from firing current employees and from hiring labour market entrants (Makszin and Schneider 2010; 
Schneider and Makszin 2011). Furthermore, a the high degree of unionization contributes to 
achieving higher salaries for labour market insiders (Lindbeck and Snower 2001): 
H2a: Higher levels of labour market intervention foster the electoral participation of young citizens. 
H2b: Higher levels of labour market intervention foster the electoral participation of young outsiders.  
H2c: Higher levels of labour market intervention foster the electoral participation of young insiders.  
The third mechanism focuses on the parity of inclusion in the labour market and analyses the 
empirical realization of the insider-outsider divide between young and old citizens (Van der Velden, 
Welters, and Wolbers 2001). In other words, this paper investigates to what extent young citizens are 
pushed into less than full employment arrangements. Inequality and employment traps are fostered 
when young citizens are employed on a part-time and/or temporary contract basis, or excluded from 
the labour market altogether (Eurofond 2012; OECD 2010). 
H3a: Higher levels of labour market divide (labour market in practice) depress the electoral 
participation of young citizens. 
H3b: Higher levels of labour market divide (labour market in practice) depress the electoral 
participation of young outsiders.  
H3c: Higher levels of labour market divide (labour market in practice) foster the electoral 
participation of young insiders.  
Figure 1 below schematises the effects and the corresponding hypotheses of labour market 
characteristics on young citizens’ electoral participation. It outlines the direct (solid arrow) and the 
moderating effect (dashed arrows) of the three dimensions on labour market insiders (working young 
citizens, educational attainment) and outsiders’ (unemployed, in education) proclivity to participate 
in elections. 





Figure 1: Labour market characteristics’ effect on young citizens’ electoral participation 
2.4 Levelling labour outsiders’ odds – The welfare system  
Labour market outsiders, as discussed in the previous section, routinely participate less than insiders. 
The position of young citizens as outsiders, however, does not necessarily always translate directly 
into an absence from the political scene. Alternative resources outlets can counteract or cancel out 
the instability resulting from labour market exclusion. The welfare system, for instance, works as a 
moderator in the case of political participation to the extent that it manages to provide adequate 
resources substitutes (Plougmann 2002, 18) and counterbalance the negative externalities of labour 
market exclusion (Rector and Lauber 1995). Accordingly, young citizens’ socioeconomic exclusion 
is less acute in countries with a comparatively more generous and open welfare system. At the same 
time, young citizens’ exclusion weighs less on their political participation, thereby fostering their 
electoral participation. In other words, a young individual experiencing labour market exclusion or 
low socioeconomic endowment will be more likely to participate politically in a country with a 
generous and accessible welfare regime than her peer living in country with a stricter welfare system.  
Countries follow different types of welfare regimes, as suggested by Esping-Andersen's (1990) 
tripartite classification of welfare systems' degree of "decommodification". Indeed, European 
countries offer different degrees of protection through their social security nets in terms of social 
spending, benefits generosity, and eligibility requirements (Makszin and Schneider 2010; Schneider 
and Makszin 2011; Starke and Obinger 2009; Venn 2012). Accordingly, young citizens' 
empowerment and their electoral participation will be higher whenever welfare systems are more 
generous towards young citizens in terms of both the access to (eligibility) and quantity (income 
substitution) of their welfare safety nets.  
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Initial evidence supports the argument that the generosity of the welfare system evens out inequalities 
by increasing spending on social protection (Radcliff 1992). However, previous research on the 
effects of welfare generosity has also formulated cautionary notes about the posited positive effect 
on re-entry in the labour market (Halla and Lackner 2010; Layard, Nickell, and Jackman 1994; 
Lindbeck 1995a, 1995b; Messacar 2014). Decommodification can have counteractive effects on 
individuals’ need to get back into employment and their political participation. Confronted with the 
choice of going back to work or continuing to receive unemployment benefits, generous 
unemployment benefits might tip the balance in favour of continued unemployment (Lindbeck 1995a, 
1995b). This decision might subsequently be reflected in an electoral abstention given that the 
individual’s needs have been met, and no further motive to engage with politics exists. I argue that 
the motivation to participation or not in politics among labour market outsiders is shaped by the ease 
of access to unemployment benefits. For instance, countries vary both in terms of the generosity and 
the ease of access to unemployment benefits. Employment and contribution conditions regulate the 
access to and discriminate between the recipients of unemployment benefits. Lower employment 
and/or contribution conditions would allow young citizens easier access to unemployment benefits. 
Accordingly, more inclusive and generous welfare settings are expected to directly and indirectly 
affect young citizens’ electoral participation (see Figure 2 below for a schematic summary): 
H2a: The more inclusive the institutional arrangements of the welfare system are, the more likely a 
young citizen will participate in a national election. 
H2b: More inclusive welfare settings promote the electoral participation of young outsiders.  
Figure 2 schematises the direct (solid arrow) and the indirect effect (dashed arrow) of the welfare 








Welfare system generosity 
Welfare system access 
Figure 2: Welfare systems characteristics’ effect on young citizens’ electoral participation 
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3. Research design 
To investigate the electoral participation of young citizens the analysis made use of individual level 
information collected in six rounds of the European Social Survey (2013). The analysis rests on 
survey data compiled for 33398 individuals under the age of 30 referring to 70 different elections.2,3 
The cut-off point for considering a respondent as young was set at 30 years old following Plutzer's 
(2002) finding, according to which the habit of voting is set within the first three voting occasions.4  
3.1 Operationalization 
Dependent variable 
Young citizens’ electoral participation constitutes the dependent variable of the analysis and refers to 
young citizens’ participation in national legislative elections. Electoral participation was 
operationalised at the individual level by means of a dummy variable reporting whether the 
respondent had voted or not in the last national election.5  
Explanatory variables – Labour market and welfare system characteristics 
The key independent variables – the labour market and the welfare system – were located at the 
context level.  
Labour market characteristics 
The strength of the insider-outsider divide in the labour market was analysed over three dimensions. 
The first dimension was measured using two labour market characteristics. First, the indexes on 
employment protection for temporary jobs (EPT), and the employment protection of regular contract 
jobs (EPR), as proposed by the OECD (2014, 2016), informed on the hiring and firing costs faced by 
employers. High employment protection confronts employers with highly protected employees and 
higher firing costs, while outsiders face higher entry obstacles. Information on the EPT and EPR 
indexes were primarily provided by the OECD (2016a). Data for Central and Eastern European 
countries was based on information provided by Eamets and Masso (2004) and Muravyev (2010), 
while information for Iceland is from Sigurdsson and Sigurdardottir (2012).6  
                                                          
2  If not otherwise stated, the operationalization of individual level variables was based on data collected by the European 
Social Survey (2013). More information on the used variables and their operationalisation can be found in Table D. 1 
in Appendix D. 
3
  Individuals were attributed to a specific election by comparing the date of the interview with the date of the last 
election.  
4  Countries vary with respect to the length of the electoral term. For the sake of the analysis, a four year electoral term 
was adopted. Citizens qualify as young until 12 years after enfranchisement, thus until the age of 30.  
5  Summary statistics can be found in Table A. 2 in Appendix A. 
6  For more information on the EPR and EPT legislation, see Table A. 1 in Appendix A. 
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The second labour market mechanism was operationalised by measuring the level at which wage 
coordination takes place, to what extent government is involved in wage coordination, and the union 
membership density. Information on these variables was provided by the database on Institutional 
Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS) 
compiled by Visser (2015), and from the Democracy Barometer (2016) dataset.7 
The third aspect, the de facto realisation and specificity of the labour market divide to young people 
was measured on the basis of three indicators: 
a) Difference in the occurrence of temporary contracts between young and old (%) (EUROSTAT 
2016c) 
b) Difference in occurrence of unemployment between young and old (%) (EUROSTAT 2016d) 
c) Young people not in employment, education or training (NEET) (%) (EUROSTAT 2016e) 
Information on both aspects of the labour market was reduced by means of factor analysis (see Table 
A. 3). The predicted scores for each context group are displayed in Figure B. 5 and Figure B. 6 in 
Appendix B, respectively. 
Welfare system characteristics 
The generosity of the welfare system was also expected to positively affect young citizens’ electoral 
participation. Two dimensions of the welfare system were of interest: the generosity in terms of 
spending and the eligibility rules governing access to unemployment relief measures. The first 
dimension was captured by means of the social expenditure for young persons. Following Boersch-
Supan and Nisticò (2007), expenditures on education, unemployment, and family/child (all as 
percentage of the GDP) were considered to be primarily directed towards young people. Information 
on these expenditures was compiled from EUROSTAT (2016b). In addition, this dimension was also 
operationalized by means of the formal rules governing the generosity of unemployment relief 
measures. To this end, data on the duration of unemployment benefits (in months), the net 
replacement rate, the waiting period required before entering the unemployment benefit programme, 
and the percentage of GDP devoted to active labour market policies was collected. Information was 
obbtained from the OECD (2016a), Van Vliet and Caminada (2012), Social Security Administration 
(2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014), and EUROSTAT (2016). Factor analysis was applied to reduce 
the information (see Table A. 3) and the predicted scores are graphically displayed in Figure B. 7 in 
Appendix B. The second dimension was measured by means of the employment and contribution 
requirements required to be eligible for unemployment benefits. This measure was based on 
information provided by country reports compiled by the OECD (2016d) and the Social Security 
                                                          
7  For more information on the ICTWSS database, please consult the ICTWSS codebook (Visser 2015a). 
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Administration (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014), and was computed using a weighted ratio of 
required employment and contribution days (EC index).8  
Moderated variables 
The theoretical framework distinguishes between the direct and indirect effects of the two context 
factors. Indirect effects are expected for labour market insiders and labour market outsiders.  
Labour market insiderness or outsiderness was operationalised on the basis of two individual level 
variables capturing the status of a young citizen and his vulnerability to disadvantage on the labour 
market (Emmenegger, Marx, and Schraff 2015): occupational status and educational attainment.  
Occupational status was operationalised based on the survey participants’ responses to a question 
about their main occupational activity in the seven days prior to the interview. Three dummy variables 
capture whether the respondent’s status was unemployed, working, or in education. The second 
moderating variable of interest to the analysis is education. Operationalised as the highest level of 
education attained by the respondent, the variable informs on individuals’ educational attainment on 
a five category-scale, as proposed by the ISCED 1997 classification (UIS 2012) and contemplated 
the following categories “less than lower secondary, “lower secondary”, “secondary”, “post-
secondary, not tertiary”, and “tertiary or higher”. 9 Young survey respondents affirming to being 
currently employed or having a comparatively higher education were considered labour market 
insiders, whereas unemployed and young citizens currently in education were treated as labour market 
outsiders.  
Control variables 
The analysis also controlled, further, for additional explanatory factors for turnout. At the individual 
level, a dummy for female respondent controls for gender differences. Three dummies – political 
interest, being close to a political party, and trust in the national parliament – control for the political 
affinity of the respondent. At the country level, a dummy for compulsory voting and the turnout of 
citizens aged more than 30 inform on the political participation culture in a given country and election.  
3.2 Methodology 
The analysis of young citizens’ electoral participation relied on a series of hierarchical logit models 
allowing within-cluster dependency among individuals (Rabe-Heshket and Skrondal 2008, 51), and 
                                                          
8  The scores for the EC Index are displayed and scored against the generosity of unemployment benefits in Figure B. 8 
in Appendix B. The four quadrants inform on four broad groups of countries based on a combination of low and high 
values on the two dimensions of unemployment generosity and ease of access to unemployment benefits.  
9  ISCED: International Standard Classification of Education. 
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for the data’s hierarchical structure to be accounted for (Bickel 2007; Hox 2010, 4–11). Concretely, 
context factors’ direct effects on electoral participation were assessed by means of random intercept 
models, and the indirect effects by means of random slope models (cross-level interactions) for the 
occupational status dummies (unemployment, in education, working) and educational attainment. 
Furthermore, as the obtained interaction coefficient only expresses the marginal effect for the case in 
which the moderating variable takes its mean value (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006), the marginal 
effects were re-estimated and graphically represented.10 
4. Empirical results 
The paper focused on the socioeconomic position of a young citizen and the socioeconomic context 
– the labour market and the welfare system – to explain differences in young citizens’ electoral 
participation occurring between elections and between groups of young citizens (labour market 
insiders and outsiders).  
Descriptive evidence from 70 European national legislative elections between 2001 and 2012 showed 
that differences exist in the electoral participation of young citizens (Figure B. 1 in Appendix B). The 
highest turnout was found in Belgian national elections, followed closely by Denmark and Sweden, 
while the lowest turnouts were encountered in Lithuania, Czech Republic, and Estonia, followed 
closely by Switzerland and the United Kingdom.11 The multilevel analysis attributed 13.6 percent of 
the variance to the context level (Table A. 4 in Appendix A)12, and found 55 out of 70 elections to 
significantly deviate from the average observation (Figure B. 2 in Appendix B).  
The socioeconomic position of a young citizen as a labour market insider or outsider influenced her 
electoral participation (see Figure 3 below).13  
Being unemployed or still in education precluded young citizens from accessing socioeconomic 
resources tied to the labour market and cutailed their electoral participation. The extent to which being 
a labour market insider or outsider represented an advantage or a disadvantage was largely context 
dependent, as indicated by the significant random slopes for the individual level markers.14 For 
example, unemployment curtailed electoral participation more in Germany (2009) than in Spain 
(2004) or Greece (2009).  
                                                          
10  All empirical analyses were carried out using STATA 12.1’s xtmelogit command, graphical representations are based 
on the margins command (fixed part only) and marginsplot commands. 
11  Belgium implements compulsory voting. 
12  Intraclass correlation: ρ = σ2u0 / (σ2u0 + σ2e) = 0.519/(0. 519+3.29) = 0.136 
13   Coefficients based on the estimates reported in Model 2 of Table A. 4 Appendix A. The remaining control variables 
also behaved as expected. 
14  Table A. 4 in Appendix A for the estimation results and Figure B. 3 in Appendix B for their graphic depiction.  




Figure 3: The effect of labour market insiderness and outsiderness on young 
citizens’ electoral participation (95% & 90%-CI)15 
To explain these differences and context dependencies, the analysis reverted to two context factors 
controlling the access to, and redistribution of, socioeconomic resources: labour market and welfare 
system.  
Labour market characteristics and young citizens’ electoral participation 
The first sets of hypotheses focussed on the effects of three labour market characteristics – 
employment protection legislation, government intervention in the labour market, and the specificity 
of the labour market insider-outsider divide. Figure 4 (below) graphically depicts their direct effects 
on levels of electoral participation. In line with the theoretical expectations, the higher employment 
protection associated with regular contracts (EPR) provided a positive environment for young citizens 
to participate in elections. Conversely, lowering the firing costs faced by employers and increasing 
job insecurity had the side effect of lowering the electoral participation of young citizens. The 
protection of temporary contracts (EPT) did not have a standalone effect on electoral participation, 
but moderated the effect of the level of protection of regular contracts (EPR). The wider applicability 
and security of temporary contracts (higher EPT) diminished the positive contribution of higher EPR 
levels to electoral participation. Although guaranteeing easier access to the labour market, the fixed 
nature of the contract introduced a degree of job insecurity that kept young citizens away from the 
                                                          
15  The coefficient plot graphically displays the empirical estimates of Model 2 of Table A. 4 Appendix A. Coefficients 
to the right of the vertical 0-line denote a positive effect of the individual level determinant on electoral participation, 
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voting booth. Contrary to theoretical expectations, a higher degree of intervention of the state in the 
labour market (LM intervention) did not mobilize young citizens to vote. A stronger mobilization 
effect was achieved by the specificity of the insider-outsider divide to young citizens (LM in practice). 
 
Figure 4: Direct effects of labour market characteristics on young citizens’ electoral 
participation (95 & 90%-CI)16 
The index informed on whether the insider-outsider labour market divide was more pronounced 
among young citizens or not. In countries where most, and specifically young citizens, were excluded 
from the labour market, electoral participation was higher than in settings with a weak or broader 
based labour market divide. Overall, labour market characteristics’ direct effects on young citizens’ 
overall level of electoral participation were limited. Turning to the cross-level interactions revealed 
substantial moderating effects on different sub-groups of young citizens, which were largely in line 
with theoretical expectations.17 Higher EPR levels reinforced the effect of individual factors on 
electoral participation (Figure 5, first row).18  
  
                                                          
16  Figure 1 graphically depicts the coefficients reported in the first model of Table A. 5 (EPR), Table A. 6 (EPT), Table 
A. 7 (interaction EPR*EPT), Table A. 8 (labour market intervention), and Table A. 9 (labour market in practice) in 
Appendix A.  
17  The estimates results for the cross-level interactions are reported in models “RS work” through “RS in education” in 
Table A. 5 (EPR), Table A. 6 (EPT), Table A. 7 (interaction EPR*EPT), Table A. 8 (labour market intervention), and 
Table A. 9 (labour market in practice) in Appendix A. 
18  Marginal effects based on the estimates of models “Z work” to “Z in education” in Table A. 5 in Appendix A. No 
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Figure 5: Marginal effects of labour market status markers (occupational statuses and education) on electoral participation as the employment protection of 
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Figure 6: Marginal effects of labour market status markers (occupational statuses and education) on electoral participation as the degree of intervention in the 
labour market changes (90%-CI) 
 
Figure 7: Marginal effects of labour market status markers (occupational statuses and education) on electoral participation as the insider-outsider divide in the 
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Unemployed young citizens were even less likely to vote in national elections in countries with 
stricter employment regulations and less accessible labour markets. Conversely, the higher levels of 
protection offered by regular contracts fostered voting among young workers employed under these 
terms, thereby cementing the consequences of the insider-outsider divide for electoral participation. 
The moderation effect of EPT differed substantially from that exerted by the EPR level (Figure 5, 
second row).19 Broadening the applicability and increasing the protection of temporary jobs balanced 
out the negative effects of being a labour market outsider and increased outsider participation. 
Currently unemployed young citizens were less likely to abstain in countries with more lenient rules 
about temporary contracts. In a similar fashion, the participatory advantage highly educated young 
citizens held over their counterparts declined in elections in countries with a higher EPT level. 
Similarly to the regulation of regular contracts, a higher EPT level fostered the participation of 
workers, but it left students largely unaffected by it. Lastly, the moderating effect of one dimension 
of employment protection appeared to depend on the level of protection of the other dimension 
(Figure 5, third row).20 Securing regular contracts lead unemployed young citizens to abstain only in 
countries granting very low protection to temporary jobs. Increasing the security and protection of 
regular contracts proved especially beneficial to workers’ voting turnouts in countries that extended 
the same level of protection to fixed term contracts. The relevance of additional education was more 
marked in countries characterised by mixed levels of employment protection (high EPR, low EPT). 
The same mix, however, proved beneficial to the participation of young citizens still in education.  
The degree of intervention in the labour market moderated the effect of being a labour market insider 
or outsider.21 The electoral participation of the young unemployed suffered less in countries with a 
comparatively high degree of intervention in the labour market, but proved detrimental to the 
participation of students (Figure 6). Higher degrees of intervention had also had positive spill-over 
effects on the participation of young workers No effect was detected for students, whose participation 
remained largely insensitive to the level of intervention. 
The specificity and intensity of the insider-outsider divide (see Figure 7) acted as a catalyst 
for the electoral participation of the young unemployed. In a context of strong labour market divide, 
being unemployed made no difference, insiders and outsiders were similarly likely to show up at the 
polls, much like young citizens with a low or a high educational attainment level. While young 
workers also profited from a stronger insider-outsider divide, it kept students away from the voting 
booths. 
                                                          
19  Marginal effects based on the estimates of models “Z work” through “Z in education” in Table A. 6 in Appendix A.  
20  Marginal effects based on the estimates of models “Z work” through “Z in education” in Table A. 7 in Appendix A.  
21
  Table A. 8 in Appendix A reports the estimation results of the direct and moderating effects of the degree of 
intervention in the labour market.  
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In sum, a positive labour market experience, steered by higher levels of employment 
protection and intervention in the labour market, fostered the electoral participation of young citizens. 
While young workers constantly profited from a more positive labour market environment, the 
changes in arrangements implied trade-offs for other groups, for instance students and currently 
unemployed young citizens. The second part of the analysis focused on the welfare system and its 
unemployment benefits as an additional measure to specifically target this last group, namely young 
unemployed citizens.  
Welfare system characteristics and young citizens’ electoral participation 
Three characteristics of the welfare system were tested on their contribution to electoral participation: 
the generosity of social protection expenditures targeting young citizens, and the generosity and 
accessibility of unemployment benefits.22 The results found the welfare system to mainly affect 
electoral participation via its moderating effect on unemployment, only the generosity of the welfare 
system affected participation directly. Contrary to the theoretical expectations, young citizens living 
in countries spending more on social protection programmes targeted at the young, were less likely 
to vote. With their needs catered for by the welfare system in their needs, the young unemployed 
lacked motivation to participate in elections, a phenomenon which may indicate the existence of a so 
called “welfare trap”. The examination of the moderating effects provided further proof of its 
existence (see Figure 8 below).23  
The young unemployed living in a country with a more generous welfare system were less likely to 
vote (Figure 8, upper-left graph). The “unemployment trap” became even more concrete when 
examining the accessibility and generosity of unemployment systems. More generous unemployment 
benefits appeared to cement the abstention of young unemployed people (Figure 8, bottom-left 
graph). Stricter accessibility rules (EC Index), on the other hand, mobilized unemployed young 
citizens to vote (Figure 8, upper-right graph). The combination of these last two effects cemented the 
existence of an “unemployment trap” concerning electoral participation (Figure 8, bottom-right 
graph). Interacting the generosity with the accessibility of unemployment benefits, showed that 
unemployment leads to abstention only in countries with very generous, and at the same time easily 
accessible unemployment benefits. Increasing the employment and contribution requirements, and de 
facto making the access to unemployment more difficult, led the young unemployed to start voting, 
and cancelled out the previously observed participation gap between labour market insiders and 
outsiders.  
                                                          
22  Estimations results to be found in Table A. 10 in Appendix A. 
23
  Marginal effects based on the estimates of the interaction terms in Table A. 10 in Appendix A. 




Figure 8: Marginal effect of unemployment on electoral participation as welfare characteristics change 
(90%-CI) 
To sum up, the empirical results indicate that the welfare system and, in particular, unemployment 
benefits did not act as a panacea solution to the low electoral participation of young unemployed 
citizens. On the contrary, in line with previous research (Lindbeck 1995a, 1995b among others), only 
an unemployment system with carefully designed accessibility rules, i.e. higher employment and 
contribution requirements, hinders young unemployed citizens from falling into an “unemployment 
trap” and fosters their political participation,  
Robustness checks 
The empirical results underwent several robustness checks to test their sensitivity to alternative 
specifications and their specificity to young citizens.  
The first set of robustness checks implemented alternative definitions of young citizens – under the 
age of 25 (robustness check 1a) and under the age of 35 (robustness check 1b) – whose empirical 
results proved largely resistant.24,25 In the case of citizens under 25, labour market and welfare system 
characteristics yielded similarly significant effects to the original specification, albeit slightly smaller 
ones. The negative effect of unemployment was substantially smaller, which can be partially 
                                                          
24  See Table C. 1 through Table C. 7 and Figure C. 1 through Figure C. 4 in Appendix C for robustness checks 1a 
(enfranchised citizens under the age of 25).  
25  See Table C. 8 through Table C. 14, and Figure C. 5 through Figure C. 5 through Figure C. 8 in Appendix C for 
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explained by the higher percentage of young people still in (tertiary) education. In the case of young 
citizens aged 35 years of age the effects reveals were quite similar to the original specification in the 
case of the examined context factors. The main differences related to the increased significance of 
occupational statuses and educational attainment. Overall, the negative effect of unemployment and 
being in education became even more substantial, while higher educational attainment had a stronger 
positive effect on electoral participation.  
The second set of robustness checks tested the specificity of the results to young citizens by re-running 
the analysis for enfranchised citizens older than 30 and comparing it to the original analysis.26 The 
comparison revealed substantial differences in how labour market and welfare system characteristics 
affect the electoral participation of the two age groups. Unemployed older citizens were sensitive in 
their electoral participation to low levels of protection, especially regarding temporary contracts. In a 
labour market favouring regular over temporary contracts, unemployed older citizens profited, while 
the employed were less likely to vote. Intervention in the labour market and the degree of realisation 
of the insider-outsider divide played a stronger role among older citizens, with the exception of those 
currently employed. With regard to the welfare system, the main difference related to the generosity 
of the unemployment benefits. Increasing the generosity of unemployment benefits while holding 
everything else equal did not cause an “unemployment trap”, but instead mobilized older unemployed 
citizens to participate in elections. Differences were also detected for characteristics of the welfare 
system and unemployment benefits.  
The experiences of young and older citizens with labour market and welfare system arrangements 
diverged. Employment protection regulations appeared to affect mainly young citizens’ electoral 
participation. This indicates that they more strongly depended on the ease of (re-)access to the labour 
market in a situation of unemployment. While, generous and easily accessible unemployment benefits 
appeared to constitute an “unemployment trap” for younger citizens, they promoted the participation 
of older citizens. These two divergences demonstrate the need for and relevance of a youth-specific 
approach to (re-)designing labour markets and welfare systems in order to foster the electoral 
participation of young citizens.  
  
                                                          
26  See Table C. 15 to Table C. 21, and Figure C. 9 to Figure C. 12 in Appendix C for robustness check 2 (enfranchised 
citizens over the age of 30). 
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Case evidence – Young insiders and outsiders electoral participation in the Czech Republic, 
Germany, and Sweden 
This section investigates case evidence from three countries – the Czech Republic, Germany, and 
Sweden – and focuses on the relationship between labour market and welfare system characteristics, 
and the electoral participation of labour market insiders and outsiders over time (see Figure 9 
below).27 
The Czech Republic’s labour market in 2002 favoured the protection of regular over 
temporary contracts, allowed for only a comparatively low degree of intervention, and saw a clear 
divide in participation between labour market insiders and outsiders. Following the changes in 
employment protection leading to a higher protection of temporary contracts (between 2006 and 
2007), a lower protection of regular contracts (shorter notices, less generous severance pays, and a 
redefinition of an unfair dismissal in 2004-2005), and a decline in government intervention in wage 
setting (2003-2004), both outsiders and insiders experienced a marked increase in political 
participation, especially in the 2010 election. Changes in the welfare system appeared to also 
influence the positive electoral participation trend. Stricter access requirements due to stricter 
contribution rules (2003-2004) combined with higher unemployment benefits, fostered the political 
participation of the young unemployed.  
In Germany, employment protection and welfare system reforms conspired to discourage 
electoral participation among labour market outsiders. The stronger protection of regular contracts, 
and weaker protection of temporary contracts in the aftermath of the 2002 election, did not erode the 
electoral participation of labour market outsiders in the 2005 election, and only marginally affected 
insiders. The subsequent election, however, registered a marked decrease in voting among 
unemployed citizens and only a slight increase among other labour market outsiders. The drop 
coincided with a reform of the German unemployment benefit system, which introduced stricter 
contribution and employment rules required to access unemployment benefits. Between the 2005 and 
2009 elections, the unemployment system went from a comparatively generous and easily accessible 
to a more restrictive and less generous unemployment benefit regime.  
Another solution led Sweden to successfully increase the already comparatively high electoral 
participation of the young unemployed. While the labour market arrangements remained quite stable, 
with the exception of the decline in protection of temporary contracts (less applicability and longer 
durations) in the aftermath of the 2006 election, the drop in the generosity of unemployment benefits 
                                                          
27  For the sake of visualization and comparability, the explanatory variables were standardized over observations to 
range between 0 (minimum value) and 100 (maximum value). 
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between 2007 and 2008 (shorter duration of unemployment benefits and lower net replacement rates) 
was followed by an increase in electoral participation among young unemployed citizens. 
 
Figure 9: Labour market and welfare system context factors and the electoral turnout of young citizens over 
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The objective of this paper was to explain the differences in electoral participation occurring between 
young citizens in different countries and elections. To this end, the paper proposed a micro-macro 
theoretical framework modelling participation in national elections on the characteristics and 
arrangements of the labour market and the welfare system. Building on the resource theory of political 
participation (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995), and the insider-outsider theory of employment 
(Lindbeck and Snower 1986, 2001), differences in electoral participation were modelled on different 
levels of labour market integration and welfare system generosity. I expected young citizens to 
participate more in countries with a higher protection of employment, and a higher level of inclusion 
towards young citizens in terms of labour meaning that the insider-outsider divide would not replicate 
along the age divide, and would have fewer negative spill-over effects on electoral participation. 
Conversely, I expected labour market outsiders – unemployed young citizens – to be less impaired in 
their political participation in more generous and accessible welfare system settings, meaning that 
labour market and welfare system peculiarities were expected to function as levellers and 
redistributors of the socioeconomic resources deemed essential for electoral participation. 
To test these hypotheses, I applied hierarchical logit analyses and analysed the electoral participation 
of young citizens in 70 legislative national elections in European countries. The analyses addressed 
both differences in the participation between countries and elections (random intercepts), as well as 
the moderating effect of context level factors on individual level markers of the insider-outsider 
divide (occupational statuses and educational attainment). The latter were assessed by means of cross-
level interactions between labour market and welfare system characteristics, and individual level 
determinants of electoral participation.  
The empirical results showed that more inclusive labour markets fostered young citizens’ electoral 
participation, especially the engagement of labour market outsiders. The regulation of employment 
protection was found to foster the political participation of young citizens. Taking a closer look at the 
regulation of regular and temporary contracts revealed that while stricter regulations of regular 
contracts promoted the electoral participation of labour market insiders (young working citizens), 
simultaneously granting a higher protection to temporary contracts, diminished the tendency to 
abstain among labour market outsiders (unemployed young citizens). The intervention of government 
in the bargaining of salaries, and the union density were only able to explain differences in the 
electoral participation of young workers. Conversely, the investigation of the empirical realisation of 
the insider-outsider divide showed that the widespread occurrence of unemployment and the 
incidence of temporary jobs among young citizens acted as mobilizing factors in the electoral 
participation of young citizens. 
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With respect to the welfare system, more accessible and generous unemployment benefits and a 
generally more generous welfare system were expected to alleviate the effects of young citizens’ 
lower socioeconomic endowment. The empirical analysis revealed a more complex relationship 
between the welfare system and young citizens’ electoral participation than theoretically expected. 
Welfare characteristics do not contribute to explaining turnout differences between countries, but 
instead work via cross-level interactions to influence the electoral participation of the unemployed. 
Contrary to theoretical expectations, more generous unemployment benefits and welfare systems 
were found to depress the political participation of the unemployed youth. However, this effect only 
held true for young unemployed people with a comparatively easier access to generous 
unemployment benefits. The young unemployed whose road to access to unemployment benefits was 
comparatively more difficult, were indeed mobilized by more generous unemployment benefits.  
Labour market and welfare characteristics contributed to the understanding of turnout 
differences among young citizens. The insider-outsider divide appears to be guided and strengthened 
by the regulations governing the access to the labour market (employment protection legislation) and 
is only partially affected by an increased mobilization when young citizens as a group are primarily 
targeted by unemployment and temporary contracts, e.g. during the economic crisis. Interestingly, 
welfare regimes are only partially capable of supplementing exclusion from the labour market 
(unemployment). For instance, differences in turnout are only cancelled out by generous, but not 
easily accessible, unemployment benefits. This may be an indication of a so-called unemployment 
trap: young citizens caught in unemployment faced with easily available and generous unemployment 
benefits are less likely to mobilize politically.  
The implications of the results for young citizens’ electoral participation are twofold. First, the 
analysis reinforces the role played by the labour market in mobilizing young citizens. Attention, 
however, should not only be paid to the protection of regular contracts, but also to temporary 
contracts. Higher protection of regular contracts strengthens the divide between insiders and outsiders 
by making young outsiders’ perspective of (re-)integration in the labour market even more strenuous. 
Granting higher protection to temporary jobs, although only a partial solution to reintegration in the 
labour market, might alleviate the insider-outsider divide and grant better employment perspectives 
to young citizens. Second, welfare regimes can only partially compensate for a lack of integration in 
the labour market. Thus, efforts should be put on young citizens’ integration into the labour market. 
Achieving better labour market integration, thus, bears consequences for the political participation of 
young citizens and ensures a better representation of their interest and needs in the political decision 
making process.   
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Appendix A - Tables 
 
Table A. 1: Employment Protection Legislation – Methodology (OECD 2014) 
Employment protection legislation 
– Regular contracts  
EPR Individual dismissal of workers 
with regular contracts 
Procedural inconveniences Notification procedures 
Delay to start a notice 
Notice periods and severance pay Notice period after 9 months 
4 years 
20 years 
Severance pay 4 years 
20 years 




Maximum time for claim 
Employment protection legislation 
– Collective dismissals 
EPC Additional costs for collective dismissals Definition of collective dismissal 
Additional notification requirements 
Additional delays involved 
Other special costs to employers 
Employment protection legislation 
– Temporary contracts 
EPT Regulation of temporary contracts Fixed term contracts Valid cases for use of fixed-term contracts 
Maximum number of successive contracts 
Maximum number cumulated duration 
Temporary work agency employment Types of work for which is legal 
Restrictions on number of renewals 
Maximum cumulated duration 
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Table A. 2: Summary statistics 
 Mean St. dev. Min Max 
Voted 0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00 
EPR -0.01 0.66 -1.22 2.17 
EPT 0.02 0.88 -1.42 1.96 
LM intervention -0.00 1.00 -1.39 2.44 
LM in practice 0.00 1.00 -1.68 2.16 
EC Index 0.50 0.20 0.14 1.00 
Generosity unemployment benefits -0.00 1.00 -1.85 2.33 
Welfare generosity 9.09 2.30 5.55 15.04 
Unemployed 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Work 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
In education 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Educ. attainment 0.14 1.09 -2.14 1.86 
Female 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Political interest 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Close to a party 0.47 0.85 0.00 9.00 
Trust in parliament 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Turnout >30 (%) -0.18 8.89 -20.35 15.18 
Compulsory voting 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Observations 33398    
 
Table A. 3: Varimax rotated factor loadings 
Variable Factor Uniqueness 
 
Labour market intervention 
Government intervention 0.6541 0.5722 
Level 0.8833 0.2198 
Union density 0.7151 0.4886 
 
Labour market in practice 
Difference in temporary contracts -0.4355 0.8103 
Difference in unemployment 0.7910 0.3743 
NEET 0.8963 0.1967 
 
Unemployment benefits generosity 
Waiting period -0.5496 0.6979 
Maximum duration unemployment benefits 0.5744 0.6700 
Net replacement rate 0.7730 0.4024 
Expenditures on active labour market policies 0.7097 0.4963 
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Table A. 4: Young citizens’ electoral participation 












Unemployed  -0.297*** -0.296*** -0.290*** -0.303*** -0.302*** 
  (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.064) (0.057) 
Work  0.172*** 0.166** 0.177*** 0.171*** 0.177*** 
  (0.044) (0.052) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
In education  -0.0901+ -0.0923+ -0.0745 -0.0910+ -0.0921 
  (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.065) 
Educ. attainment  0.363*** 0.365*** 0.385*** 0.363*** 0.366*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.013) (0.013) 
Female  0.0977*** 0.0929*** 0.0946*** 0.0974*** 0.0947*** 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Political interest  0.838*** 0.838*** 0.837*** 0.838*** 0.840*** 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Close to a party  0.471*** 0.470*** 0.469*** 0.472*** 0.471*** 
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Trust in parliament  0.319*** 0.317*** 0.314*** 0.318*** 0.317*** 
  (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Turnout >30 (%)  0.0517*** 0.0515*** 0.0505*** 0.0517*** 0.0522*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Compulsory voting  1.013*** 1.013*** 1.087*** 1.007*** 1.042*** 
  (0.178) (0.179) (0.173) (0.187) (0.188) 
Constant 0.767*** -0.0396 -0.0284 -0.0406 -0.0393 -0.0404 
 (0.087) (0.066) (0.067) (0.065) (0.066) (0.067) 
L2 RI -0.328*** -1.019*** -0.988*** -1.033*** -1.014*** -1.006*** 
 (0.088) (0.094) (0.102) (0.095) (0.095) (0.098) 
L1 RS   0.0443*** 0.0138*** 0.0425*** 0.119*** 
   (0.008) (0.002) (0.014) (0.017) 
Covariance   -0.251 0.451** -0.0703 -0.140 
   (0.178) (0.147) (0.262) (0.177) 
N/ N groups 33398/70 33398/70 33398/70 33398/70 33398/70 33398/70 
Log. likelihood -20109.1 -18279.9 -18269.1 -18263.2 -18278.1 -18251.0 
AIC 40238.9 36684.8 36684.1 36672.2 36701.9 36647.8 
BIC 40222.1 36583.8 36566.3 36554.4 36584.1 36530.0 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, RI: Random 
intercept 
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Table A. 5: Employment protection regulation – Regular contracts – and young citizens’ electoral 
participation 










EPR 0.188** 0.159* 0.181** 0.189** 0.182** 
 (0.066) (0.073) (0.065) (0.067) (0.068) 
Unemployed -0.298*** -0.297*** -0.291*** -0.304*** -0.302*** 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.064) (0.057) 
Work 0.170*** 0.163** 0.176*** 0.169*** 0.176*** 
 (0.044) (0.052) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
In education -0.0916+ -0.0931+ -0.0763 -0.0925+ -0.0934 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.065) 
Educ. attainment 0.364*** 0.367*** 0.385*** 0.364*** 0.367*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.013) (0.013) 
Work*EPR  0.0444    
  (0.055)    
Educ. attainment*EPR   0.0325   
   (0.027)   
Unemployed*EPR    -0.0180  
    (0.074)  
In education*EPR     0.0369 
     (0.080) 
Female 0.0971*** 0.0923*** 0.0941*** 0.0970*** 0.0942*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Political interest 0.838*** 0.839*** 0.838*** 0.839*** 0.840*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Close to a party 0.470*** 0.469*** 0.468*** 0.471*** 0.470*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Trust in parliament 0.320*** 0.318*** 0.315*** 0.319*** 0.318*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.0533*** 0.0537*** 0.0522*** 0.0534*** 0.0538*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Compulsory voting 1.005*** 1.013*** 1.069*** 0.994*** 1.031*** 
 (0.169) (0.170) (0.166) (0.177) (0.178) 
Constant -0.0374 -0.0276 -0.0379 -0.0367 -0.0382 
 (0.064) (0.066) (0.064) (0.064) (0.065) 
L2 RI -1.083*** -1.020*** -1.097*** -1.079*** -1.068*** 
 (0.096) (0.104) (0.097) (0.097) (0.100) 
L1 RS  0.0421*** 0.0131*** 0.0426*** 0.119*** 
  (0.008) (0.002) (0.014) (0.017) 
Covariance  -0.341+ 0.409* -0.0460 -0.161 
  (0.174) (0.159) (0.265) (0.179) 
N/N groups 33398/70 33398/70 33398/70 33398/70 33398/70 
Log. likelihood -18276.1 -18265.2 -18259.5 -18274.3 -18247.1 
AIC 36687.6 36697.1 36685.7 36715.2 36660.8 
BIC 36578.2 36562.4 36551.0 36580.6 36526.2 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, 
RI: Random intercept; Z: Random slope variable/moderated variable 
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Table A. 6: Employment protection regulation – Temporary contracts - and young citizens’ 
electoral participation 










EPT -0.00166 -0.0128 0.00467 -0.0106 0.00691 
 (0.056) (0.060) (0.054) (0.056) (0.057) 
Unemployed -0.297*** -0.295*** -0.291*** -0.306*** -0.302*** 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.063) (0.057) 
Work 0.172*** 0.167** 0.175*** 0.172*** 0.177*** 
 (0.044) (0.052) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
In education -0.0901+ -0.0914+ -0.0745 -0.0903+ -0.0928 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.064) 
Educ. attainment 0.363*** 0.366*** 0.385*** 0.363*** 0.366*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.013) (0.013) 
Work*EPT  0.0202    
  (0.043)    
Educ. attainment *EPT   -0.0471*   
   (0.021)   
Unemployed*EPT    0.0866  
    (0.056)  
In education*EPT     -0.0592 
     (0.061) 
Female 0.0977*** 0.0930*** 0.0952*** 0.0964*** 0.0947*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Political interest 0.838*** 0.838*** 0.838*** 0.838*** 0.840*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Close to a party 0.471*** 0.470*** 0.469*** 0.471*** 0.470*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Trust in parliament 0.319*** 0.317*** 0.315*** 0.318*** 0.317*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.0517*** 0.0515*** 0.0502*** 0.0517*** 0.0522*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Compulsory voting 1.014*** 1.017*** 1.064*** 1.006*** 1.045*** 
 (0.186) (0.187) (0.177) (0.193) (0.196) 
Constant -0.0397 -0.0296 -0.0375 -0.0395 -0.0400 
 (0.066) (0.067) (0.065) (0.066) (0.067) 
L2 RI -1.019*** -0.988*** -1.043*** -1.015*** -1.006*** 
 (0.094) (0.102) (0.095) (0.095) (0.098) 
L1 RS  0.0446*** 0.0116*** 0.0395*** 0.118*** 
  (0.008) (0.002) (0.014) (0.016) 
Covariance  -0.249 0.502** -0.0726 -0.141 
  (0.178) (0.151) (0.268) (0.177) 
N/N groups 33398/70 33398/70 33398/70 33398/70 33398/70 
Log. likelihood -18279.9 -18269.0 -18260.4 -18276.8 -18250.5 
AIC 36695.2 36704.7 36687.6 36720.3 36667.7 
BIC 36585.8 36570.1 36552.9 36585.7 36533.1 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, 
RI: Random intercept; Z: Random slope variable/moderated variable 
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Table A. 7: Employment protection regulation – Regular and temporary contracts – and young citizens’ 
electoral participation 
DV: Voted EPR*EPT Z: Work Z: Education Z: Unemployed Z: In education 
Unemployed -0.295*** -0.292*** -0.289*** -0.325*** -0.302*** 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.066) (0.057) 
Work 0.171*** 0.154** 0.176*** 0.172*** 0.176*** 
 (0.044) (0.053) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
In education -0.0906+ -0.0919+ -0.0722 -0.0911+ -0.0649 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.065) 
Educ. attainment 0.363*** 0.366*** 0.401*** 0.363*** 0.367*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) 
Female 0.0978*** 0.0928*** 0.0945*** 0.0967*** 0.0942*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Political interest 0.838*** 0.839*** 0.838*** 0.838*** 0.841*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Close to a party 0.470*** 0.469*** 0.468*** 0.470*** 0.469*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Trust in parliament 0.317*** 0.315*** 0.313*** 0.316*** 0.314*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.0528*** 0.0527*** 0.0526*** 0.0532*** 0.0528*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Compulsory voting 1.039*** 1.041*** 1.043*** 0.996*** 1.026*** 
 (0.165) (0.167) (0.162) (0.173) (0.175) 
EPT -0.0651 -0.0707 -0.0579 -0.0727 -0.0462 
 (0.052) (0.057) (0.050) (0.052) (0.055) 
EPR 0.199** 0.170* 0.186** 0.203** 0.186** 
 (0.065) (0.072) (0.063) (0.065) (0.069) 
EPT*EPR -0.210** -0.245** -0.210** -0.217** -0.179* 
 (0.069) (0.076) (0.066) (0.068) (0.073) 
Work*EPT  0.0118    
  (0.045)    
Work*EPR  0.0436    
  (0.057)    
Work*EPT*EPR  0.0607    
  (0.060)    
Educ. attainment*EPT   -0.0765***   
   (0.019)   
Educ. attainment*EPR   0.0641**   
   (0.023)   
Educ. attainment*EPT*EPR   -0.0792***   
   (0.023)   
Unemployed*EPT    0.112+  
    (0.060)  
Unemployed*EPR    -0.0643  
    (0.079)  
Unemployed*EPT*EPR    0.0737  
    (0.083)  
In education*EPT     -0.0808 
     (0.063) 
In education*EPR     0.0663 
     (0.082) 
In education*EPT*EPR     -0.158+ 
     (0.087) 
Constant -0.00436 0.0125 -0.00193 -0.000240 -0.00584 
 (0.063) (0.065) (0.062) (0.063) (0.065) 
L2 RI -1.166*** -1.119*** -1.205*** -1.174*** -1.117*** 
 (0.098) (0.108) (0.100) (0.100) (0.103) 
L1 RS  0.0407*** 0.00484*** 0.0388*** 0.110*** 
  (0.008) (0.002) (0.014) (0.016) 
Covariance  -0.296 0.167 0.117 -0.294 
  (0.185) (0.248) (0.281) (0.170) 
N/N groups 33398/70 33398/70 33398/70 33398/70 33398/70 
Log. likelihood -18271.2 -18259.7 -18247.6 -18267.2 -18239.7 
AIC 36698.6 36727.8 36703.6 36742.8 36687.8 
BIC 36572.3 36559.5 36535.3 36574.4 36519.4 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, RI: Random 
intercept; Random slope variable/moderated variable   
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Table A. 8: Intervention in the labour market (regulation) and young citizens’ electoral participation 










LM intervention -0.0627 -0.0846 -0.0623 -0.0668 -0.0571 
 (0.069) (0.074) (0.067) (0.070) (0.072) 
Unemployed -0.297*** -0.294*** -0.290*** -0.301*** -0.302*** 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.064) (0.057) 
Work 0.172*** 0.170** 0.177*** 0.172*** 0.177*** 
 (0.044) (0.052) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
In education -0.0898+ -0.0901+ -0.0741 -0.0904+ -0.0927 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.064) 
Educ. attainment 0.364*** 0.366*** 0.385*** 0.363*** 0.366*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.013) (0.013) 
Work*LM intervention  0.0406    
  (0.039)    
Educ. attainment*LM intervention   0.0000860   
   (0.020)   
Unemployed*LM intervention    0.0236  
    (0.053)  
In education*LM intervention     -0.0810 
     (0.055) 
Female 0.0977*** 0.0929*** 0.0945*** 0.0973*** 0.0949*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Political interest 0.838*** 0.839*** 0.837*** 0.838*** 0.840*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Close to a party 0.471*** 0.470*** 0.469*** 0.472*** 0.471*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Trust in parliament 0.319*** 0.318*** 0.315*** 0.319*** 0.318*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.0559*** 0.0560*** 0.0548*** 0.0561*** 0.0571*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Compulsory voting 1.068*** 1.074*** 1.141*** 1.062*** 1.108*** 
 (0.187) (0.190) (0.182) (0.196) (0.200) 
Constant -0.0414 -0.0330 -0.0427 -0.0414 -0.0414 
 (0.066) (0.067) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) 
L2 RI -1.025*** -0.989*** -1.040*** -1.021*** -1.015*** 
 (0.094) (0.103) (0.095) (0.095) (0.098) 
L1 RS  0.0446*** 0.0139*** 0.0426*** 0.118*** 
  (0.008) (0.002) (0.014) (0.016) 
Covariance  -0.272 0.448** -0.0742 -0.133 
  (0.178) (0.146) (0.262) (0.179) 
N/N groups 33398/70 33398/70 33398/70 33398/70 33398/70 
Log. likelihood -18279.5 -18268.2 -18262.7 -18277.5 -18249.4 
AIC 36694.4 36703.0 36692.1 36721.7 36665.4 
BIC 36585.0 36568.3 36557.5 36587.1 36530.7 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, RI: Random 
intercept; Z: Random slope variable/moderated variable 
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Table A. 9: Labour market in practice and young citizens’ electoral participation 
DV: Voted  









LM in practice 0.0764 0.0604 0.0730 0.0631 0.102* 
 (0.048) (0.051) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) 
Unemployed -0.298*** -0.297*** -0.290*** -0.330*** -0.303*** 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.062) (0.057) 
Work 0.173*** 0.166** 0.180*** 0.170*** 0.180*** 
 (0.044) (0.052) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
In education -0.0893+ -0.0935+ -0.0720 -0.0928+ -0.0946 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.063) 
Educ. attainment 0.363*** 0.365*** 0.385*** 0.363*** 0.366*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.013) (0.013) 
Work*LM in practice  0.0296    
  (0.036)    
Educ. Attainment*LM in practice   -0.0319   
   (0.020)   
Unemployed*LM in practice    0.133**  
    (0.048)  
In education*LM in practice     -0.100* 
     (0.050) 
Female 0.0979*** 0.0935*** 0.0955*** 0.0974*** 0.0950*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Political interest 0.839*** 0.840*** 0.839*** 0.840*** 0.841*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Close to a party 0.472*** 0.471*** 0.470*** 0.472*** 0.471*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Trust in parliament 0.321*** 0.319*** 0.316*** 0.318*** 0.318*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.0544*** 0.0544*** 0.0538*** 0.0544*** 0.0555*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Compulsory voting 0.910*** 0.916*** 0.967*** 0.904*** 0.948*** 
 (0.186) (0.187) (0.179) (0.192) (0.193) 
Constant -0.0293 -0.0178 -0.0310 -0.0267 -0.0325 
 (0.065) (0.067) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) 
L2 RI -1.037*** -0.995*** -1.057*** -1.032*** -1.039*** 
 (0.094) (0.102) (0.095) (0.095) (0.097) 
L1 RS  0.0430*** 0.0128*** 0.0264*** 0.108*** 
  (0.008) (0.002) (0.012) (0.015) 
Covariance  -0.285 0.481** -0.0701 -0.0692 
  (0.176) (0.143) (0.306) (0.182) 
N/N groups 33398/70 33398/70 33398/70 33398/70 33398/70 
Log. likelihood -18278.6 -18267.6 -18259.7 -18272.9 -18247.4 
AIC 36692.7 36701.8 36686.0 36712.5 36661.5 
BIC 36583.3 36567.2 36551.4 36577.9 36526.9 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, RI: 
Random intercept; Z: Random slope variable/moderated variable 
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Table A. 10: Welfare characteristics and young citizens’ electoral participation 
















Female 0.0976*** 0.0972*** 0.0974*** 0.0974*** 0.0971*** 0.0964*** 0.0975*** 0.0972*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Political interest 0.837*** 0.838*** 0.837*** 0.838*** 0.837*** 0.838*** 0.838*** 0.838*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Close to a party 0.471*** 0.472*** 0.471*** 0.471*** 0.470*** 0.470*** 0.471*** 0.472*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Trust in parliament 0.319*** 0.318*** 0.317*** 0.316*** 0.317*** 0.315*** 0.320*** 0.318*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.0519*** 0.0520*** 0.0462*** 0.0461*** 0.0501*** 0.0501*** 0.0591*** 0.0590*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Compulsory voting 1.002*** 0.994*** 1.043*** 1.028*** 0.878*** 0.852*** 0.955*** 0.974*** 
 (0.179) (0.187) (0.176) (0.184) (0.196) (0.203) (0.179) (0.186) 
EC Index 0.132 0.106   0.0377 0.0224   
 (0.241) (0.243)   (0.239) (0.240)   
Educ. attainment 0.364*** 0.363*** 0.364*** 0.364*** 0.364*** 0.364*** 0.364*** 0.364*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Unemployed -0.297*** -0.422** -0.297*** -0.312*** -0.298*** -0.381** -0.297*** -0.0113 
 (0.057) (0.143) (0.057) (0.063) (0.057) (0.139) (0.057) (0.206) 
In education -0.0901+ -0.0911+ -0.0910+ -0.0930+ -0.0910+ -0.0939+ -0.0892+ -0.0914+ 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Work 0.172*** 0.171*** 0.171*** 0.170*** 0.170*** 0.168*** 0.172*** 0.171*** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Unemployed*EC Index  0.235    0.148   
  (0.254)    (0.245)   
Generosity unemployment benefits   0.0902+ 0.0981+ -0.218 -0.195   
   (0.054) (0.054) (0.189) (0.191)   
Unemployed*Generosity 
unemployment benefits 
   -0.0647  -0.338+   
    (0.052)  (0.182)   
Generosity unemployment 
benefits*EC Index 
    0.573+ 0.543   
     (0.338) (0.341)   
Unemployed*Generosity 
unemployment benefits*EC Index 
     0.515   
      (0.329)   
Welfare generosity       -0.0414 -0.0378 
       (0.027) (0.027) 
Unemployed*Welfare generosity        -0.0326 
        (0.022) 
Constant -0.104 -0.0906 -0.0423 -0.0397 -0.0403 -0.0290 0.334 0.302 
 (0.135) (0.136) (0.065) (0.065) (0.137) (0.138) (0.251) (0.253) 
L2 RI 0.130*** 0.0413*** 0.125*** 0.0350*** 0.119*** 0.0297*** 0.125*** 0.0319*** 
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 (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) 
L1 RS  0.131***  0.125***  0.120***  0.128*** 
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
Covariance  -0.0564  0.00385  0.0271  -0.194 
  (0.265)  (0.287)  (0.302)  (0.300) 
N/N groups 33398/70 33398/70 33398/70 33398/70 33398/70 33398/70 33398/70 33398/70 
Log. likelihood -18279.8 -18277.5 -18278.5 -18275.9 -18276.9 -18272.7 -18278.7 -18275.8 
AIC 36694.9 36721.6 36692.5 36718.5 36710.1 36753.8 36692.9 36718.3 
BIC 36585.5 36587.0 36583.0 36583.8 36583.9 36585.4 36583.5 36583.7 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, RI: Random intercept; Z: Random slope variable/moderated variable 
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Appendix B – Figures 
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Figure B. 3: Predicted random slopes – Unemployed, work, in education, and educational attainment 
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Figure B. 5: Degree on intervention in the labour market – Factor analysis scores 
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Figure B. 6: Labour market in practice (strength of the insider-outsider divide) – Factor analysis scores 
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Figure B. 7: Generosity of unemployment benefits – Factor analysis scores 
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Appendix C – Robustness checks 
Robustness check 1a 
Table C. 1: Empty model and controls – Robustness check 1a – Enfranchised citizens under 25 
DV: Voted Empty model Controls RS work RS education RS unemployed RS in education 
Unemployed  -0.121 -0.125 -0.116 -0.123 -0.122 
  (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.081) (0.078) 
Work  0.306*** 0.289*** 0.312*** 0.306*** 0.318*** 
  (0.064) (0.072) (0.065) (0.064) (0.065) 
In education  0.117+ 0.108+ 0.135* 0.117+ 0.133+ 
  (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.076) 
Educ. attainment  0.399*** 0.399*** 0.430*** 0.399*** 0.399*** 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.030) (0.019) (0.019) 
Female  0.0446 0.0409 0.0394 0.0441 0.0430 
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Political interest  0.812*** 0.813*** 0.814*** 0.812*** 0.814*** 
  (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Close to a party  0.426*** 0.424*** 0.426*** 0.427*** 0.426*** 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Trust in parliament  0.238*** 0.235*** 0.234*** 0.238*** 0.236*** 
  (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Turnout >30 (%)  0.0487*** 0.0498*** 0.0486*** 0.0488*** 0.0493*** 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Compulsory voting  0.911*** 0.968*** 0.992*** 0.886*** 0.985*** 
  (0.191) (0.192) (0.189) (0.201) (0.197) 
Constant 0.583*** -0.185* -0.174* -0.182* -0.183* -0.200* 
 (0.086) (0.082) (0.086) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) 
L2 RI -0.358*** -0.980*** -0.863*** -0.965*** -0.984*** -1.011*** 
 (0.090) (0.099) (0.104) (0.100) (0.101) (0.108) 
L1 RS   0.0555*** 0.0280*** 0.0233* 0.100*** 
   (0.011) (0.005) (0.018) (0.017) 
Covariance   -0.558** 0.452* 0.0880 -0.0513 
   (0.152) (0.156) (0.430) (0.206) 
N 18318/70 18318/70 18318/70 18318/70 18318/70 18318/70 
Log. likelihood -11387.6 -10458.9 -10448.9 -10444.1 -10458.6 -10443.1 
AIC 22794.8 21035.5 21035.3 21025.6 21054.5 21023.5 
BIC 22779.2 20941.7 20925.9 20916.2 20945.1 20914.1 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, RI: Random intercept 
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Table C. 2: EPR and young citizens’ electoral participation – Robustness check 1a – Enfranchised citizens under 
25 
DV: Voted EPR Z: Work Z: Education Z: Unemployed Z: In education 
EPR 0.157* 0.151+ 0.158* 0.155* 0.150* 
 (0.072) (0.084) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) 
Unemployed -0.122 -0.125 -0.117 -0.124 -0.122 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.081) (0.078) 
Work 0.305*** 0.288*** 0.311*** 0.304*** 0.316*** 
 (0.064) (0.072) (0.065) (0.064) (0.065) 
In education 0.115+ 0.107 0.132* 0.115+ 0.131+ 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.076) 
Educ. attainment 0.400*** 0.401*** 0.430*** 0.399*** 0.400*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.029) (0.019) (0.019) 
Work*EPR  0.0111    
  (0.068)    
Educ. Attainment*EPR   0.0413   
   (0.040)   
Unemployed*EPR    0.0213  
    (0.088)  
In education*EPR     0.0277 
     (0.080) 
Female 0.0443 0.0405 0.0394 0.0438 0.0428 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Political interest 0.813*** 0.814*** 0.815*** 0.813*** 0.815*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Close to a party 0.425*** 0.423*** 0.425*** 0.426*** 0.425*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Trust in parliament 0.240*** 0.237*** 0.236*** 0.240*** 0.237*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.0501*** 0.0511*** 0.0499*** 0.0502*** 0.0507*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Compulsory voting 0.904*** 0.965*** 0.977*** 0.885*** 0.977*** 
 (0.185) (0.186) (0.185) (0.195) (0.191) 
Constant -0.183* -0.172* -0.180* -0.181* -0.198* 
 (0.081) (0.085) (0.081) (0.081) (0.080) 
L2 RI -1.021*** -0.889*** -1.008*** -1.024*** -1.053*** 
 (0.100) (0.105) (0.101) (0.103) (0.111) 
L1 RS  0.0552*** 0.0267*** 0.0222* 0.0998*** 
  (0.011) (0.005) (0.018) (0.017) 
Covariance  -0.595** 0.419* 0.0563 -0.0596 
  (0.148) (0.165) (0.440) (0.211) 
N/N groups 18318/70 18318/70 18318/70 18318/70 18318/70 
Log. likelihood -10456.6 -10446.4 -10441.8 -10456.3 -10440.7 
AIC 21040.8 21049.9 21040.6 21069.6 21038.4 
BIC 20939.2 20924.9 20915.6 20944.5 20913.4 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, RI: Random 
intercept; Z: Random slope variable/moderated variable 
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Table C. 3: EPT and young citizens’ electoral participation – Robustness check 1a – Enfranchised citizens 
under 25 
DV: Voted EPT Z: Work Z: Education Z: Unemployed Z: In education 
EPT -0.0118 -0.0399 -0.0172 -0.0199 0.000532 
 (0.059) (0.068) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
Unemployed -0.121 -0.123 -0.117 -0.125 -0.123 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.081) (0.078) 
Work 0.306*** 0.290*** 0.311*** 0.306*** 0.317*** 
 (0.064) (0.072) (0.065) (0.064) (0.065) 
In education 0.117+ 0.109+ 0.135* 0.117+ 0.132+ 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.076) 
Educ. attainment 0.399*** 0.400*** 0.431*** 0.399*** 0.400*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.030) (0.019) (0.019) 
Work*EPT  0.0411    
  (0.053)    
Educ. Attainment*EPT   -0.0301   
   (0.031)   
Unemployed*EPT    0.0835  
    (0.064)  
In education*EPT     -0.0685 
     (0.062) 
Female 0.0446 0.0410 0.0396 0.0430 0.0430 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Political interest 0.812*** 0.813*** 0.814*** 0.811*** 0.814*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Close to a party 0.426*** 0.424*** 0.426*** 0.427*** 0.426*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Trust in parliament 0.238*** 0.235*** 0.235*** 0.238*** 0.235*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.0488*** 0.0497*** 0.0486*** 0.0489*** 0.0493*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Compulsory voting 0.922*** 0.986*** 0.997*** 0.898*** 0.998*** 
 (0.199) (0.200) (0.196) (0.208) (0.205) 
Constant -0.186* -0.176* -0.182* -0.184* -0.200* 
 (0.082) (0.086) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) 
L2 RI -0.980*** -0.864*** -0.969*** -0.984*** -1.011*** 
 (0.099) (0.104) (0.100) (0.101) (0.108) 
L1 RS  0.0555*** 0.0270*** 0.0190* 0.0983*** 
  (0.011) (0.005) (0.018) (0.016) 
Covariance  -0.556** 0.465* 0.0805 -0.0505 
  (0.152) (0.157) (0.464) (0.211) 
N/N groups 18318/70 18318/70 18318/70 18318/70 18318/70 
Log. likelihood -10458.8 -10448.6 -10443.6 -10457.7 -10442.4 
AIC 21045.3 21054.3 21044.3 21072.4 21041.9 
BIC 20943.7 20929.2 20919.3 20947.4 20916.8 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, RI: Random intercept; 
Z: Random slope variable/moderated variable 
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Table C. 4: Labour market in practice and young citizens’ electoral participation – Robustness check 1a – 
Enfranchised citizens under 25 
DV: Voted lp1 Z: Work Z: Education Z: Unemployed Z: In education 
LM in practice 0.0238 -0.00187 0.0188 0.0177 0.0522 
 (0.052) (0.058) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
Unemployed -0.122 -0.123 -0.116 -0.144+ -0.124 
 (0.078) (0.079) (0.078) (0.082) (0.078) 
Work 0.307*** 0.289*** 0.313*** 0.305*** 0.321*** 
 (0.064) (0.071) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
In education 0.117+ 0.106 0.136* 0.115+ 0.134+ 
 (0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.075) 
Educ. attainment 0.399*** 0.398*** 0.430*** 0.398*** 0.399*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.030) (0.019) (0.019) 
Work*LM in practice  0.0662    
  (0.044)    
Educ. Attainment*LM in practice   -0.0159   
   (0.029)   
Unemployed*LM in practice    0.0792  
    (0.057)  
In education*LM in practice     -0.0807 
     (0.051) 
Female 0.0447 0.0421 0.0397 0.0443 0.0431 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Political interest 0.813*** 0.814*** 0.815*** 0.813*** 0.815*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Close to a party 0.427*** 0.424*** 0.426*** 0.427*** 0.426*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Trust in parliament 0.239*** 0.237*** 0.235*** 0.237*** 0.235*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.0496*** 0.0513*** 0.0496*** 0.0497*** 0.0505*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Compulsory voting 0.879*** 0.924*** 0.957*** 0.847*** 0.948*** 
 (0.203) (0.202) (0.200) (0.212) (0.206) 
Constant -0.182* -0.169* -0.180* -0.178* -0.199* 
 (0.082) (0.086) (0.083) (0.082) (0.081) 
L2 RI -0.982*** -0.864*** -0.969*** -0.989*** -1.021*** 
 (0.099) (0.104) (0.100) (0.101) (0.108) 
L1 RS  0.0501*** 0.0278*** 0.0178* 0.0908*** 
  (0.011) (0.005) (0.018) (0.016) 
Covariance  -0.578** 0.450* 0.158 -0.00991 
  (0.155) (0.157) (0.517) (0.211) 
N/N groups 18318/70 18318/70 18318/70 18318/70 18318/70 
Log. likelihood -10458.8 -10447.5 -10443.8 -10457.5 -10441.6 
AIC 21045.1 21052.1 21044.6 21072.0 21040.2 
BIC 20943.5 20927.0 20919.6 20947.0 20915.2 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, RI: Random intercept; Z: 
Random slope variable/moderated variable 
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Table C. 5: Intervention in the labour market and young citizens’ electoral participation – Robustness check 
1a – Enfranchised citizens under 25 
DV: Voted LM intervention Z: Work Z: Education Z: Unemployed 
LM intervention -0.0383 -0.0749 -0.0503 -0.0405 
 (0.075) (0.081) (0.074) (0.076) 
Unemployed -0.121 -0.124 -0.116 -0.120 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.081) 
Work 0.306*** 0.290*** 0.312*** 0.306*** 
 (0.064) (0.072) (0.065) (0.064) 
In education 0.117+ 0.109+ 0.135* 0.117+ 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
Educ. attainment 0.399*** 0.399*** 0.430*** 0.399*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.030) (0.019) 
Work*LM intervention  0.0180   
  (0.049)   
Educ. Attainment* LM intervention   -0.00666  
   (0.030)  
Unemployed*LM intervention    0.0411 
    (0.062) 
Female 0.0446 0.0408 0.0392 0.0439 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Political interest 0.812*** 0.813*** 0.814*** 0.812*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Close to a party 0.427*** 0.424*** 0.426*** 0.427*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Trust in parliament 0.239*** 0.236*** 0.235*** 0.240*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.0513*** 0.0541*** 0.0518*** 0.0514*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Compulsory voting 0.944*** 1.029*** 1.035*** 0.914*** 
 (0.202) (0.204) (0.200) (0.212) 
Constant -0.187* -0.176* -0.184* -0.185* 
 (0.082) (0.086) (0.082) (0.082) 
L2 RI -0.982*** -0.860*** -0.969*** -0.987*** 
 (0.099) (0.105) (0.100) (0.101) 
L1 RS  0.0565*** 0.0280*** 0.0210* 
  (0.011) (0.005) (0.018) 
Covariance  -0.576** 0.453* 0.104 
  (0.150) (0.155) (0.457) 
N/N groups 18318/70 18318/70 18318/70 18318/70 
Log. likelihood -10458.7 -10448.5 -10443.9 -10458.2 
AIC 21045.1 21054.1 21044.8 21073.5 
BIC 20943.5 20929.0 20919.7 20948.4 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, RI: Random intercept; 
Z: Random slope variable/moderated variable 
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Table C. 6: EPR*EPT and young citizens’ electoral participation– Robustness check 1a – Enfranchised 
citizens under 25 
DV: Voted EPR*EPT Z: Work Z: Education Z: Unemployed Z: In education 
Unemployed -0.119 -0.121 -0.115 -0.145+ -0.121 
 (0.078) (0.079) (0.078) (0.084) (0.078) 
Work 0.306*** 0.271*** 0.310*** 0.305*** 0.316*** 
 (0.064) (0.073) (0.065) (0.064) (0.065) 
In education 0.115+ 0.107 0.134* 0.114+ 0.146+ 
 (0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.078) 
Educ. attainment 0.399*** 0.400*** 0.445*** 0.399*** 0.400*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.029) (0.019) (0.019) 
Female 0.0456 0.0415 0.0407 0.0442 0.0438 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Political interest 0.813*** 0.814*** 0.816*** 0.813*** 0.815*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Close to a party 0.425*** 0.422*** 0.424*** 0.425*** 0.424*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Trust in parliament 0.235*** 0.232*** 0.232*** 0.235*** 0.232*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.0494*** 0.0502*** 0.0497*** 0.0496*** 0.0499*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Compulsory voting 0.929*** 0.982*** 0.962*** 0.875*** 0.978*** 
 (0.175) (0.177) (0.175) (0.184) (0.181) 
EPT -0.0703 -0.0992 -0.0765 -0.0761 -0.0503 
 (0.055) (0.064) (0.055) (0.055) (0.057) 
EPR 0.167* 0.172* 0.169* 0.167* 0.151* 
 (0.069) (0.080) (0.069) (0.068) (0.072) 
EPT*EPR -0.286*** -0.325*** -0.285*** -0.292*** -0.251*** 
 (0.072) (0.085) (0.072) (0.072) (0.075) 
Work*EPT  0.0457    
  (0.055)    
Work*EPR  -0.00379    
  (0.071)    
Work*EPT*EPR  0.0986    
  (0.074)    
Educ. attainment*EPT   -0.0591+   
   (0.031)   
Educ. attainment*EPR   0.0640   
   (0.039)   
Educ. Attainment*EPT*EPR   -0.0820*   
   (0.040)   
Unemployed*EPT    0.0986  
    (0.070)  
Unemployed*EPR    -0.0202  
    (0.095)  
Unemployed*EPT*EPR    0.0749  
    (0.101)  
In education*EPT     -0.0830 
     (0.065) 
In education*EPR     0.0624 
     (0.084) 
In education*EPT*EPR     -0.0890 
     (0.089) 
Constant -0.134+ -0.115 -0.129 -0.128 -0.152+ 
 (0.079) (0.083) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) 
L2 RI -1.154*** -1.025*** -1.159*** -1.170*** -1.156*** 
 (0.105) (0.111) (0.107) (0.108) (0.119) 
L1 RS  0.0509*** 0.0180*** 0.0187* 0.0948*** 
  (0.010) (0.004) (0.018) (0.016) 
Covariance  -0.554** 0.267 0.360 -0.166 
  (0.161) (0.212) (0.588) (0.205) 
N/N groups 18318/70 18318/70 18318/70 18318/70 18318/70 
Log. likelihood -10449.0 -10438.6 -10433.2 -10447.3 -10432.4 
AIC 21045.2 21073.5 21062.7 21091.0 21061.1 
BIC 20928.0 20917.2 20906.3 20934.6 20904.8 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, RI: Random intercept; 
Z: Random slope variable/moderated variable  
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Table C. 7: Welfare characteristics and young citizens’ electoral participation – Robustness check 1a – Enfranchised citizens under 25 
DV: Voted EC Index Z: Unemployed Unemp. benefits Z: Unemployed Unemp. 
benefits*EC Index 
Z: Unemployed Welfare generosity Z: Unemployed 
Female 0.0446 0.0441 0.0444 0.0441 0.0441 0.0431 0.0445 0.0442 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Political interest 0.812*** 0.812*** 0.811*** 0.811*** 0.811*** 0.811*** 0.812*** 0.812*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Close to a party 0.426*** 0.427*** 0.425*** 0.426*** 0.424*** 0.425*** 0.426*** 0.427*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Trust in parliament 0.238*** 0.238*** 0.235*** 0.234*** 0.234*** 0.233*** 0.239*** 0.238*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.0487*** 0.0488*** 0.0413*** 0.0413*** 0.0441*** 0.0441*** 0.0522*** 0.0520*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Compulsory voting 0.911*** 0.877*** 0.952*** 0.923*** 0.837*** 0.788*** 0.884*** 0.878*** 
 (0.192) (0.202) (0.187) (0.197) (0.210) (0.218) (0.194) (0.195) 
EC Index -0.00403 -0.0357   -0.0689 -0.0937   
 (0.257) (0.258)   (0.255) (0.255)   
Educ. attainment 0.399*** 0.398*** 0.400*** 0.399*** 0.400*** 0.400*** 0.399*** 0.399*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Unemployed -0.121 -0.297+ -0.122 -0.128 -0.122 -0.258 -0.121 0.102 
 (0.078) (0.172) (0.078) (0.081) (0.078) (0.167) (0.078) (0.242) 
In education 0.117+ 0.117+ 0.115+ 0.114+ 0.115+ 0.113+ 0.117+ 0.116+ 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
Work 0.306*** 0.306*** 0.304*** 0.303*** 0.304*** 0.302*** 0.306*** 0.306*** 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.065) 
Unemployed*EC Index  0.341    0.273   
  (0.296)    (0.287)   
Generosity unemployment 
benefits 
  0.123* 0.127* -0.108 -0.0902   
   (0.057) (0.057) (0.204) (0.204)   
Unemployed*Generosity 
unemployment benefits 
   -0.0205  -0.327   
    (0.062)  (0.216)   
Generosity unemployment 
benefits*EC Index 
    0.427 0.399   




     0.577   
      (0.385)   
Welfare generosity       -0.0191 -0.0156 
       (0.029) (0.029) 
Unemployed*Welfare 
generosity 
       -0.0251 
        (0.025) 
Chapter 2 Levelling the odds Karima S. Bousbah 
92 
 
Constant -0.183 -0.164 -0.187* -0.184* -0.138 -0.120 -0.0121 -0.0420 
 (0.151) (0.151) (0.081) (0.081) (0.152) (0.152) (0.278) (0.279) 
L2 RI 0.141*** 0.0233* 0.132*** 0.0202* 0.129*** 0.0117 0.139*** 0.139*** 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) 
L1 RS  0.139***  0.130***  0.126***  0.0151+ 
  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.018) 
Covariance  0.150  0.146  0.335   
  (0.450)  (0.490)  (0.815)   
N/N groups 18318/70 18318/70 18318/70 18318/70 18318/70 18318/70 18318/70 18318 
Log. likelihood -10458.9 -10457.9 -10456.6 -10456.2 -10455.9 -10453.8 -10458.7 -10457.9 
AIC 21045.3 21072.8 21040.8 21069.4 21059.0 21103.8 21044.9 21063.1 
BIC 20943.7 20947.8 20939.2 20944.3 20941.8 20947.5 20943.3 20945.8 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, RI: Random intercept; Z: Random slope variable/moderated variable  




Figure C. 1: Marginal effects of labour market status markers (occupational statuses and education) on electoral participation as the employment protection of 
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Figure C. 2: Marginal effects of labour market status markers (occupational statuses and education) on electoral participation as the degree of 
intervention in the labour market changes (90%-CI) – Robustness check 1a – Enfranchised citizens under 25 
 
Figure C. 3: Marginal effects of labour market status markers (occupational statuses and education) on electoral participation as the insider-
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Figure C. 4: Marginal effect of unemployment on electoral participation as welfare characteristics 
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Robustness check 1b 
Table C. 8: Empty model and controls – Robustness check 1b – Enfranchised citizens under 35 
DV: Voted Empty model Controls RS education RS work RS unemployed RS in education 
Unemployed  -0.459*** -0.447*** -0.462*** -0.463*** -0.462*** 
  (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.054) (0.046) 
Work  0.109** 0.117*** 0.102* 0.109** 0.112** 
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.044) (0.035) (0.035) 
In education  -0.290*** -0.261*** -0.292*** -0.290*** -0.301*** 
  (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.061) 
Educ. attainment  0.335*** 0.366*** 0.336*** 0.335*** 0.337*** 
  (0.010) (0.021) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
Female  0.127*** 0.125*** 0.122*** 0.126*** 0.124*** 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Political interest  0.864*** 0.865*** 0.864*** 0.865*** 0.866*** 
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Close to a party  0.487*** 0.483*** 0.487*** 0.487*** 0.486*** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Trust in parliament  0.384*** 0.375*** 0.383*** 0.384*** 0.384*** 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Turnout >30 (%)  0.0549*** 0.0544*** 0.0546*** 0.0552*** 0.0552*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Compulsory voting  0.959*** 1.067*** 0.960*** 0.899*** 0.962*** 
  (0.166) (0.165) (0.165) (0.172) (0.173) 
Constant 0.926*** 0.127* 0.115* 0.139* 0.131* 0.132* 
 (0.089) (0.057) (0.057) (0.059) (0.057) (0.059) 
L2 RI -0.309*** -1.073*** -1.101*** -1.035*** -1.086*** -1.050*** 
 (0.087) (0.092) (0.093) (0.099) (0.093) (0.094) 
L1 RS   0.0210*** 0.0433*** 0.0415*** 0.129*** 
   (0.003) (0.007) (0.011) (0.017) 
Covariance   0.320* -0.279+ 0.208 -0.158 
   (0.142) (0.157) (0.242) (0.167) 
N/N groups 50414/70 50414/70 50414/70 50414/70 50414/70 50414/70 
Log. likelihood -29274.6 -26485.7 -26433.4 -26466.8 -26482.3 -26446.7 
AIC 58570.9 53101.3 53085.2 53018.4 53116.1 53045.1 
BIC 58553.2 52995.4 52961.6 52894.8 52992.5 52921.5 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, RI: Random intercept 
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Table C. 9: EPR and young citizens’ electoral participation – Robustness check 1b – Enfranchised citizens 
under 35 
DV: Voted EPR Z: Work Z: Education Z: Unemployed Z: In education 
EPR 0.203*** 0.169* 0.189** 0.202*** 0.199** 
 (0.061) (0.068) (0.060) (0.060) (0.063) 
Unemployed -0.459*** -0.463*** -0.448*** -0.465*** -0.463*** 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.054) (0.046) 
Work 0.108** 0.0995* 0.116*** 0.108** 0.110** 
 (0.035) (0.043) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
In education -0.291*** -0.292*** -0.263*** -0.291*** -0.302*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.060) 
Educ. attainment 0.336*** 0.337*** 0.366*** 0.336*** 0.338*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.021) (0.010) (0.011) 
Work*EPR  0.0504    
  (0.050)    
Educ. Attainment*EPR   0.0337   
   (0.030)   
Unemployed*EPR    -0.000516  
    (0.065)  
In education*EPR     0.0314 
     (0.080) 
Female 0.126*** 0.122*** 0.124*** 0.125*** 0.124*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) 
Political interest 0.864*** 0.864*** 0.865*** 0.865*** 0.866*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Close to a party 0.486*** 0.485*** 0.483*** 0.486*** 0.485*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Trust in parliament 0.384*** 0.383*** 0.375*** 0.384*** 0.384*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.0566*** 0.0569*** 0.0561*** 0.0569*** 0.0570*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Compulsory voting 0.952*** 0.957*** 1.042*** 0.891*** 0.955*** 
 (0.154) (0.155) (0.156) (0.160) (0.161) 
Constant 0.129* 0.140* 0.118* 0.133* 0.133* 
 (0.055) (0.058) (0.054) (0.055) (0.056) 
L2 RI -1.156*** -1.077*** -1.180*** -1.173*** -1.130*** 
 (0.093) (0.101) (0.095) (0.095) (0.096) 
L1 RS  0.0415*** 0.0204*** 0.0422*** 0.129*** 
  (0.006) (0.003) (0.012) (0.017) 
Covariance  -0.379* 0.276+ 0.228 -0.175 
  (0.150) (0.150) (0.240) (0.168) 
N/N groups 50414/70 50414/70 50414/70 50414/70 50414/70 
Log. likelihood -26480.5 -26461.4 -26428.7 -26477.0 -26441.6 
AIC 53101.8 53096.0 53030.6 53127.3 53056.4 
BIC 52987.1 52954.8 52889.3 52986.0 52915.1 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, RI: Random 
intercept; Z: Random slope variable/moderated variable   
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Table C. 10: EPT and young citizens’ electoral participation – Robustness check 1b – Enfranchised citizens 
under 35 
DV: Voted EPT Z: Work Z: Education Z: Unemployed Z: In education 
EPT 0.00278 -0.00552 -0.0000754 -0.0000577 0.0118 
 (0.052) (0.056) (0.051) (0.052) (0.054) 
Unemployed -0.459*** -0.461*** -0.447*** -0.467*** -0.463*** 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.054) (0.047) 
Work 0.109** 0.103* 0.116*** 0.110** 0.111** 
 (0.035) (0.044) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
In education -0.290*** -0.291*** -0.261*** -0.290*** -0.302*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.060) 
Educ. attainment 0.335*** 0.336*** 0.367*** 0.334*** 0.337*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.020) (0.010) (0.011) 
Work*EPT  0.0140    
  (0.039)    
Educ. Attainment*EPT   -0.0602**   
   (0.022)   
Unemployed*EPT    0.0778  
    (0.049)  
In education*EPT     -0.0589 
     (0.062) 
Female 0.127*** 0.122*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.124*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Political interest 0.864*** 0.864*** 0.865*** 0.864*** 0.865*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Close to a party 0.487*** 0.487*** 0.483*** 0.487*** 0.486*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Trust in parliament 0.384*** 0.383*** 0.375*** 0.384*** 0.384*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.0548*** 0.0546*** 0.0541*** 0.0552*** 0.0552*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Compulsory voting 0.956*** 0.959*** 1.051*** 0.896*** 0.960*** 
 (0.173) (0.173) (0.168) (0.178) (0.181) 
Constant 0.127* 0.138* 0.117* 0.131* 0.133* 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.057) (0.057) (0.059) 
L2 RI -1.073*** -1.035*** -1.110*** -1.087*** -1.050*** 
 (0.092) (0.099) (0.093) (0.093) (0.094) 
L1 RS  0.0435*** 0.0181*** 0.0385*** 0.128*** 
  (0.007) (0.002) (0.011) (0.016) 
Covariance  -0.278+ 0.346* 0.220 -0.158 
  (0.157) (0.142) (0.247) (0.167) 
N/N groups 50414/70 50414/70 50414/70 50414/70 50414/70 
Log. likelihood -26485.7 -26466.7 -26429.7 -26481.0 -26446.3 
AIC 53112.2 53106.7 53032.6 53135.3 53065.8 
BIC 52997.4 52965.5 52891.4 52994.0 52924.6 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, RI: Random 
intercept; Z: Random slope variable/moderated variable 
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Table C. 11: Labour market in practice and young citizens’ electoral participation – Robustness check 1b – 
Enfranchised citizens under 35 
DV: Voted LM in practice Z: Work Z: Education Z: Unemployed Z: In education 
LM in practice 0.0918* 0.0770 0.0880* 0.0823+ 0.109* 
 (0.044) (0.048) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) 
Unemployed -0.460*** -0.462*** -0.449*** -0.485*** -0.464*** 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.053) (0.046) 
Work 0.110** 0.102* 0.119*** 0.109** 0.113** 
 (0.035) (0.044) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
In education -0.290*** -0.293*** -0.259*** -0.292*** -0.304*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.059) 
Educ. attainment 0.335*** 0.335*** 0.364*** 0.334*** 0.337*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.020) (0.010) (0.011) 
Work*LM in practice  0.0255    
  (0.033)    
Educ. Attainment*LM in practice   -0.0540**   
   (0.020)   
Unemployed*LM in practice    0.127**  
    (0.043)  
In education*LM in practice     -0.0937+ 
     (0.050) 
Female 0.127*** 0.122*** 0.125*** 0.126*** 0.124*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Political interest 0.865*** 0.865*** 0.866*** 0.866*** 0.867*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Close to a party 0.487*** 0.487*** 0.484*** 0.487*** 0.486*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Trust in parliament 0.386*** 0.385*** 0.376*** 0.384*** 0.385*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.0581*** 0.0581*** 0.0583*** 0.0580*** 0.0592*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Compulsory voting 0.836*** 0.840*** 0.932*** 0.792*** 0.854*** 
 (0.172) (0.172) (0.165) (0.175) (0.176) 
Constant 0.140* 0.152** 0.127* 0.144* 0.143* 
 (0.057) (0.059) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) 
L2 RI -1.103*** -1.049*** -1.139*** -1.114*** -1.095*** 
 (0.092) (0.099) (0.093) (0.093) (0.092) 
L1 RS  0.0422*** 0.0182*** 0.0267*** 0.119*** 
  (0.007) (0.002) (0.010) (0.015) 
Covariance  -0.324* 0.398** 0.219 -0.0709 
  (0.153) (0.132) (0.289) (0.173) 
N/N groups 50414/70 50414/70 50414/70 50414/70 50414/70 
Log. likelihood -26483.6 -26464.4 -26425.9 -26476.4 -26442.7 
AIC 53107.9 53102.1 53025.0 53126.1 53058.7 
BIC 52993.2 52960.9 52883.8 52984.9 52917.5 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, RI: Random 
intercept; Z: Random slope variable/moderated variable 
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Table C. 12: Intervention in the labour market and young citizens’ electoral participation – Robustness check 
1b – Enfranchised citizens under 35 
DV: Voted LM intervention Z: Work Z: Education Z: Unemployed 
LM intervention -0.0798 -0.0881 -0.0771 -0.0829 
 (0.064) (0.069) (0.062) (0.063) 
Unemployed -0.458*** -0.461*** -0.447*** -0.459*** 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.054) 
Work 0.109** 0.103* 0.117*** 0.110** 
 (0.035) (0.044) (0.035) (0.035) 
In education -0.290*** -0.291*** -0.261*** -0.289*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Educ. attainment 0.335*** 0.336*** 0.366*** 0.334*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.021) (0.010) 
Work*LM intervention  0.0126   
  (0.035)   
Educ. Attainment*LM intervention   -0.0170  
   (0.021)  
Unemployed*LM intervention    0.0591 
    (0.047) 
Female 0.127*** 0.122*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Political interest 0.864*** 0.864*** 0.865*** 0.865*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Close to a party 0.487*** 0.487*** 0.484*** 0.487*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Trust in parliament 0.384*** 0.383*** 0.375*** 0.385*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.0603*** 0.0604*** 0.0592*** 0.0610*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Compulsory voting 1.030*** 1.035*** 1.127*** 0.961*** 
 (0.174) (0.174) (0.172) (0.179) 
Constant 0.124* 0.134* 0.112* 0.127* 
 (0.057) (0.059) (0.056) (0.057) 
L2 RI -1.084*** -1.033*** -1.114*** -1.100*** 
 (0.092) (0.100) (0.093) (0.093) 
L1 RS  0.0433*** 0.0208*** 0.0393*** 
  (0.007) (0.003) (0.011) 
Covariance  -0.318+ 0.309* 0.255 
  (0.156) (0.142) (0.247) 
N/N groups 50414/70 50414/70 50414/70 50414/70 
Log. likelihood -26484.9 -26466.0 -26432.4 -26480.6 
AIC 53110.6 53105.2 53038.1 53134.4 
BIC 52995.9 52963.9 52896.8 52993.1 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, RI: 
Random intercept; Z: Random slope variable/moderated variable   
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Table C. 13: EPR*EPT and young citizens’ electoral participation – Robustness check 1b – Enfranchised 
citizens under 35 
DV: Voted EPR*EPT Z: Work Z: Education Z: Unemployed Z: In education 
Unemployed -0.457*** -0.459*** -0.446*** -0.488*** -0.462*** 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.056) (0.046) 
Work 0.109** 0.0931* 0.116*** 0.109** 0.110** 
 (0.035) (0.045) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
In education -0.291*** -0.292*** -0.259*** -0.291*** -0.268*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.061) 
Educ. attainment 0.335*** 0.336*** 0.388*** 0.335*** 0.338*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.018) (0.010) (0.011) 
Female 0.127*** 0.122*** 0.124*** 0.125*** 0.124*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) 
Political interest 0.864*** 0.864*** 0.865*** 0.865*** 0.866*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Close to a party 0.485*** 0.485*** 0.482*** 0.485*** 0.485*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Trust in parliament 0.382*** 0.381*** 0.374*** 0.381*** 0.381*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.0562*** 0.0563*** 0.0566*** 0.0567*** 0.0557*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Compulsory voting 0.989*** 0.993*** 0.986*** 0.900*** 0.957*** 
 (0.152) (0.153) (0.151) (0.156) (0.159) 
EPT -0.0635 -0.0644 -0.0584 -0.0647 -0.0453 
 (0.048) (0.054) (0.046) (0.047) (0.051) 
EPR 0.216*** 0.180** 0.196*** 0.215*** 0.204** 
 (0.061) (0.068) (0.058) (0.059) (0.064) 
EPT*EPR -0.177** -0.200** -0.180** -0.184** -0.153* 
 (0.064) (0.072) (0.061) (0.062) (0.067) 
Work*EPT  0.00207    
  (0.041)    
Work*EPR  0.0531    
  (0.053)    
Work*EPT*EPR  0.0391    
  (0.055)    
Educ. attainment* EPT   -0.0899***   
   (0.019)   
Educ. attainment* EPR   0.0669**   
   (0.024)   
Educ. attainment*EPT*EPR   -0.115***   
   (0.025)   
Unemployed*EPT    0.0995+  
    (0.053)  
Unemployed*EPR    -0.0413  
    (0.069)  
Unemployed*EPT*EPR    0.0708  
    (0.073)  
In education*EPT     -0.0810 
     (0.063) 
In education*EPR     0.0581 
     (0.082) 
In education*EPT*EPR     -0.185* 
     (0.087) 
Constant 0.155** 0.171** 0.151** 0.163** 0.160** 
 (0.054) (0.057) (0.053) (0.054) (0.056) 
L2 RI -1.227*** -1.151*** -1.275*** -1.258*** -1.172*** 
 (0.095) (0.104) (0.097) (0.097) (0.099) 
L1 RS  0.0404*** 0.00942*** 0.0379*** 0.116*** 
  (0.006) (0.002) (0.011) (0.015) 
Covariance  -0.370* -0.0329 0.426 -0.314+ 
  (0.155) (0.187) (0.247) (0.160) 
N/N groups 50414/70 50414/70 50414/70 50414/70 50414/70 
Log. likelihood -26476.2 -26456.9 -26411.7 -26469.6 -26434.0 
AIC 53114.9 53130.4 53040.0 53155.8 53084.5 
BIC 52982.5 52953.8 52863.5 52979.3 52908.0 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, RI: Random 
intercept; Z: Random slope variable/moderated variable  
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Table C. 14: Welfare characteristics and young citizens’ electoral participation – Robustness check 1b – Enfranchised citizens under 35 














Female 0.127*** 0.126*** 0.127*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.125*** 0.127*** 0.126*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Political interest 0.863*** 0.865*** 0.863*** 0.864*** 0.863*** 0.864*** 0.864*** 0.865*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Close to a party 0.487*** 0.487*** 0.486*** 0.486*** 0.486*** 0.486*** 0.487*** 0.487*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Trust in parliament 0.384*** 0.384*** 0.383*** 0.382*** 0.383*** 0.382*** 0.385*** 0.384*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.0551*** 0.0554*** 0.0507*** 0.0508*** 0.0541*** 0.0539*** 0.0632*** 0.0628*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Compulsory voting 0.948*** 0.887*** 0.981*** 0.918*** 0.836*** 0.778*** 0.895*** 0.860*** 
 (0.166) (0.173) (0.164) (0.171) (0.184) (0.188) (0.165) (0.171) 
EC Index 0.137 0.134   0.0605 0.0579   
 (0.226) (0.224)   (0.225) (0.223)   
Educ. attainment 0.335*** 0.335*** 0.335*** 0.335*** 0.335*** 0.335*** 0.335*** 0.335*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Unemployed -0.459*** -0.531*** -0.459*** -0.467*** -0.459*** -0.485*** -0.458*** -0.253 
 (0.046) (0.126) (0.046) (0.054) (0.046) (0.124) (0.046) (0.188) 
In education -0.291*** -0.290*** -0.291*** -0.291*** -0.291*** -0.292*** -0.289*** -0.290*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Work 0.109** 0.109** 0.109** 0.109** 0.108** 0.108** 0.109** 0.109** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Unemployed*EC Index  0.134    0.0470   
  (0.227)    (0.222)   
Generosity unemployment benefits   0.0689 0.0719 -0.197 -0.184   
   (0.050) (0.050) (0.179) (0.177)   
Unemployed*Generosity unemployment benefits    -0.0194  -0.318+   
    (0.048)  (0.164)   
Generosity unemployment benefits*EC Index     0.496 0.478   
     (0.320) (0.317)   
Unemployed*Generosity unemployment 
benefits*EC Index 
     0.566+   
      (0.297)   
Welfare generosity       -0.0469+ -0.0430+ 
       (0.025) (0.025) 
Unemployed*Welfare generosity        -0.0237 
        (0.020) 
Constant 0.0598 0.0653 0.125* 0.130* 0.113 0.119 0.551* 0.519* 
 (0.125) (0.124) (0.057) (0.057) (0.127) (0.126) (0.232) (0.232) 
L2 RI 0.116*** 0.0414*** 0.114*** 0.0401*** 0.109*** 0.0345*** 0.111*** 0.0362*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
L1 RS  0.113***  0.110***  0.106***  0.109*** 
Chapter 2 Levelling the odds Karima S. Bousbah 
103 
 
  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Covariance  0.211  0.241  0.238  0.130 
  (0.242)  (0.249)  (0.260)  (0.257) 
N/N groups 50414/70 50414/70 50414/70 50414/70 50414/70 50414/70 50414/70 50414/70 
Log. likelihood -26485.5 -26481.9 -26484.8 -26481.2 -26483.4 -26478.0 -26484.0 -26480.2 
AIC 53111.8 53137.1 53110.3 53135.6 53129.2 53172.6 53108.7 53133.6 
BIC 52997.0 52995.9 52995.6 52994.3 52996.8 52996.0 52993.9 52992.3 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, RI: Random intercept; Z: Random slope variable/moderated variable 




Figure C. 5: Marginal effects of labour market status markers (occupational statuses and education) on electoral participation as the employment 
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Figure C. 6: Marginal effects of labour market status markers (occupational statuses and education) on electoral participation as the degree of 
intervention in the labour market changes (90%-CI) – Robustness check 1b – Enfranchised citizens under 35 
 
Figure C. 7: Marginal effects of labour market status markers (occupational statuses and education) on electoral participation as the insider-outsider 
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Figure C. 8: Marginal effect of unemployment on electoral participation as welfare 
characteristics change (90%-CI) – Robustness check 1b – Enfranchised 
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Robustness check 2 
Table C. 15: Empty model and controls – Robustness check 2 – Enfranchised citizens over 30 
 Empty model Controls RS work RS education RS unemployed 
Unemployed  -0.693*** -0.691*** -0.685*** -0.669*** 
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.047) 
Work  -0.0778*** -0.0524+ -0.0826*** -0.0785*** 
  (0.015) (0.031) (0.015) (0.015) 
Educ. attainment  0.161*** 0.165*** 0.195*** 0.161*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.017) (0.006) 
Female  0.120*** 0.121*** 0.125*** 0.120*** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Political interest  0.948*** 0.949*** 0.946*** 0.949*** 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Close to a party  0.730*** 0.728*** 0.722*** 0.730*** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Trust in parliament  0.433*** 0.430*** 0.426*** 0.433*** 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Turnout <=30 (%)  0.0348*** 0.0351*** 0.0379*** 0.0348*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Compulsory voting  0.379* 0.393* 0.122 0.396* 
  (0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.169) 
Constant 1.680*** 0.835*** 0.824*** 0.850*** 0.832*** 
 (0.086) (0.044) (0.046) (0.043) (0.044) 
L2 RI -0.336*** -1.141*** -1.087*** -1.173*** -1.134*** 
 (0.086) (0.090) (0.096) (0.093) (0.091) 
L1 RS   0.0468*** 0.0162*** 0.0767*** 
   (0.006) (0.002) (0.012) 
Covariance   -0.342* -0.432** -0.118 
   (0.142) (0.125) (0.193) 
N/N groups 172045/70 172045/70 172045/70 172045/70 172045/70 
Log. likelihood -77104.3 -70282.1 -70218.8 -70093.3 -70270.7 
AIC 154232.8 140696.9 140594.2 140343.2 140698.1 
BIC 154212.7 140586.3 140463.5 140212.5 140567.4 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, RI: Random 
intercept 
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Table C. 16: EPR and old citizens’ electoral participation – Robustness check 2 – Enfranchised citizens over 
30 
DV: Voted EPR Z: Work Z: Education Z: Unemployed 
EPR -0.0654 -0.0834 -0.0829 -0.0689 
 (0.060) (0.064) (0.058) (0.060) 
Unemployed -0.704*** -0.703*** -0.697*** -0.683*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.047) 
Work -0.0914*** -0.0688* -0.0962*** -0.0922*** 
 (0.015) (0.031) (0.015) (0.015) 
Educ. attainment 0.164*** 0.169*** 0.199*** 0.164*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.017) (0.006) 
Work*EPR  0.0302   
  (0.044)   
Educ. attainment* EPR   0.0355  
   (0.025)  
Unemployed*EPR    0.0644 
    (0.065) 
Female 0.120*** 0.121*** 0.125*** 0.120*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Political interest 0.948*** 0.949*** 0.946*** 0.949*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Close to a party 0.729*** 0.727*** 0.721*** 0.728*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Trust in parliament 0.434*** 0.431*** 0.426*** 0.433*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Turnout <=30 (%) 0.0351*** 0.0357*** 0.0382*** 0.0352*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Compulsory voting 0.364* 0.375* 0.113 0.373* 
 (0.156) (0.156) (0.156) (0.170) 
In education -0.822*** -0.828*** -0.820*** -0.825*** 
 (0.083) (0.083) (0.084) (0.083) 
Constant 0.851*** 0.841*** 0.865*** 0.849*** 
 (0.044) (0.046) (0.043) (0.045) 
L2 RI -1.140*** -1.079*** -1.176*** -1.134*** 
 (0.090) (0.095) (0.093) (0.091) 
L1 RS  0.0460*** 0.0158*** 0.0751*** 
  (0.005) (0.002) (0.012) 
Covariance  -0.359* -0.415** -0.0932 
  (0.139) (0.127) (0.196) 
N/N groups 172045/70 172045/70 172045/70 172045/70 
Log. likelihood -70238.2 -70174.2 -70048.8 -70226.1 
AIC 140633.1 140541.2 140290.5 140645.0 
BIC 140502.4 140380.4 140129.6 140484.1 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, RI: 
Random intercept; Z: Random slope variable/moderated variable 
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Table C. 17: EPT and old citizens’ electoral participation – Robustness check 2 – Enfranchised 
citizens over 30 
DV: Voted EPT Z: Work Z: Education Z: Unemployed 
EPT 0.0456 0.0654 0.0315 0.0395 
 (0.048) (0.051) (0.047) (0.049) 
Unemployed -0.705*** -0.703*** -0.697*** -0.682*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.047) 
Work -0.0916*** -0.0685* -0.0959*** -0.0923*** 
 (0.015) (0.031) (0.015) (0.015) 
Educ. attainment 0.164*** 0.169*** 0.199*** 0.164*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.006) 
Work*EPT  -0.0427   
  (0.034)   
Educ. attainment* EPT   -0.0487**  
   (0.018)  
Unemployed*EPT    0.0444 
    (0.052) 
Female 0.120*** 0.121*** 0.125*** 0.120*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Political interest 0.949*** 0.950*** 0.946*** 0.949*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Close to a party 0.729*** 0.727*** 0.721*** 0.728*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Trust in parliament 0.434*** 0.431*** 0.426*** 0.433*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Turnout <=30 (%) 0.0349*** 0.0352*** 0.0383*** 0.0349*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Compulsory voting 0.331* 0.345* 0.112 0.347* 
 (0.162) (0.161) (0.159) (0.177) 
In education -0.822*** -0.827*** -0.820*** -0.825*** 
 (0.083) (0.083) (0.084) (0.083) 
Constant 0.853*** 0.843*** 0.864*** 0.850*** 
 (0.044) (0.046) (0.043) (0.045) 
L2 RI -1.140*** -1.088*** -1.170*** -1.133*** 
 (0.091) (0.096) (0.093) (0.091) 
L1 RS  0.0446*** 0.0144*** 0.0768*** 
  (0.005) (0.001) (0.012) 
Covariance  -0.332* -0.434** -0.111 
  (0.146) (0.125) (0.194) 
N/N groups 172045/70 172045/70 172045/70 172045/70 
Log. likelihood -70238.4 -70173.9 -70046.8 -70226.3 
AIC 140633.4 140540.7 140286.6 140645.5 
BIC 140502.7 140379.8 140125.7 140484.6 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, RI: 
Random intercept; Z: Random slope variable/moderated variable 
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Table C. 18: Labour market in practice and old citizens’ electoral participation – Robustness check 2 – 
Enfranchised citizens over 30 
DV: Voted LM in practice Z: Work Z: Education Z: Unemployed 
LM in practice 0.0648 0.0629 0.0756+ 0.0523 
 (0.041) (0.044) (0.039) (0.041) 
Unemployed -0.705*** -0.703*** -0.698*** -0.710*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.045) 
Work -0.0915*** -0.0698* -0.0960*** -0.0924*** 
 (0.015) (0.031) (0.015) (0.015) 
In education -0.822*** -0.828*** -0.820*** -0.826*** 
 (0.083) (0.084) (0.084) (0.083) 
Educ. attainment 0.164*** 0.169*** 0.199*** 0.164*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.017) (0.006) 
Work*LM in practice  0.0105   
  (0.029)   
Educ. Attainment*LM in practice   -0.0320*  
   (0.016)  
Unemployed*LM in practice    0.145*** 
    (0.043) 
Female 0.120*** 0.121*** 0.125*** 0.120*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Political interest 0.949*** 0.950*** 0.947*** 0.950*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Close to a party 0.729*** 0.727*** 0.721*** 0.728*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Trust in parliament 0.434*** 0.432*** 0.426*** 0.434*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Turnout <=30 (%) 0.0364*** 0.0375*** 0.0391*** 0.0368*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Compulsory voting 0.279+ 0.281+ 0.0487 0.337+ 
 (0.165) (0.165) (0.163) (0.172) 
Constant 0.856*** 0.847*** 0.868*** 0.850*** 
 (0.044) (0.047) (0.043) (0.044) 
L2 RI -1.152*** -1.073*** -1.187*** -1.135*** 
 (0.091) (0.096) (0.093) (0.092) 
L1 RS  0.0463*** 0.0151*** 0.0599*** 
  (0.005) (0.002) (0.010) 
Covariance  -0.408** -0.405** -0.288 
  (0.135) (0.128) (0.189) 
N/N groups 172045/70 172045/70 172045/70 172045/70 
Log. likelihood -70237.6 -70173.6 -70047.4 -70220.1 
AIC 140631.8 140540.0 140287.7 140633.1 
BIC 140501.1 140379.1 140126.8 140472.2 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, RI: Random 
intercept; Z: Random slope variable/moderated variable 
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Table C. 19: Intervention in the labour market and old citizens’ electoral participation – Robustness check 2 
– Enfranchised citizens over 30 
DV: Voted LM intervention Z: Work Z: Education Z: Unemployed 
LM intervention 0.127* 0.130* 0.107* 0.122* 
 (0.051) (0.056) (0.049) (0.053) 
Unemployed -0.705*** -0.702*** -0.697*** -0.673*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.047) 
Work -0.0915*** -0.0647* -0.0962*** -0.0923*** 
 (0.015) (0.032) (0.015) (0.015) 
Educ. attainment 0.164*** 0.169*** 0.199*** 0.164*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.017) (0.006) 
Unemployed*LM intervention    0.0734 
    (0.047) 
Work*LM intervention  0.0100   
  (0.031)   
Educ. Attainment*LM intervention   -0.0325*  
   (0.016)  
Female 0.120*** 0.121*** 0.125*** 0.120*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Political interest 0.948*** 0.949*** 0.946*** 0.949*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Close to a party 0.729*** 0.727*** 0.721*** 0.728*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Trust in parliament 0.433*** 0.430*** 0.426*** 0.433*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Turnout <=30 (%) 0.0299*** 0.0290*** 0.0346*** 0.0299*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Compulsory voting 0.278+ 0.295+ 0.0694 0.276 
 (0.156) (0.155) (0.155) (0.171) 
In education -0.823*** -0.826*** -0.821*** -0.825*** 
 (0.083) (0.083) (0.084) (0.083) 
Constant 0.856*** 0.845*** 0.866*** 0.855*** 
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.042) (0.043) 
L2 RI -1.176*** -1.152*** -1.207*** -1.172*** 
 (0.091) (0.097) (0.094) (0.091) 
L1 RS  0.0477*** 0.0154*** 0.0753*** 
  (0.006) (0.002) (0.012) 
Covariance  -0.251 -0.386** -0.0688 
  (0.160) (0.133) (0.199) 
N/N groups 172045/70 172045/70 172045/70 172045/70 
Log. likelihood -70235.9 -70172.1 -70046.9 -70222.9 
AIC 140628.5 140537.0 140286.7 140638.7 
BIC 140497.7 140376.2 140125.9 140477.8 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, RI: Random intercept; 
Z: Random slope variable/moderated variable 
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Table C. 20: EPR*EPT and old citizens’ electoral participation – Robustness check 2 – Enfranchised citizens 
over 30 
DV: Voted EPR*EPT Z: Work Z: Education Z: Unemployed 
Unemployed -0.693*** -0.703*** -0.697*** -0.676*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.050) 
Work -0.0781*** -0.0397 -0.0965*** -0.0924*** 
 (0.015) (0.030) (0.015) (0.015) 
In education  -0.825*** -0.819*** -0.825*** 
  (0.083) (0.084) (0.083) 
Educ. attainment 0.161*** 0.169*** 0.223*** 0.165*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006) 
Female 0.120*** 0.121*** 0.125*** 0.119*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Political interest 0.947*** 0.950*** 0.946*** 0.949*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Close to a party 0.730*** 0.727*** 0.721*** 0.728*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Trust in parliament 0.433*** 0.430*** 0.426*** 0.433*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Turnout <=30 (%) 0.0376*** 0.0367*** 0.0388*** 0.0378*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Compulsory voting 0.274+ 0.277+ 0.151 0.261 
 (0.149) (0.147) (0.157) (0.166) 
EPT 0.0756+ 0.111* 0.0566 0.0731 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) 
EPR -0.0810 -0.109+ -0.0972+ -0.0852 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) 
EPT*EPR 0.219*** 0.288*** 0.166** 0.223*** 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.065) 
Work*EPT  -0.0638+   
  (0.033)   
Work*EPR  0.0436   
  (0.042)   
Work*EPT*EPR  -0.151***   
  (0.045)   
Educ. attainment* EPT   -0.0718***  
   (0.015)  
Educ. attainment *EPR   0.0557**  
   (0.019)  
Educ. attainment*EPT*EPR   -0.119***  
   (0.020)  
Unemployed*EPT    0.0297 
    (0.055) 
Unemployed*EPR    0.0497 
    (0.069) 
Unemployed*EPT*EPR    -0.0323 
    (0.073) 
Constant 0.804*** 0.796*** 0.832*** 0.818*** 
 (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.043) 
L2 RI -1.249*** -1.262*** -1.248*** -1.234*** 
 (0.091) (0.097) (0.092) (0.092) 
L1 RS  0.0351*** 0.00731*** 0.0751*** 
  (0.005) (0.001) (0.012) 
Covariance  -0.125 -0.237 -0.0485 
  (0.165) (0.156) (0.210) 
N/N groups 172045/70 172045/70 172045/70 172045/70 
Log. likelihood -70275.1 -70160.0 -70028.5 -70219.4 
AIC 140718.9 140561.2 140298.1 140680.0 
BIC 140578.2 140360.1 140096.9 140478.9 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, RI: Random 
intercept; Z: Random slope variable/moderated variable   
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Table C. 21: Welfare characteristics and old citizens’ electoral participation – Robustness check 2 – Enfranchised citizens over 30 










Welfare generosity Z: Unemployed 
Female 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.119*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Political interest 0.948*** 0.949*** 0.948*** 0.949*** 0.948*** 0.948*** 0.948*** 0.949*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Close to a party 0.729*** 0.728*** 0.729*** 0.728*** 0.729*** 0.729*** 0.729*** 0.728*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Trust in parliament 0.434*** 0.434*** 0.434*** 0.433*** 0.434*** 0.434*** 0.432*** 0.432*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Turnout <=30 (%) 0.0356*** 0.0357*** 0.0342*** 0.0342*** 0.0333*** 0.0335*** 0.0283*** 0.0277*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Compulsory voting 0.338* 0.376* 0.384* 0.401* 0.519** 0.555** 0.483** 0.443** 
 (0.156) (0.169) (0.160) (0.174) (0.171) (0.180) (0.147) (0.156) 
EC Index 0.339 0.321   0.412* 0.404*   
 (0.207) (0.209)   (0.203) (0.205)   
Educ. attainment 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
In education -0.822*** -0.825*** -0.822*** -0.825*** -0.822*** -0.825*** -0.824*** -0.827*** 
 (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) 
Unemployed -0.705*** -0.815*** -0.704*** -0.677*** -0.705*** -0.778*** -0.704*** -0.349+ 
 (0.028) (0.129) (0.028) (0.048) (0.028) (0.126) (0.028) (0.189) 
Work -0.0916*** -0.0924*** -0.0915*** -0.0923*** -0.0914*** -0.0923*** -0.0914*** -0.0923*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Unemployed*EC Index  0.265    0.200   
  (0.239)    (0.234)   
Generosity unemployment benefits   0.0166 0.0149 0.347* 0.380*   
   (0.048) (0.048) (0.151) (0.154)   
Unemployed*Generosity unemployment benefits    0.0265  -0.312+   
    (0.048)  (0.170)   
Generosity unemployment benefits*EC Index     -0.632* -0.702*   
     (0.275) (0.281)   
Constant 0.684*** 0.688*** 0.850*** 0.847*** 0.627*** 0.626*** 0.230 0.187 
 (0.110) (0.111) (0.044) (0.045) (0.109) (0.111) (0.174) (0.175) 
L2 RI 0.100*** 0.0760*** 0.104*** 0.0772*** 0.0931*** 0.0699*** 0.0862*** 0.0682*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.012) 
L1 RS  0.102***  0.105***  0.0949***  0.0851*** 
  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
Covariance  -0.185  -0.116  -0.188  0.0923 
  (0.195)  (0.196)  (0.191)  (0.220) 
N/N groups 172045/70 172045/70 172045/70 172045/70 172045/70 172045/70 172045/70 172045/70 
Log. likelihood -70237.5 -70225.0 -70238.7 -70226.9 -70234.9 -70220.2 -70232.7 -70219.0 
AIC 140631.7 140643.0 140634.2 140646.6 140650.6 140681.6 140622.0 140630.8 
BIC 140501.0 140482.1 140503.5 140485.7 140499.7 140480.5 140491.3 140469.9 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L: Level; RS: Random slope, RI: Random intercept; Z: Random slope variable/moderated variable 




Figure C. 9: Marginal effects of labour market status markers (occupational statuses and education) on electoral participation as the 
employment protection of regular (EPR) and temporary contracts (EPT) changes (90%-CI) – Robustness check 2 – 
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Figure C. 10: Marginal effects of labour market status markers (occupational statuses and education) on electoral participation as the degree 
of intervention in the labour market changes (90%-CI) – Robustness check 2 – Enfranchised citizens over 30 
 
Figure C. 11: Marginal effects of labour market status markers (occupational statuses and education) on electoral participation as the 
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Figure C. 12: Marginal effect of unemployment on electoral participation as welfare characteristics 
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Appendix D – Operationalisation of variables 
Table D. 1: Operationalisation of individual level variables (corresponding questions and coding in the European Social Surveys) and context level variables28  
Variable Description Indicator 
coding 
ESS variable/rounds ESS Question ESS coding 
Individual level and ESS based variables 
Political participation 
Vote Voted in the last national 




vote Some people don't vote 
nowadays for one reason or 
another. Did you vote in the last 
[country] national election in 
[month/year]? 
2: No 












0: No  mnactic Main activity, last 7 days. All 
respondents. Post coded 
3: Unemployed, looking for job  
4: Unemployed, not looking for 
job  
1: Yes 1: Paid work     
2: Education 5 Permanently sick 
or disabled  
6: Retired    
7: Community or military service  
8: Housework, looking after 
children, others    
9: Other  
Work Being currently employed 0: No  mnactic Main activity, last 7 days. All 
respondents. Post coded 
1: Paid work  
 
                                                          
28
  Categories not reported in the ESS coding column, e.g. refusal or not applicable, were recoded to missing and, hence, not considered in the analysis. Further, all information 
pertains on enfranchised individuals in a specific country. Source: ESS (2013). 
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1: Yes 2: Education 
3: Unemployed, looking for job  
4: Unemployed, not looking for 
job 
5 Permanently sick or disabled  
6: Retired    
7: Community or military service  
8: Housework, looking after 
children, others    
9: Other  
In education Being currently in 
education 
0: No  mnactic Main activity, last 7 days. All 
respondents. Post coded 
2: Education 
 
1: Yes 1: Paid work  
3: Unemployed, looking for job  
4: Unemployed, not looking for 
job 
5 Permanently sick or disabled  
6: Retired    
7: Community or military service  
8: Housework, looking after 
children, others    
9: Other  
Educational attainment Highest level of education 
achieved 
0 edulvla (ESS 1-3) 
edulvlb (ESS 4-7) 
What is the highest level of 
education you have achieved? 
1: Less than lower secondary 
education (ISCED 0-1)  
1 2: Lower secondary education 
completed (ISCED 2)  
2 3: Upper secondary education 
completed (ISCED 3) 
3 4: Post-secondary non-tertiary 
education completed (ISCED 4) 
4 5: Tertiary education completed 
(ISCED 5-6) 
Sex Female respondent 0: No gndr Respondent is male 1 
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1: Yes Respondent is female 2 
Trust in parliament High trust in parliament 0: No  trstprl please tell me on a score of 0-
10 how much you personally 
trust [country]’ parliament 
0: No trust at all  
1-6 
1: Yes 7-9 
10: Complete trust 
Political interest Being interested in politics 0: No  polintr How interested would you say 
you are in politics? 
Hardly interested (3)  
Not at all interested (4) 
1: Yes Very interested (1) 
Quite interested (2)  
Close to a political party Feeling close to a political 
party 
0: No  clsprty Is there a particular political 
party you feel closer to than all 
the other parties? 
2: No 
1: Yes 1: Yes 
Voter turnout Turnout among old 
citizens (aged 30 and 
more); aggregated values 






vote Some people don't vote 
nowadays for one reason or 
another. Did you vote in the last 





Citizenship Respondent is citizen of 
the country / enfranchised 
0: No  ctzcntr Are you a citizen of [country]? 2: No 
1: Yes 1: Yes 
Age group Age group dummy for 









agea Age of responded, calculated Continuous measure of age in 
years 
Identifying variables  
Countries   cntry Country Country name 
Election years Year of election Year  Day/Month/Year of the 
interview 
Based on administrative 
variables: 
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- Day of month of interview 
(inwdds/inwdde/inwdd) 
- Month of interview 
(inwmms/inwmme/inwmm) 




Context level variables Description Coding Source 
Labour market characteristics 
EPL – Regular contracts Individual dismissal of workers with 
regular contracts 
See Table A. 1 OECD (2016a, 2016c) 
EPL – Temporary contracts Regulation of temporary contracts See Table A. 1 OECD (2016a, 2016c) 
Wage coordination level The predominant* level at which wage 
bargaining takes place (Level) 
5 = bargaining predominantly takes place at central or cross-industry 
level and there are centrally determined binding norms or ceilings to 
be respected by agreements negotiated at lower levels; 
4 = intermediate or alternating between central and industry 
bargaining; 
3 = bargaining predominantly takes place at the sector or industry 
level; 
2 = intermediate or alternating between sector and company 
bargaining; 
1 = bargaining predominantly takes place at the local or company 
level 
Visser (2015a, 2015b) 
Government intervention Government intervention in wage 
bargaining (Govt) 
5 = the government imposes private sector wage settlements, places a 
ceiling on bargaining outcomes or suspends bargaining; 
4 = the government participates directly in wage bargaining (tripartite 
bargaining, as in social pacts); 
3 = the government influences wage bargaining outcomes indirectly 
through price-ceilings, indexation, tax measures, minimum wages, 
and/or pattern setting through public sector wages; 
2 = the government influences wage bargaining by providing an 
institutional framework of consultation and information exchange, by 
conditional agreement to extend private sector agreements, and/or by 
providing a conflict resolution mechanism which links the settlement 
of disputes across the economy and/or allows the intervention of state 
arbitrators or Parliament; 
1 = none of the above. 
Visser (2015a, 2015b) 
Union density Union density rate, net union membership 
as a proportion of wage and salary 
earners in employment (UD) 
(0-100) = NUM*100/WSEE = Net Union Membership *100 / Wage 
and Salary Earners in Employment 
Visser (2015a, 2015b) 
Temporary contracts  Temporary employees as percentage of 
the total number of employees, by sex and 
age (%) (lfsa_etpga) 
Reduced by means of factor analysis, see Table A. 3 EUROSTAT( 2016c) 
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Unemployment  Unemployment rate by sex and age - 
annual average, % (une_rt_a) 
EUROSTAT (2016d) 
NEET Young people neither in employment nor 
in education and training by sex and age 
(NEET rates) (edat_lfse_20) 
EUROSTAT (2016e) 
Welfare system characteristics 




Sum of expenditures as percentages of GDP  EUROSTAT (2016b) 
Generosity of unemployment 
benefits (UB) 
Rules governing: 
- Duration of UB 
- Net replacement rate (NRR) 
- Waiting period before entering 
unemployment programme 
- Active Labour Market Policies 
(% GDP) 
Reduced by means of factor analysis, see Table A. 3 OECD (2016b, 2016d); Social 
Security Administration (2002, 
2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 
2014); Van Vliet and Caminada 
(2012) 
Access to unemployment benefits Employment and contribution 
requirements 
Weighted ratio of required employment and contribution days (EC 
Index) 
OECD (2016d); Social Security 
Administration (2002, 2004, 
2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014) 
Others 
Compulsory voting Voting is compulsory (as opposed to 
voluntary) 



































Someone like me 
 
Descriptive representation and young citizens’ 
electoral participation 
  




Young citizens’ electoral participation has been the target of many critics who blame it for the low 
turnout figures in established democracy (Blais 2007; Franklin 2004). Fear of diminished legitimacy 
and functionality have fuelled scholarly concerns (Christiano 2004; Dahl 2006; Lijphart 1997; Verba 
2003). Previous research has identified young citizens’ strained relationship with the political system 
and its actors as a major determining factor (Hay 2007; Kimberlee 2002; Rubenson et al. 2004; Sloam 
2012).  
So far, research efforts have identified low political interest and low political efficacy as key factors 
in young citizens’ low political participation (Kimberlee 2002; Quintelier 2007; Sloam 2012). 
However, previous research has failed to consider at least three other aspects. First, it has strongly 
focused on individual level factors affecting political participation. Substantial differences in voting 
(electoral participation) among young citizens, however, highlight the need to investigate the causes 
of such differences, and call for a more detailed theoretical and methodological approach (Bühlmann 
and Freitag 2006; Gallego 2007, 2015; Garcia-Albacete 2014; Smets 2015). Differences in 
participation occur on two levels. On the one hand, turnout varies significantly between countries and 
elections. On the other hand, sub-groups of young citizens exhibit different levels of readiness to 
participate in elections, e.g. dependent on their educational attainment or political interest. Second, 
in relation to country and election differences, previous research efforts have largely ignored context 
factors which could explain the development of turnout differences. Electoral participation does not 
occur in a vacuum: it is heavily influenced by the economic and socio-economic conditions 
dominating the political scene during an election. Third, previous literature has focused mainly on 
one aspect of the citizen-political system relationship, namely how young citizens assess the latter. 
How the political system fairs in recruiting, mobilizing, and addressing young citizens and their 
political interests and needs, in contrast, has been largely overlooked by academia. 
This paper addresses these research gaps by developing a micro-macro model of political 
participation focusing on the relationship between young citizens and the political system. Young 
citizens’ low political interest and their abstention can be conceived of as a failure of the political 
system to engage and mobilize them, and to consider their political needs (Berry 2014; Kimberlee 
2002). Political representation, however, can counteract this political marginalisation and promote 
electoral participation (Atkeson 2003; Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; 
Karp and Banducci 2008; Mansbridge 1999; Rocha et al. 2010 among others). While quotas and 
reserved seats have been introduced in some countries for visible political minorities, e.g. reserved 
seats for the Maori population in New Zealand and emigrants in Italy, or quotas, as in the case of 
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women, no such provisions exist for young citizens (Camera dei Deputati 2015; Htun 2004). Their 
inclusion as candidates running for election happens on a voluntary basis or after active recruitment 
efforts by political parties.  
This paper focuses on the consequences and implications of the strained relationship between young 
citizens and the political system for electoral participation.1 In light of young citizens’ low 
participation in politics, and the legitimacy and functioning threat an ever-ageing electorate poses 
(Berry 2014), there are theoretical grounds to expect descriptive representation to mobilize young 
citizens and to reduce the distance between them and the institutions of electoral democracy. The 
proposed micro-macro theoretical approach models differences in electoral participation as a function 
of the descriptive representation of the political system. This paper argues that higher levels of 
descriptive representation serve as contextual cues fostering the electoral participation of young 
citizens. The effect rests on the passive and active mobilizing effects of descriptive representation on 
the information levels, political empowerment, and heuristic potential of age as a political cue. The 
objective of this paper is to analyse to what extent descriptive representation directly and indirectly 
affects the political participation of young citizens.  
By applying the concept of descriptive representation to young citizens, this paper speaks to different 
literature strands. It contributes to the literature on political participation and political minorities by 
combining theoretical efforts, and presenting an innovative model of political participation bringing 
together micro and macro level determinants of political participation among young citizens. 
Furthermore, it contributes empirically by introducing an original dataset on the descriptive 
representation of young citizens, defined as enfranchised citizens under the age of 30, among the 
candidates running for, and the members of parliament elected in, national legislative elections in 
European countries. The dataset contains information on the descriptive representation of young 
citizens for 44 elections held in European countries between 2001 and 2013. By applying a 
hierarchical design, the empirical analysis disentangles the direct and indirect effects of descriptive 
representation on young citizens’ electoral participation.  
The following structure informs the remainder of the paper. The second section develops the 
theoretical framework and presents an overview of previous research on young citizens, and on 
descriptive representation. The third section presents the research design and the methodological 
strategy applied to the empirical analysis. The fourth section presents the empirical results while the 
fifth and concluding section critically discusses and concludes the paper.   
                                                          
1  The implications, however, likely extend beyond electoral participation into the broader participation repertoire of 
young citizens. The primary goal of this paper, however, lies in assessing the link between descriptive representation 
and young citizens’ electoral participation.  
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2. Theoretical framework 
Recent years have seen a revival of interest in the effects of age on political participation (Blais 2007; 
Franklin 2004; Wattenberg 2002). Held responsible for the turnout decline in established 
democracies, young citizens’ low political participation has prompted numerous theoretical 
explanations from the research community. Two main theoretical perspectives have guided the 
research agenda so far. On the one hand, life-cycle explanations have focused on the acquisition of 
adult roles and socioeconomic factors, and have forecast an increase in political participation, as 
individuals get older, followed by a decline after reaching a peak at around the ages of 40-50. Young 
citizens’ low political participation, thus, arises from initial starting up problems, which individuals 
surmount as they grow older (Campbell et al. 1960; Milbrath 1965; Nie, Verba, and Kim 1974). On 
the other hand, generational explanations have claimed that participation patterns established during 
the political socialization period have long lasting consequences for individuals’ political 
participation and, thus, turnout rates among young citizens’ might not recover at all as individuals 
age (Franklin 2004; Miller and Shanks 1996; Wass 2007).  
By focusing on individual level factors, previous research efforts have failed to consider differences 
in political participation arising between countries and elections, and among sub-groups of young 
citizens, e.g. low or highly educated. Absent from previous research on young citizen’s political 
participation, active mobilization efforts and passive mobilization effects by the political system and 
its actors shape the differences in political participation, and could contribute to understanding the, at 
times difficult, relationship between young citizens and the political system. Building on previous 
research on cognitive resources and attitudinal determinants of political participation (Brady, Verba, 
and Schlozman 1995; Leighley 1995; Zukin et al. 2006 among others), I address these research gaps 
by building a micro-macro model of young citizens’ electoral participation. The paper focuses on the 
relationship between young citizens and political actors and models their political participation onto 
differences in the political context. Because it delivers active and passive mobilization cues to young 
citizens, descriptive representation plays a key role in mobilizing young citizens. Differences in 
political participation are attributed to differences in the level of descriptive representation of young 
citizens in the political system.  
In the remainder of the theoretical framework, I develop the theoretical micro-macro model. In a first 
step, I outline how young citizens’ cognitive resources and political affinity and awareness shape 
electoral participation at the individual level. In a second step, I explain how descriptive 
representation, as a contextual factor, shapes and explains differences in the electoral participation of 
young citizens.  
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At the individual level, studies in political participation have found some individuals to be 
more likely to participate in politics than others. The quest for factors influencing political 
participation found socioeconomic resources and political awareness to be central ingredients of 
higher political engagement. According to the resource theory of political participation, 
socioeconomic and cognitive capabilities, and political awareness and affinity concur in bringing 
individuals to the ballot box (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995). Individuals with comparatively 
higher education, political interest, knowledge, and sophistication are overrepresented among electors 
(Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Zukin et al. 2006). In a similar fashion, individuals with a closer 
connection to the instances of the electoral system, i.e. parties, are more likely to vote. Furthermore, 
political interest and knowledge are larger among persons with higher education attainments 
(Gronlund and Milner 2006). While disagreement exists on the possibility of an increase in political 
interest over an individual’s life-span (see Glenn and Grimes 1968 and Prior 2010 for two contrasting 
studies), political information is considered a vital precursor of political participation altogether 
(Downs 1957).  
While previous studies have mainly focused on individual level factors, the differences in the political 
participation of young citizens between countries and elections call for an analysis of context level 
determinants because political participation is linked to the opportunities granted by the political 
environment and context (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).2 On the one hand, contextual differences in 
the opportunities to gain access to information affect individuals’ political knowledge, sophistication, 
and political participation. On the other hand, individuals’ political participation increases as a result 
of the mobilizing effect of contextual cues. Opportunities to acquire electoral information in an easy 
and prompt fashion, and political mobilization are particularly relevant for young citizens. As new 
entrants to the electoral system, young citizens are, comparatively speaking, less knowledgeable 
about, and inexperienced in the workings of politics and of the different actors. This inexperience, 
combined with their seemingly declining political interest and fading partisanship, means that 
contextual cues are an increasingly important source of electoral information. Furthermore, the 
increased relevance of generational aspects in politics, makes today’s youth more sensitive and 
receptive to contextual factors (Franklin 2004; Rubenson et al. 2004).  
To summarise, both individual level factors such as cognitive capabilities and political awareness, 
and context level factors providing cues facilitating the engagement with politics affect the political 
                                                          
2  As opposed to theoretical explanations purely focused on socioeconomic resources and their availability (cf. Brady et 
al. 1995; Nie et al. 1974; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980) 
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participation of young citizens (Berggren 2001; Fraile 2013; Gordon and Segura 1997; Kuklinski et 
al. 2001).  
Previous literature distinguishes five types of contextual cues or voting heuristics affecting 
individuals’ relationship with politics and facilitating their political participation (Lau and Redlawsk 
2001, 953–54): the party, and the ideological standpoint of the candidate, the affinity with groups 
endorsing the candidate, the viability of a candidate, and a candidate’s appearance characteristics. 
The paper focuses on the last contextual cue as it is easily accessible, requires low cognitive 
processing, and is more likely to be used by individuals with lower political interest and sophistication 
levels (Lau and Redlawsk 2001, 959). Thus, the paper focuses on the contextual cue effects 
channelled by the (descriptive) representation of age among political actors.3  
Descriptive representation refers to shared ascribed characteristics between representatives 
and represented (Pitkin 1967). In established democracies, descriptive representation is achieved 
when representatives replicate the distribution of characteristics present in the population they 
represent (Barnes and Burchard 2013; Celis et al. 2008). Unjustly relegated to the background by 
research on (substantive) representation (c.f. Pitkin 1967), descriptive representation contributes 
substantially to the functioning and legitimacy of the democratic political system (Mansbridge 1999; 
Phillips 1995, 1998; Uhlaner 2012). Its contribution extends over four aspects, all of which promote 
the political integration of (formerly) excluded and marginalised groups (Phillips 1998, 228). First, 
from a justice viewpoint, descriptive representation ensures access to the political system and allows 
previous discriminations against marginalized group to be compensated for. Second, descriptive 
representation potentially grants a means for neglected interests to find their way into the political 
discussion, and the decision making process. Third, representatives sharing ascribed characteristics 
with the electorate may function as role models to the marginalised group and promote their political 
empowerment. Fourth, descriptive representation contributes to the mobilization and the political 
participation of the members of the marginalised group (Abney and Hutcheson 1981; Burns, 
Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Phillips 1998). The focus of this paper lays on the last two contributions 
of descriptive representation, as they explicitly focus on the political engagement of marginalised 
groups, and can stand in as a proxy for the politicization of youth-related issues.  
Descriptive representation’s contribution to the engagement of politically underrepresented groups 
rests on the assumption that members of an underrepresented group are better suited to represent its 
interests (Phillips 1995), and its power resides within its potential for responsiveness (Pitkin 1967; 
                                                          
3  Candidates running for election and elected representatives to the legislative power. In bicameral systems, they refer 
to the lowest chamber.  
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Uhlaner 2012; Uhlaner and Scola 2016). Likeness between represented and representatives creates, 
for the represented, a feeling of shared interests and needs and reassurance of the representatives’ 
goodwill in defending their interests should they ever be threatened. For descriptive representation to 
foster electoral participation, actual responsiveness is not required. The possibility of responsiveness 
being delivered is sufficient for individuals to assess the future doing and undoing of political actors 
(Uhlaner 2012). Accordingly, voters’ choices and their mobilization will then fall on the electoral 
choice closest to their own demographic characteristics (McDermott 1998).  
The descriptive underrepresentation of a specific group constitutes a psychological and systemic 
hurdle to their political participation. Descriptive representation varies between countries and 
elections and thus affects the context within which political participation takes place, and the political 
choices offered to an individual (Atkeson 2003; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). In other words, 
political behaviour changes in response to changes in the descriptive representation of an 
underrepresented group.  
The theoretical link between descriptive representation and political behaviour rests on the theoretical 
contributions of the contextual cue theory and the political empowerment hypothesis (Atkeson 2003; 
Atkeson and Carrillo 2007; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Griffin and Keane 2006; Hansen 1997; Pantoja 
and Segura 2003; Reingold and Harrell 2010; Rocha et al. 2010; Rosenstone 1982; Segura and Bowler 
2005). Building on these two literature strands, I distinguish two channels of mobilization by which 
descriptive representation affects the political participation of young citizens. The first mobilization 
channel focuses on active mobilization efforts and the second on the passive mobilization effects of 
young representatives.  
Active mobilization efforts can be expected on the account of representatives and aspiring 
representatives directing their efforts at mobilizing young citizens (Gerber and Green 2000; Leighley 
1995; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) as they share characteristics and are more likely to respond to 
their mobilization efforts. Indeed, efforts by parties and candidates have proven to be effective in 
mobilizing citizens and have led to higher turnout rates (see Karp and Banducci 2007, 2008a; Trumm 
and Sudulich 2016).  
Passive mobilization effects rely on on the likeness between young (potential) representatives and 
young citizens. The perceived similarity between representatives and represented affects young 
citizens’ readiness to participate in politics. The presence of young candidates and representatives has 
a positive effect on the engagement of young citizens because it functions as a voting heuristic and 
cue. Especially in an environment of low political interest and sophistication, but also low 
partisanship, as is the case among young citizens, voting cues and heuristics can be expected to be 
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used on a more frequent basis (Lau and Redlawsk 2001). As such, the presence of young candidates 
and young representatives sends three distinct messages to young citizens: empowerment, 
information, and responsiveness.  
First, descriptive representation conveys a message of political empowerment to young citizens. The 
presence of young candidates and members of parliament provides role models for disengaged young 
citizens. In the case of young citizens running for election or being  elected to parliament, their peers 
have role models to identify with and have a more positive assessment of their own chances of 
becoming actively engaged in the political decision making process (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; 
Broockman 2014). 
Second, the presence of young candidates and MPs delivers age related voting cues which aid young 
citizens in participating politically by lowering the information level and the political cognition 
required to make an informed decision and thus to participate in politics (Segura and Bowler 2005).  
Third, the presence of young political actors encourages political participation by signalling a higher 
responsiveness and openness to young citizens, and their political needs and interest. By virtue of 
sharing a similar age and, potentially, similar interests and worldviews, young political actors accrue 
higher levels of trust and efficacy from their peers (Atkeson 2003; Atkeson and Carrillo 2007; Bobo 
and Gilliam 1990; Rocha et al. 2010).  
Previous evidence on the relationship between descriptive representation and political participation 
is found in studies on the political representation of women and ethnic minorities. Both literature 
strands argue for a positive effect of descriptive representation on political engagement. The empirical 
results, however, are of a mixed nature, largely based on a low number of cases, and predominantly 
focused on the United States. The evidence regarding the effect of descriptive representation on 
women's political engagement can be divided into two groups. One group found a positive effect 
(among others Atkeson and Carrillo 2007; Atkeson 2003; Barnes and Burchard 2013; Hansen 1997; 
Reingold and Harrell 2009) while the second group found no effect, or effects conditional on 
ideological congruence (among others Banducci et al. 2004; Karp and Banducci 2008; Lawless 2004; 
Reingold and Harrell 2009). Similarly, evidence on the empowerment of ethnic minorities has 
produced both positive (among others Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Griffin and Keane 2006; Pantoja and 
Segura 2003; Rocha et al. 2010; Tate 1993) as well as mixed and conditional results (among others 
Banducci et al. 2004; Griffin and Keane 2006). To date only a few studies have examined the cross-
country effect of descriptive representation. While Karp and Banducci (2008) only find a significant 
effect of women's representation on the assessment of democracy, both Barnes and Burchard (2013) 
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and Norris and Krook (2009) found a fostering effect of women's descriptive representation on both 
political attitudes and engagement. 
The paper argues that the same mechanism applies to young citizens because they have long been 
politically excluded. So far, few studies have investigated the descriptive representation of young 
citizens (see Kissau et al. (2012) for the case of the Swiss parliament) and tackled its relationship 
with young citizens' political engagement, revealing some mixed results. Investigating the impact of 
the presence of young representatives in national legislatives, Norris and Krook (2009) found a 
positive and reinforcing effect of the proportion of young representatives on voting, but a deterrent 
effect on demonstrating and associational membership levels. Based on pooled survey data from 48 
countries, Norris and Krook (2009) assessed the effect of descriptive representation by means of an 
interaction between the presence of young MPs and the age of the respondent, thus merely informing 
on the average effect of age and descriptive representation. I propose to analyse the effect of 
descriptive representation more thoroughly by focussing exclusively on young citizens.  
The effect of descriptive representation, however, might be more complex than previously theorised. 
The theoretical linkage between descriptive representation and political participation needs amending 
and expanding on at least two dimensions: the definition and operationalization of descriptive 
representation, and the nature of the effect (moderating effect). 
The first amendment concerns the understanding of descriptive representation and its 
implication for electoral participation. Previous efforts to understand the effect of descriptive 
representation can be roughly divided into two types according to their understanding of descriptive 
representation. The first type of empirical analysis, which includes the majority of empirical efforts 
(among others Banducci et al. 2004; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Karp and Banducci 2008; Norris and 
Krook 2009; Rocha et al. 2010), focuses on the presence of representatives of the group (members of 
parliament, MPS) in the national legislative body. The second type of analysis investigates the role 
of candidates' descriptive representation in mobilizing underrepresented groups (Atkeson 2003; Brace 
et al. 1995; Reingold and Harrell 2010; Tate 1993). The presence of candidates and MPs of an 
underrepresented group are both expected to foster political engagement (Karp and Banducci 2008b, 
106). However, the effects need to be disentangled from one another and put in relation to electoral 
participation. Firstly, electoral participation is expected to be more susceptible to the presence of 
young candidates rather than members of parliament (Reingold and Harrell 2010, 281), because it 
more directly affects the voting choices available to citizens.  
A higher presence of young candidates, furthermore, disseminates additional age cues, 
rendering political participation easier and increasing active mobilization efforts addressed towards 
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young citizens. Similarly, the presence of MPs can be thought of as signalling the responsiveness of 
the political system to young citizens, and informs the previous electoral experience and affinity with 
the political system. Accordingly, the following hypotheses can be formulated: 
H1a: The higher the descriptive representation of young citizens (a, b), the more likely a young citizen 
will vote.  
Where a) is the descriptive representation among candidates, and b) the descriptive 
representation among members of parliament. 
In addition, since individuals' political behaviour is dependent on changes to the political 
choices available to them (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) and the changes in political incorporation 
and influence (Bobo and Gilliam 1990, 378), the effect of descriptive representation among 
candidates depends on the previous level of representation in the legislative body: 
H1b: The effect of the descriptive representation of young citizens among candidates on voting will 
be stronger the higher previous representation level was among members of parliament (MPs) 
The second amendment to the link between descriptive representation and political participation 
focuses on the nature of the effect. I argue that descriptive representation affects the composition of 
young voters participating in elections because it moderates the effect specific individual level factors 
have on electoral participation. The three mechanisms described above suggest descriptive 
representation conveys cues and heuristics lowering the information and political cognition needed 
to participate in politics (second mechanism) (Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Segura and Bowler 2005), 
and informs on the responsiveness of the political system (third mechanism) (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; 
Rocha et al. 2010). Thus, young citizens with comparatively lower cognitive capabilities and less 
political awareness might profit more than proportionally from a political environment filled with age 
related cues. At a disadvantage, young citizens with lower educational attainment tend to participate 
less because they lack the capabilities to face the demands of political participation. The presence of 
cues, however, significantly lowers the hurdles to electoral participation. Similarly, persons who are 
less aware and interested in politics are more likely to participate in an environment with cues of 
responsiveness and politicians keen on mobilizing people of a same age. Indeed, previous research 
into the effect of descriptive representation on the composition of the electorate has showed that it 
affects political attitudes and increases levels of efficacy among citizens, aspects which, in turn, 
increase electoral participation.  
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In examining the effect of collective descriptive representation on external efficacy, Atkeson and 
Carrillo (2007) found that female respondents felt more politically efficient when a large proportion 
of legislators were female. Karp and Banducci (2008), analysing survey data from 35 countries, found 
a positive effect of women’s representation on the respondents’ satisfaction with the workings of 
democracy. Furthermore, Norris and Krook (2009) found on the part of the female population an 
increased interest in, and importance attached to, politics when legislative bodies included a large 
proportion of female representatives. Their analyses were based on surveys and representation data 
in the lower chambers of 66 parliaments. Similarly, Barnes and Burchard (2013), in investigating 
women's political engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa, found political interest and political discussion 
to increase in the presence of female legislators. Similarly, because descriptive representation carries 
easily accessible information, it reduces both the information necessary to be politically active and 
reduces the cognitive efforts requirements of electoral participation. Because of this, politically less 
interested and comparatively less educated young citizens find in descriptive representation a ready 
ally to their participation in elections (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Segura and Bowler 2005). In other 
words, less educated and less politically interested young citizens are more likely to participate in 
elections in which their peers are running for election or have been elected to office:  
H2: The higher descriptive representation (a, b), the smaller the effect of political awareness and 
education will be on the electoral participation of a young citizen. 
Where a) is the descriptive representation among candidates, and b) the descriptive 
representation among members of parliament. 
In summary, the micro-macro model (Figure 1 below) argues that young citizens' electoral 
participation is a function of both individual level factors - socioeconomic resources and political 
attitudes - and the descriptive representation of young citizens. The representativeness of the 
candidate selection and members of parliament positively affects participation among the young 
(direct effect). Moreover, young candidates' presence may foster political participation among the 
youngest citizens by moderating the effect of individual level variables – socioeconomic resources 
and political attitudes – on individuals’ political participation (indirect effect).   














3. Research design 
The focus of this paper is the analysis of electoral participation as a function of the descriptive 
representation of candidates and members of parliament (MPs) in national legislative elections in 
Europe. The analysis focuses on individuals' political behaviour in legislative elections in Europe in 
the time period 2001-2013, in which voting occurred on a voluntary basis.4,5 Based on the surveys 
carried out on a regular basis by the European Social Survey (2013) (ESS), the analysis relies on the 
information provided by 109996 individuals from 17 countries and 44 elections.6,7,8 The analysis 
focused on citizens under the age of thirty because, following (Plutzer 2002), citizens establish the 
habit of voting within the first two to three elections after enfranchisement.9,10 
  
                                                          
4  In bicameral systems, the focus lies on the lower chamber of parliament.   
5  As opposed to countries in which voting is compulsory. 
6  Only enfranchised individuals were considered in the analysis.  
7  Cross-referencing interview dates and elections dates, individuals' responses were assigned to a specific election for 
a total of 46 elections in 18 countries (See Table A.1 in the Appendix).  
8  Table D. 1 recounts operationalisation details for all variables and the corresponding European Social Survey variables 
used at the individual level.  
9  Countries do differ with respect to the length of the legislative terms. For the sake of analysis, a legislative term was 
considered to be of four years. Provided enfranchisement is set at the age of 18, individuals are considered to be young 
citizens for a period of three legislative terms (12 years) after enfranchisement.  
10  In the countries under study enfranchisement is set at the age of 18, with the exception of Austria where since 2007, 





Candidates & MPs 
H1a, b: +  H2: - 
Figure 1: Micro-macro model of young citizens’ electoral participation 
Level 2 
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Electoral participation was operationalized at the individual level as a dummy informing on whether 
the respondent indicated having voted in a national legislative election.11  
Explanatory variables 
Young citizens' descriptive representation is the key explanatory factor in the analysis, and its effect 
was assessed over two dimensions. Rather than solely relying on information on the age distribution 
among members of parliament, the paper adds the descriptive representation among candidates as a 
second dimension. The descriptive representation of young citizens is operationalized as the 
percentage of candidates under the age of 30. Information about the age distribution among candidates 
and elected MPs relied on an original database on the presence of young candidates and 
representatives based on official electoral and parliamentary sources (see Table D. 2 in Appendix D).  
Moderated variables 
The theoretical model also expected descriptive representation to have a moderating effect. Higher 
levels of descriptive representation interact with individual level factors and moderate their effect on 
electoral participation. The analysis focused on three individual level variables: educational 
attainment, political interest, and being close to a political party.12 Education was operationalized as 
the highest level of educational attainment achieved by the respondent.13 Political interest and being 
close to a political party are operationalised as dummies.14  
Control variables 
Furthermore, the following factors believed to affect electoral participation were added as control 
variables: the occupational status of the respondent (being employed/working, unemployed, in 
                                                          
11  Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in Table A.2 in the Appendix and more detailed information on 
the variables and their operationalization in Table D. 1 in Appendix D.  
12  Other control variables were tested and subsequently dropped from the analysis because found not statistically 
significant: competitiveness of the election, modifiability of the ballot (open list proportional representation). 
13  Five response categories informed on the respondent’s highest educational attainment: less than secondary (ISCED 
0-1), completed upper secondary (ISCED 3), completed post-secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED 4), and 
completed tertiary education and higher (ISCED 5-6). 
14  Political interest was operationalized as a dummy informing on whether the respondent stated to be very interested or 
somewhat interested in politics. Feeling close to a political party was operationalized as a dummy variable based on 
respondents’ affirmative answer in the questionnaire. 
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education), trust in parliament, female respondent (dummy), and the participation of enfranchised 
citizens over the age of 30 (as a proxy for the political culture of a country).15,16  
3.2 Methodology 
While the dependent variable - voted in national election – and most control variables are located at 
the individual level, the key explanatory variable - descriptive representation - is a context level 
factor. Hence, individual respondents are nested within elections, and are not independent from one 
another. To account for the hierarchical structure of the data (Bickel 2007; Hox 2010) and the 
dependency among individuals within the same cluster (Rabe-Heshket and Skrondal 2008), 
hierarchical logit models were estimated. To analyse the moderating effect of descriptive 
representation cross-level interactions between individual level determinants (political interest, trust 
in parliament, educational attainment) and descriptive representation among candidates and members 
of parliament were subsequently introduced into the analysis.17 To aid the interpretation, I visualise 
the average marginal effects of the three individual level variables – educational attainment, political 
interest, and feeling close to a political party. The marginal effects were computed for a male 
employed respondent, mistrusting parliament, living in a country with average turnout among older 
citizens, and with average descriptive representation among candidates and members of parliament 
(MPs). When not involved in the interaction, the moderated individual level factors were held at zero 
(political interest, feeling close to a party) or at their mean (educational attainment).  
4. Empirical results 
The empirical analyses assessed the direct and indirect effects of descriptive representation on young 
citizens’ electoral participation. The micro-macro model proposed modelled differences in young 
citizens’ propensity to vote between countries and elections on divergences in the level of descriptive 
representation (direct effect), and differences in the participation of different sub-groups of young 
citizens to the moderating effects of descriptive representation on individual level characteristics 
(indirect effect). To this end, I focused on three individual level characteristics previously found to 
                                                          
15  Three dummy variables assess the occupational status of the respondent based on the respondent’s main activity in 
the seven days preceding the interview: working, unemployed, and in education (other activities serves as a reference 
category and comprises the following occupational categories: permanently sick or disabled, community or military 
service, housework, and other). Trust in the parliament assesses the overall confidence of the respondent in political 
institutions. The dummy variable introduced in the analysis was operationalized by recoding the original 10-scale 
assessment of the European Social Survey to take on the value 1 for a trust in the parliament equal or higher to 6 on 
the 10-scale self-assessment. 
16  If not otherwise stated, the variables were operationalized based on information provided by the ESS surveys. 
17  All empirical analyses were carried out using Stata 12.1's xtmelogit command, graphical representations are based on 
the margins and marginsplot commands.  
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affect young citizens’ political participation, namely education, political interest, and identification 
with a political party. The investigation of the direct and indirect effects of descriptive representation 
focused on two dimensions of descriptive representation: candidates running for election and elected 
members of parliaments.  
The empirical analysis combined survey data from the European Social Survey (2013) with an 
original dataset of young citizens’ descriptive representation. The dataset contains data on the 
descriptive representation of young citizens among candidates and elected members of parliament 
(MPs) for 44 elections in 17 countries, implementing voluntary voting, between 2001 and 2013.18  
Descriptively, young citizens displayed quite striking differences in their participation in different 
elections. Figure 2 below shows the turnout among citizens under the age of 30 as reported by the 
respondents of the European Social Survey (2013). Young Swedes, Danes, and Icelanders reported 
the highest turnout, while the Swiss, Czech, Estonian, and Lithuanian young people the lowest. 
Concretely, electoral participation was higher than 80 percent in the first group, while in the second 
group only about 40 per cent reported having voted in the last national election.  
Figure 3 below informs on the descriptive representation of young citizens in national elections in 
European countries. At first glance, two main trends emerge from the visualization of young citizens’ 
descriptive representation. First, the level of representation varied substantially between countries 
and elections, and second, there were substantial differences in the descriptive representation among 
candidates and among members of parliament. Switzerland showed the most substantial difference 
over the two dimensions of descriptive representation. Swiss elections displayed the highest level of 
descriptive representation among candidates but had very few members of parliament were under the 
age of thirty. At the other end of the spectrum, Italy had the lowest number of young people running 
for election due to the age restriction set at 25, as well as the lowest representation level among 
members of parliament (none). In the middle ground, Denmark had average levels of descriptive 
representation among candidates running for election, but the highest level of representation among 
members of parliament.  
  
                                                          
18  See Table D. 2 for a detailed account of the sources.  
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ESS (2013), own calculations
Figure 2: The electoral participation of young citizens (%) 




Figure 3: Young citizens’ descriptive representation among candidates (t, %) and 
members of parliament (t-1, %) 
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The first set of hypotheses addressed the direct effects of descriptive representation on the electoral 
participation of young citizens. Figure 4 graphically depicts the relationship between the two 
dimensions of descriptive representation and the propensity of young citizens to vote in different 
elections.19 The results indicate that descriptive representation is partially responsible for young 
citizens’ voting propensity. Introduced separately in the analysis (Model A-C), the dimensions of 
descriptive representation appear to depress (candidates) or leave young citizens’ electoral 
participation unchanged (MPs). Figure 4 indicates that a young citizen was less likely to vote in an 
election which saw a comparatively large number of her peers running for election. Conversely, the 
presence of peers among members of parliament (MPs) did not affect her electoral participation. 
 
Figure 4: Direct effects of descriptive representation on young citizens’ electoral participation, 95%-CI20 
The results appear less contradictory against the background of the descriptive representation among 
members of parliament. By introducing the interaction between the two dimensions of descriptive 
representation, the failure to participate in elections with a substantial number of young candidates 
appears to be the result of previous failures to include young citizens in parliament. Figure 5 depicts 
the marginal effects of the interaction between the two dimensions of descriptive representation. 
                                                          
19  Table A. 2 in Appendix A depicts the detailed results of the direct effect of descriptive representation on young 
citizens’ electoral participation.  
20  Coefficients based on the estimates reported in Models A-D in Table A. 2 in Appendix A. 
(a): Young candidates (t, %)
(b): Young MPs (t-1, %)
(a)*(b)
-.04 -.02 0 .02 .04
Model A Model B Model C Model D




Figure 5: Marginal effect of descriptive representation among candidate as the descriptive 
representation among MPs changes, 95%-CI21 
At increasing levels of representation in parliament, the negative effect of having more young 
candidates running for election becomes less substantial and eventually loses its statistical 
significance. What this entails is that a young citizen confronted with an outgoing parliament mainly 
composed of older citizens will be less likely to participate in an upcoming election. Descriptive 
representation affects young citizens in both prospective and retrospective terms. The results suggest 
that when deciding to participate in an election, a young citizens takes into account previous 
experiences of representation (descriptive representation among MPs) to evaluate the chances of 
current candidates of being elected. This implies an underlying learning process dictated by 
contextual cues (descriptive representation) about the chances and opportunities granted by the 
political system to young citizens. If there is no premise of inclusion among political actors, 
increasing the presence of young citizens in the ranks of candidates running for election might not 
achieve the desired outcome, namely fostering their electoral participation. Increasing the presence 
of young people on electoral lists does not automatically ensure a higher participation level, since 
                                                          
























Descriptive representation - MPs (%)
Marginal effect of candidates
Chapter 3 Someone like me Karima S. Bousbah 
142 
 
voters’ previous experience regarding the electoral chances of young citizens also matters. The 
question thus arises of how to break the vicious cycle of underrepresentation and non-participation.22 
The second set of hypotheses addressed the indirect effects of descriptive representation on young 
citizens’ electoral participation.23 Cross-level interactions informed on whether the effect of 
individual level factors on electoral participation varied in response to different levels of descriptive 
representation. It was investigated whether the electoral participation of young citizens with a specific 
set of individual characteristics changed in different context settings. Comparing the marginal effect 
of three individual level variables in elections with an increasing level of descriptive representation 
informs on the moderating effect the presence of young citizens among political actors has on their 
peers’ electoral participation. Individuals who are better educated and are politically aware – 
politically interested and can identify with a political party – are expected to have an advantage over 
their counterparts, which translates into a higher likelihood of voting in elections. To the extent that 
this advantage diminishes or disappears in elections with a higher presence of young political actors, 
descriptive representation exterts a moderating effect. The empirical results for the cross-level 
interactions between descriptive representation and the three individual level characteristics – 
education, political interest, and feeling close to a political party – are summarised in Table A. 3 
(descriptive representation among candidates ) and Table A. 4 (descriptive representation among 
MPs) in Appendix A. The marginal effects were re-estimated and graphically depicted in Figure 6 
below.  
First, focussing on the moderating effect of descriptive representation among candidates it becomes 
evident that different sub-groups of young citizens react differently to the presence of young 
candidates. Among those turning out more were young citizens with comparatively lower education 
(upper left graph in Figure 6 below). Indeed the advantage of highly educated young citizens over 
their couterparts diminished in elections which saw comparatively more young individuals running 
for election. In other words, a young citizen with a lower educational attainment was more likely to 
participate in an election in a country in which a high percentage of candidates is young. Having 
young candidates, thus, mobilizes a previously marginalised group into political participation and 
reduces the participation gap due to education. Conversely, young candidates do not help young 
citizens overcome the obstacles to electoral participation represented by low political awareness 
(middle and bottom left graph in Figure 6). 
                                                          
22  The remaining factors (control variables) behaved as expected and are summarized in Model 1 in Table A. 2 in 
Appendix A and graphically visualized in Figure B. 3 in Appendix B.  
23  Estimation results on the random slopes for educational attainment, political interest, and feeling close to a political 
party are summarized in Models 2-4 in Table A. 2 in Appendix A and the visualized in Figure B. 2 in Appendix B. 




Figure 6: Marginal effect of individual level determinants on young citizens’ electoral participation as 
the descriptive representation among candidates (A) and members of parliament (B) changes, 
95%-CI24 
Politically less aware young citizens, namely those not interested in politics and not feeling close to 
any political party, are not more likely to participate in elections with a large number of young 
citizens. On the contrary, differences in political affinity become stronger in a setting of high 
descriptive representation among candidates. Politically less aware citizens are less likely to vote in 
elections with a age resemblance between candidates and citizens. While the contextual cues offered 
by candidates manage to mobilize the young electorate barred by lower educational attainment, it did 
little to foster the electoral participation of less politically aware young citizens. 
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The opposite held true for the moderating effect of descriptive representation among members of 
parliament (right-hand side graphs in Figure 6 above). Differences in political participation due to a 
higher educational attainment become more substantial in elections with a comparatively high 
number of young members of parliament at the end of their term. Political awareness – being 
politically interested and feeling close to a political party – lost its relevance for electoral participation 
in elections with a high number of out-going young members of parliament. Young citizens’ interest 
in politics or identification with a political party did not determine thier participation in elections in 
highly descriptive countries, while its absence impeded participation in countries with less 
descriptively representative parliaments. The contextual cues offered by the composition of the out-
going parliament offereded orientation and support to young citizens who were not particularly aware 
of politics and have less affinity with political actors, while they cement the advantage of highly 
educated young ctitizens.  
To summarise, young citizens’ descriptive representation offered represents a valid instrument for 
targeting sub-groups of young citizens and fostering their participation in national elections. 
Differences in participation occuring because of different levels of education among young citizens 
were better addressed by increasing the representation of young citizens among candidates running 
for elections. The presence of young members of parliament, on the contrary, did not prove a valuable 
solution to target this subgroup of young citizens. However, more representative parliaments, 
however, prove efficient in promoting electoral participation among young citizens with a 
comparatively lower interest in politics and those who do not have a close relationship with any 
political party.  
Robustness checks  
To assess the robustness of the empirical results, I carried out three sets of checks. The first set of 
robustness checks tested alternative specifications of the model and the explanatory variable. First, I 
introduced the two dimensions of descriptive representation simultaneously and a three-way 
interaction with the individual level determinants (education, political interest, close to a political 
party) (see Table C. 1 and Figure C. 1 in Appendix C). Second, I tested two alternative specifications 
of the explanatory variable. On the one hand, I weighted descriptive representation by the population 
percentage of young citizens (Table C. 2 and Figure C. 2 in the Appendix). On the other hand, I 
introduced descriptive representation as retention rate at t-1, namely the percentage of members of 
parliament under the age of 30 divided by the percentage of candidates under 30 running for election 
at time t-1 (Table C. 3 and Figure C. 3 in Appendix C). Both alternative specifications of the 
explanatory variable – descriptive representation – showed empirical results consistent with the 
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original specification. The second set of robustness checks focused on the definition of young 
citizens. I carried out the analysis for two alternative specifications of young citizens: young citizens 
under the age of 25 (a: enfranchised young citizens under the age of 25) and under the age of 35 (b: 
enfranchised young citizens under the age of 35). The empirical results for these robustness checks 
suggested that the empirical results are resistant to the specification of the age group (see Table C. 4 
through Table C. 9, and Figure C. 4 and Figure C. 5 in Appendix C). The third set of robustness 
checks tested the effect of the descriptive representation of young on older citizens, namely 
enfranchised citizens over the age of 30, and informed on the specificity of the effect to young citizens 
(see Table C. 10 through Table C. 12, and Figure C. 6 in Appendix C). With the exception of the 
interaction between political interest and the representation among candidates, older citizens’ 
participation remained immune to the moderating effect of descriptive representation. This means 
that, while overall older citizens were less likely to vote in an election with a large presence of young 
candidates, there are no sub-groups of older citizens specifically affected by it.  
5. Conclusions 
This paper focuses on the effect of descriptive representation on the electoral participation of young 
citizens. Bridging between individual and context level determinants of electoral participation, the 
paper develops a micro-macro model to explain differences in the political participation of young 
citizens. Differences in electoral participation are theorised on two levels, between countries and 
elections, and amongst groups of young citizens. Focusing on the cognitive requirements for political 
participation and the political awareness of young citizens, descriptive representation was expected 
to deliver contextual cues to and to mobilize young citizens (Atkeson and Carrillo 2007; Bobo and 
Gilliam 1990; Mansbridge 1999; McDermott 1998 among others). Differences in electoral 
participation were modelled as a function of the presence of young citizens among candidates running 
for election and elected representatives.  
The empirical analysis is based on the individual level information provided by the European Social 
Survey (2013) and an original dataset on the descriptive representation of young citizens in national 
legislative elections in European countries. The dataset contained information on the percentage of 
candidates running for, and elected members of parliament under, the age of 30. Analysing the 
political participation of young citizens in 44 national elections in 17 countries between 2001 and 
2013, the empirical results supported the relevance of descriptive representation. 
The relationship between young citizens and the political system and actors appears to be at the root 
of the former’s distance from the voting booths. The lack of representation among political actors 
keeps young citizens away from the polls, or at least specific sub-groups of young citizens. Young 
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citizens are more likely to participate in elections if there are peers running for, or elected, to 
parliament. The overall effect of descriptive representation runs counter to theoretical expectations. 
Taken separately, the dimensions of descriptive representation considered in the analysis either leave 
young citizens indifferent (members of parliament) or even further cemented their non-participation 
even further (candidates). These, to some extent, surprising results however, merely indicate that 
young people’s previous experience with descriptive representation influences their political 
prospective. When confronted with an outgoing parliament mainly composed of grey-haired 
politicians, young citizens have no grounds to believe in the possibility of change even if a substantial 
number of their peers are running for election. Descriptive representation, however, mobilizes 
specific sub-groups of young citizens, namely those who previously abstained because of a 
comparatively lower education level or lower political awareness.  
Young citizens running for election mobilize their peers with comparatively lower education into 
participating in elections. Young citizens with both higher and lower educational attainments have 
the same likelihood of participating in an election with large numbers of peers running for election. 
While young candidates alleviate differences occurring due to education, young members of 
parliament foster the political participation of young citizens with comparatively lower political 
awareness, namely those who are not very interested in politics or cannot identify with a political 
party.  
As a tentative interpretation of the empirical results, I would argue that the presence of young people 
among candidates’ ranks manages to mobilize young citizens on the account of active mobilization 
efforts by these candidates, and exemplifies the choice and decision making process of young citizens. 
Faced with an easily accessible contextual cue, namely the age of candidates, young citizens have 
lower barriers to surmount. Politically less aware young citizens mobilize due to greater perceived 
responsiveness and closer ties with political actors, namely members of parliament.  
The implications of the empirical analysis are twofold. First, descriptive representation appears to 
shape differences in electoral participation between young citizens in different elections. Second, by 
expanding the definition of descriptive representation to also include candidates, the effect of 
descriptive representation on different sub-groups of young citizens can be disentangled.  
The results raise practical political questions and call for the implementation of electoral instruments 
aimed at increasing the presence of young citizens among candidates and members of parliament, e.g. 
quota. On the one hand, requirements for passive suffrage differ substantially over countries, and 
party requirements set additional barriers to candidacy among young citizens. On the other hand, so 
far, no official representation requirements to include young citizens in the ranks exist, as is the case 
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for other visible political minorities. This is troublesome to the extent that the empirical analysis 
hinted at negative effects stemming from the failure to include young citizens in parliament. Having 
few or no young citizens as members of parliament depresses the political participation of young 
citizens, even if there are young citizens running for elections. In the worst-case scenario, this could 
lead to a vicious circle of exclusion and abstention among young citizens.  
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Appendix A - Tables 
Table A. 1: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean St. dev. Min Max 
Voted in the last national election 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Young candidates (t, %) 0.50 5.13 -8.28 20.34 
Young MPs (t-1, %) 0.39 2.53 -4.03 6.27 
Female 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Educ. attainment -0.04 0.99 -2.41 1.59 
Close to a party 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Political interest 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Unemployed 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
In education 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Working 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Trust in parliament 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.15 10.36 -19.00 16.78 
Observations 19845    
  
     
  
Table A. 2: Descriptive representation and young citizens’ electoral participation – Direct and indirect effects 
 (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (A) (B) (C) (D) 















Young candidates (t, %)      -0.0274***  -0.0281*** -0.0186* 
      (0.008)  (0.008) (0.009) 
Young MPs (t-1, %)       -0.00992 -0.0152 -0.00318 
       (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) 
Young candidates (t, %)*Young MPs (t-1, %)         0.00867* 
         (0.004) 
Educ. attainment  0.420*** 0.421*** 0.421*** 0.425*** 0.419*** 0.420*** 0.419*** 0.419*** 
  (0.019) (0.026) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Political interest  0.808*** 0.808*** 0.809*** 0.823*** 0.812*** 0.808*** 0.811*** 0.813*** 
  (0.040) (0.040) (0.048) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Close to a party  1.013*** 1.012*** 1.013*** 1.039*** 1.015*** 1.013*** 1.016*** 1.016*** 
  (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.087) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Female  0.0739* 0.0742* 0.0743* 0.0685+ 0.0742* 0.0738* 0.0741* 0.0743* 
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Unemployed  -0.418*** -0.414*** -0.419*** -0.431*** -0.418*** -0.419*** -0.419*** -0.421*** 
  (0.077) (0.078) (0.077) (0.078) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) 
In education  -0.101 -0.0985 -0.101 -0.0995 -0.102 -0.101 -0.102 -0.104+ 
  (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
Working  0.0794 0.0831 0.0801 0.0750 0.0811 0.0791 0.0806 0.0800 
  (0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
Trust in parliament  0.327*** 0.327*** 0.326*** 0.336*** 0.333*** 0.328*** 0.334*** 0.333*** 
  (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Turnout >30 (%)  0.0484*** 0.0469*** 0.0486*** 0.0509*** 0.0464*** 0.0487*** 0.0468*** 0.0456*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 0.691*** -0.0179 -0.0137 -0.0186 -0.00561 0.00236 -0.0155 0.00669 0.00886 
 (0.103) (0.078) (0.079) (0.079) (0.078) (0.074) (0.078) (0.074) (0.073) 
L2 RI 0.449*** 0.0910*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.0933*** 0.0698*** 0.0907*** 0.0688*** 0.0620*** 
 (0.050) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) 
L1 RS   0.0101*** 0.0265*** 0.253***     
   (0.003) (0.010) (0.038)     
Covariance   0.518+ -0.348 -0.289     
   (0.234) (0.281) (0.195)     
N/N groups 19845/44 19845/44 19845/44 19845/44 19845/44 19845/44 19845/44 19845/44 19845/44 
Log. likelihood -12053.7 -10654.3 -10649.5 -10652.5 -10615.8 -10649.1 -10654.1 -10648.7 -10646.7 
AIC 24127.1 21417.4 21427.6 21433.7 21360.2 21416.9 21427.0 21426.0 21432.0 
BIC 24111.3 21330.6 21324.9 21331.1 21257.6 21322.1 21332.3 21323.3 21321.4 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L2: Level 2; L1: Level 1; RI: random intercepts; RS: random slope at individual level; individual level residual 
variance fixed at π2/3. 
  
   
  
Table A. 3: Descriptive representation among candidates and young citizens’ electoral 
participation – Cross-level interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) 




*Close to a 
political party 
Young candidates (t, %) -0.0308*** -0.0311*** -0.0266** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Young MPs (t-1, %) -0.0187 -0.0226 -0.00999 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
Educ. attainment 0.429*** 0.420*** 0.424*** 
 (0.024) (0.019) (0.019) 
Political interest 0.811*** 0.805*** 0.826*** 
 (0.040) (0.048) (0.040) 
Close to a party 1.015*** 1.016*** 1.047*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.088) 
Educ. attainment*Young candidates (t, %) -0.0110**   
 (0.004)   
Political interest*Young candidates (t, %)  0.00545  
  (0.008)  
Close to a political party*Young candidates (t, %)   -0.00554 
   (0.015) 
Female 0.0735* 0.0745* 0.0687+ 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Unemployed -0.415*** -0.421*** -0.431*** 
 (0.078) (0.077) (0.078) 
In education -0.0985 -0.102 -0.101 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) 
Working 0.0843 0.0817 0.0760 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) 
Trust in parliament 0.335*** 0.333*** 0.343*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.0462*** 0.0473*** 0.0478*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Constant 0.0138 0.00911 0.0162 
 (0.076) (0.076) (0.077) 
L2 RI 0.0742*** 0.0809*** 0.0801*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
L1 RS 0.00619*** 0.0257*** 0.254*** 
 (0.002) (0.010) (0.038) 
Covariance 0.385 -0.503 -0.427* 
 (0.294) (0.280) (0.178) 
N/N groups 19845/44 19845/44 19845/44 
Log. likelihood -10641.3 -10646.3 -10610.3 
AIC 21441.0 21450.9 21378.9 
BIC 21314.7 21324.6 21252.5 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L2: Level 2; L1: Level 1; RI: 
random intercepts; RS: random slope at individual level; individual level residual variance fixed at π2/3.   
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Table A. 4: Descriptive representation among members of parliament (MPs) and 
young citizens’ electoral participation – Cross-level interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) 




*Close to a 
political party 
Young candidates (t, %) -0.0266** -0.0289*** -0.0281*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Young MPs (t-1, %) -0.0133 0.00141 -0.00512 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) 
Educ. attainment 0.414*** 0.420*** 0.424*** 
 (0.025) (0.019) (0.019) 
Political interest 0.811*** 0.823*** 0.826*** 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) 
Close to a party 1.015*** 1.016*** 1.047*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.087) 
Educ. Attainment*Young MPs (t-1, %) 0.0100   
 (0.009)   
Political interest*Young MPs (t-1, %)  -0.0559***  
  (0.016)  
Close to a political party*Young MPs (t-1, %)   -0.0180 
   (0.033) 
Female 0.0750* 0.0743* 0.0689+ 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Unemployed -0.415*** -0.420*** -0.431*** 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) 
In education -0.0992 -0.100 -0.101 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) 
Working 0.0844 0.0815 0.0761 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) 
Trust in parliament 0.333*** 0.335*** 0.343*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.0462*** 0.0478*** 0.0480*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Constant 0.00682 0.00132 0.0163 
 (0.075) (0.076) (0.077) 
L2 RI 0.0705*** 0.0759*** 0.0799*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) 
L1 RS 0.00895*** 0.00315 0.250*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.038) 
Covariance 0.259 -0.644 -0.422* 
 (0.284) (1.201) (0.179) 
N/N groups 19845/44 19845/44 19845/44 
Log. likelihood -10644.3 -10641.3 -10610.2 
AIC 21446.9 21441.0 21378.7 
BIC 21320.6 21314.6 21252.4 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L2: Level 2; L1: 
Level 1; RI: random intercepts; RS: random slope at individual level; individual level residual 
variance fixed at π2/3. 
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Appendix B – Figures 
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Figure B. 2: Random slopes for educational attainment, political interest, and feeling close to a political party over elections 
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Figure B. 3: Individual level determinants and controls of young citizens’ electoral participation25 
  
                                                          
25
  Based on the estimation results reported in Model 1 in Table A. 2 in Appendix A. 
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Appendix C – Robustness checks 
 Table C. 1: Robustness check 1: Candidates*MPs and young citizens’ electoral participation– Three-way 
cross-level interactions 




*Close to a 
political party 
Young candidates (t, %) -0.0186* -0.0202* -0.0205* -0.0174+ 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Young MPs (t-1, %) -0.00318 -0.00268 0.0120 0.00761 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) 
Young candidates (t, %)*Young MPs (t-1, %) 0.00867* 0.00941* 0.00827+ 0.00819+ 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Female 0.0743* 0.0739* 0.0748* 0.0690+ 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Educ. attainment 0.419*** 0.426*** 0.420*** 0.424*** 
 (0.019) (0.024) (0.019) (0.019) 
Close to a party 1.016*** 1.015*** 1.017*** 1.053*** 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.088) 
Political interest 0.813*** 0.812*** 0.827*** 0.827*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) 
Unemployed -0.421*** -0.417*** -0.422*** -0.433*** 
 (0.077) (0.078) (0.077) (0.078) 
In education -0.104+ -0.100 -0.102 -0.103 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) 
Working 0.0800 0.0833 0.0814 0.0750 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) 
Trust in parliament 0.333*** 0.333*** 0.334*** 0.342*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.0456*** 0.0447*** 0.0466*** 0.0462*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Educ. Attainment*Young candidates (t, %)  -0.0114*   
  (0.005)   
Educ. Attainment*Young MPs (t-1, %)  0.00418   
  (0.010)   
Educ. Attainment*Young candidates (t, %)*Young MPs (t-1, %)  -0.000691   
  (0.002)   
Political interest*Young candidates (t, %)   0.00465  
   (0.008)  
Political interest*Young MPs (t-1, %)   -0.0514**  
   (0.017)  
Political interest*Young candidates (t, %)*Young MPs (t-1, %)   0.00318  
   (0.004)  
Close to a political party*Young candidates (t, %)    -0.00474 
    (0.018) 
Close to a political party*Young MPs (t-1, %)    -0.0193 
    (0.034) 
Close to a political party*Young candidates (t, %)*Young MPs (t-1, %)    0.00189 
    (0.009) 
Constant 0.00886 0.0149 0.00310 0.0181 
 (0.073) (0.074) (0.075) (0.076) 
L2 RI -1.391*** -1.362*** -1.334*** -1.283*** 
 (0.130) (0.132) (0.136) (0.143) 
L1 RS  0.00569*** 0.00188** 0.248*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.038) 
Covariance  0.460 -1.000 -0.485* 
  (0.304) (0.111) (0.168) 
N/N groups 19845/44 19845/44 19845/44 19845/44 
Log. likelihood -10646.7 -10638.6 -10638.4 -10608.1 
AIC 21432.0 21465.2 21464.9 21404.2 
BIC 21321.4 21315.2 21314.9 21254.2 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L2: Level 2; L1: Level 1; RI: random intercepts; RS: 
random slope at individual level; individual level residual variance fixed at π2/3. 
 




Figure C. 1: The marginal effects of educational attainment, political interest, and being close to a political 
party as the descriptive representation among candidates (A) and members of parliament (MPs) 
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Table C. 2: Robustness check 2a: Weighted descriptive representation and young citizens’ electoral participation 












*Close to a 
political party 
Young candidates (t, %) -0.459***  -0.678** -0.490*** -0.522*** -0.422*** -0.439*** -0.464*** -0.462*** 
 (0.109)  (0.210) (0.112) (0.122) (0.124) (0.113) (0.110) (0.109) 
Young MPs (t-1, %)  -0.264 -1.173 -0.331 -0.340 -0.197 -0.237 -0.0416 -0.0813 
  (0.288) (0.787) (0.247) (0.264) (0.246) (0.253) (0.268) (0.283) 
Young candidates (t, %)*Young MPs (t-1, %)   1.121       
   (0.941)       
Female 0.0744* 0.0738* 0.0744* 0.0737* 0.0750* 0.0690+ 0.0755* 0.0748* 0.0692* 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Educ. attainment 0.418*** 0.420*** 0.418*** 0.532*** 0.419*** 0.424*** 0.368*** 0.419*** 0.424*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.057) (0.019) (0.019) (0.047) (0.019) (0.019) 
Close to a party 1.016*** 1.013*** 1.017*** 1.017*** 1.018*** 1.171*** 1.017*** 1.018*** 1.157*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.214) (0.039) (0.039) (0.158) 
Political interest 0.813*** 0.808*** 0.813*** 0.812*** 0.692*** 0.827*** 0.813*** 1.012*** 0.827*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.111) (0.040) (0.040) (0.081) (0.040) 
Unemployed -0.417*** -0.419*** -0.420*** -0.415*** -0.420*** -0.430*** -0.414*** -0.420*** -0.430*** 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) (0.077) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) 
In education -0.101 -0.101 -0.103+ -0.0986 -0.101 -0.101 -0.0986 -0.100 -0.101 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) 
Working 0.0821 0.0791 0.0811 0.0850 0.0830 0.0770 0.0857 0.0818 0.0772 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) 
Trust in parliament 0.336*** 0.328*** 0.337*** 0.338*** 0.336*** 0.346*** 0.335*** 0.339*** 0.346*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.0480*** 0.0494*** 0.0475*** 0.0484*** 0.0497*** 0.0498*** 0.0484*** 0.0498*** 0.0500*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Educ. Attainment*Young candidates (t, %)    -0.130*      
    (0.059)      
Political interest*Young candidates (t, %)     0.135     
     (0.113)     
Close to a political party*Young candidates (t, %)      -0.144    
      (0.221)    
Young MPs (t-1, %)*Educ. attainment       0.182   
       (0.146)   
Political interest*Young MPs (t-1, %)        -0.755**  
        (0.259)  
Close to a political party*Young MPs (t-1, %)         -0.418 
         (0.491) 
Constant 0.379** 0.0522 0.625** 0.498*** 0.521*** 0.411** 0.426** 0.395** 0.415** 
 (0.119) (0.109) (0.194) (0.139) (0.146) (0.146) (0.140) (0.139) (0.141) 
L2 RI 0.0616*** 0.0896*** 0.0577*** 0.0644*** 0.0680*** 0.0720*** 0.0620*** 0.0658*** 0.0719*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
L1 RS    0.00715*** 0.0229*** 0.251*** 0.00857*** 0.0100** 0.246*** 
    (0.002) (0.009) (0.038) (0.003) (0.008) (0.037) 
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Covariance    0.361 -0.420 -0.450* 0.284 -0.366 -0.445* 
    (0.284) (0.305) (0.174) (0.283) (0.428) (0.175) 
N/N groups 19845/44 19845/44 19845/44 19845/44 19845/44 19845/44 19845/44 19845/44 19845/44 
Log. likelihood -10646.7 -10653.9 -10645.4 -10640.0 -10643.6 -10607.8 -10641.6 -10640.5 -10607.6 
AIC 21412.2 21426.5 21429.3 21438.4 21445.5 21373.8 21441.5 21439.3 21373.5 
BIC 21317.5 21331.7 21318.8 21312.1 21319.1 21247.5 21315.2 21313.0 21247.2 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L2: Level 2; L1: Level 1; RI: random intercepts; RS: random slope at individual level; individual 
level residual variance fixed at π2/3. 
 




Figure C. 2: The marginal effects of educational attainment, political interest, and being close to a political 
party as the descriptive representation among candidates (A) and members of parliament (MPs) 
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Table C. 3: Robustness check 2b – Retention rate (candidates/MPs, t-1) and young citizens’ electoral 
participation 




*Close to a 
political party 
Retention rate (t-1) 0.0442 0.0622 0.207 0.0622 
 (0.183) (0.189) (0.195) (0.195) 
Educ. attainment 0.437*** 0.399*** 0.438*** 0.443*** 
 (0.021) (0.048) (0.022) (0.022) 
Political interest 0.819*** 0.818*** 1.028*** 0.835*** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.080) (0.044) 
Close to a party 0.983*** 0.981*** 0.985*** 0.965*** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.172) 
Educ. Attainment*Retention rate (t-1)  0.0825   
  (0.094)   
Political interest*Retention rate (t-1)   -0.544***  
   (0.165)  
Close to a political party*Retention rate (t-1)    0.139 
    (0.355) 
Female 0.0584 0.0580 0.0601 0.0549 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Unemployed -0.444*** -0.440*** -0.443*** -0.455*** 
 (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) 
In education -0.0804 -0.0761 -0.0792 -0.0813 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.070) 
Working 0.0476 0.0522 0.0506 0.0453 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
Trust in parliament 0.323*** 0.324*** 0.323*** 0.331*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.0476*** 0.0464*** 0.0484*** 0.0499*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant -0.0282 -0.0348 -0.0992 -0.0276 
 (0.111) (0.114) (0.116) (0.115) 
L2 RI 0.0765*** 0.0818*** 0.0830*** 0.0797*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
L1 RS  0.00972*** 0.00915* 0.271*** 
  (0.003) (0.009) (0.045) 
Covariance  0.518+ -0.171 -0.341 
  (0.248) (0.489) (0.202) 
N/N groups 16516/44 16516/44 16516/44 16516/44 
Log. likelihood -8705.8 -8701.1 -8699.2 -8673.8 
AIC 17528.1 17547.8 17544.1 17493.3 
BIC 17435.5 17432.1 17428.4 17377.6 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L2: Level 2; L1: Level 1; RI: random 
intercepts; RS: random slope at individual level; individual level residual variance fixed at π2/3. 
  




Figure C. 3: The marginal effects of educational attainment, political interest, 
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Table C. 4: Robustness Test 3a): Descriptive representation and young citizens’ electoral participation – 
Enfranchised citizens under the age of 25 












Young candidates (t, %)   -0.0199*  -0.0208* -0.0114 
   (0.009)  (0.009) (0.010) 
Young MPs (t-1, %)    -0.0142 -0.0185 -0.00622 
    (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
Young candidates (t, %)*Young MPs (t-1, %)      0.00870+ 
      (0.005) 
Educ. attainment  0.470*** 0.469*** 0.470*** 0.469*** 0.468*** 
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Political interest  0.769*** 0.774*** 0.768*** 0.773*** 0.775*** 
  (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
Close to a party  0.993*** 0.997*** 0.993*** 0.998*** 0.999*** 
  (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
Female  0.0375 0.0379 0.0375 0.0379 0.0381 
  (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Unemployed  -0.208+ -0.206+ -0.209* -0.208+ -0.211* 
  (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) 
In education  0.0709 0.0705 0.0707 0.0701 0.0684 
  (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) 
Working  0.197* 0.201* 0.197* 0.201* 0.201* 
  (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) 
Trust in parliament  0.219*** 0.228*** 0.220*** 0.230*** 0.229*** 
  (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
Turnout >30 (%)  0.0453*** 0.0438*** 0.0457*** 0.0443*** 0.0431*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Constant 0.521*** -0.112 -0.102 -0.108 -0.0968 -0.0951 
 (0.100) (0.099) (0.097) (0.099) (0.097) (0.096) 
L2 RI 0.418*** 0.0819*** 0.0720*** 0.0808*** 0.0701*** 0.0635*** 
 (0.047) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) 
N/N groups 11153/44 11153/44 11153/44 11153/44 11153/44 11153/44 
Log. likelihood -6986.1 -6254.4 -6251.8 -6254.1 -6251.3 -6249.6 
AIC 13990.8 12611.3 12615.5 12620.1 12623.8 12629.7 
BIC 13976.1 12530.8 12527.7 12532.3 12528.6 12527.2 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L2: Level 2; RI: random intercepts; RS: random slope at 
individual level; individual level residual variance fixed at π2/3.  
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Table C. 5: Robustness Test 3a): Descriptive representation among candidates and young 
citizens’ electoral participation - Enfranchised citizens under the age of 25 




*Close to a 
political party 
Young candidates (t, %) -0.0276** -0.0184+ -0.0220* 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Young MPs (t-1, %) -0.0202 -0.0179 -0.0111 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.018) 
Educ. attainment 0.477*** 0.469*** 0.476*** 
 (0.033) (0.029) (0.029) 
Political interest 0.772*** 0.781*** 0.789*** 
 (0.051) (0.065) (0.052) 
Close to a party 1.000*** 0.999*** 1.046*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.104) 
Educ. Attainment*Young candidates (t, %) -0.0171**   
 (0.006)   
Political interest*Young candidates (t, %)  -0.00613  
  (0.011)  
Close to a political party*Young candidates (t, %)   0.00163 
   (0.018) 
Female 0.0393 0.0357 0.0318 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Unemployed -0.208+ -0.207+ -0.219* 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.107) 
In education 0.0727 0.0734 0.0689 
 (0.085) (0.085) (0.086) 
Working 0.199* 0.204* 0.194* 
 (0.085) (0.085) (0.086) 
Trust in parliament 0.234*** 0.228*** 0.245*** 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.0447*** 0.0443*** 0.0441*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant -0.0899 -0.0984 -0.0892 
 (0.098) (0.098) (0.101) 
L2 RI 0.0759*** 0.0746*** 0.0970*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) 
L1 RS 0.00871*** 0.0550*** 0.322*** 
 (0.005) (0.017) (0.055) 
Covariance 0.189 -0.255 -0.538** 
 (0.379) (0.333) (0.165) 
N/N groups 11153/44 11153/44 11153/44 
Log. likelihood -6245.0 -6248.3 -6228.9 
AIC 12639.0 12645.7 12607.0 
BIC 12521.9 12528.6 12489.9 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L2: Level 2; L1: Level 
1; RI: random intercepts; RS: random slope at individual level; individual level residual variance fixed 
at π2/3. 
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Table C. 6: Robustness test 3a): Descriptive representation among MPs and young citizens’ electoral 
participation – Enfranchised citizens under the age of 25 




*Close to a 
political party 
Young candidates (t, %) -0.0219* -0.0221* -0.0216* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Young MPs (t-1, %) -0.0168 0.00760 0.00305 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) 
Educ. attainment 0.461*** 0.468*** 0.475*** 
 (0.037) (0.029) (0.029) 
Political interest 0.775*** 0.802*** 0.788*** 
 (0.051) (0.053) (0.052) 
Close to a party 0.999*** 1.002*** 1.060*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.101) 
Educ. Attainment*Young MPs (t-1, %) 0.00695   
 (0.014)   
Political interest*Young MPs (t-1, %)  -0.0882***  
  (0.020)  
Close to a political party*Young MPs (t-1, %)   -0.0461 
   (0.037) 
Female 0.0395 0.0397 0.0325 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Unemployed -0.208+ -0.206+ -0.218* 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.107) 
In education 0.0717 0.0754 0.0693 
 (0.085) (0.085) (0.086) 
Working 0.200* 0.204* 0.194* 
 (0.085) (0.085) (0.086) 
Trust in parliament 0.230*** 0.229*** 0.245*** 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.0444*** 0.0451*** 0.0443*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant -0.0943 -0.110 -0.0926 
 (0.098) (0.098) (0.101) 
L2 RI 0.0721*** 0.0733*** 0.0959*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) 
L1 RS 0.0163*** 0.00298 0.302*** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.052) 
Covariance 0.109 -0.0483 -0.529* 
 (0.351) (1.108) (0.166) 
N/N groups 11153/44 11153/44 11153/44 
Log. likelihood -6248.8 -6240.9 -6228.2 
AIC 12646.6 12631.0 12605.5 
BIC 12529.5 12513.8 12488.4 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L2: Level 2; L1: Level 1; 
RI: random intercepts; RS: random slope at individual level; individual level residual variance fixed at π2/3. 
  




Figure C. 4: The marginal effects of educational attainment, political interest, and being close to a 
political party as the descriptive representation among candidates (A) and members of 
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Table C. 7: Robustness Test 3b): Descriptive representation and young citizens’ electoral participation – 
Enfranchised citizens under the age of 35 












Young candidates (t, %)   -0.0274***  -0.0281*** -0.0186* 
   (0.008)  (0.008) (0.009) 
Young MPs (t-1, %)    -0.00992 -0.0152 -0.00318 
    (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) 
Young candidates (t, %)*Young MPs (t-1, %)      0.00867* 
      (0.004) 
Educ. attainment  0.420*** 0.419*** 0.420*** 0.419*** 0.419*** 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Political interest  0.808*** 0.812*** 0.808*** 0.811*** 0.813*** 
  (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Close to a party  1.013*** 1.015*** 1.013*** 1.016*** 1.016*** 
  (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Female  0.0739* 0.0742* 0.0738* 0.0741* 0.0743* 
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Unemployed  -0.418*** -0.418*** -0.419*** -0.419*** -0.421*** 
  (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) 
In education  -0.101 -0.102 -0.101 -0.102 -0.104+ 
  (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
Working  0.0794 0.0811 0.0791 0.0806 0.0800 
  (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
Trust in parliament  0.327*** 0.333*** 0.328*** 0.334*** 0.333*** 
  (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Turnout >30 (%)  0.0484*** 0.0464*** 0.0487*** 0.0468*** 0.0456*** 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 0.691*** -0.0179 0.00236 -0.0155 0.00669 0.00886 
 (0.103) (0.078) (0.074) (0.078) (0.074) (0.073) 
L2 RI 0.449*** 0.0910*** 0.0698*** 0.0907*** 0.0688*** 0.0620*** 
 (0.050) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) 
N/N groups 19845/44 19845/44 19845/44 19845/44 19845/44 19845/44 
Log. likelihood -12053.7 -10654.3 -10649.1 -10654.1 -10648.7 -10646.7 
AIC 24127.1 21417.4 21416.9 21427.0 21426.0 21432.0 
BIC 24111.3 21330.6 21322.1 21332.3 21323.3 21321.4 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L2: Level 2; RI: random intercepts; RS: random slope at 
individual level; individual level residual variance fixed at π2/3. 
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Table C. 8: Robustness Test 3b): Descriptive representation among candidates and young 
citizens’ electoral participation – Enfranchised citizens under the age of 35 




*Close to a 
political party 
Young candidates (t, %) -0.0308*** -0.0311*** -0.0266** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Young MPs (t-1, %) -0.0187 -0.0226 -0.00999 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
Educ. attainment 0.429*** 0.420*** 0.424*** 
 (0.024) (0.019) (0.019) 
Political interest 0.811*** 0.805*** 0.826*** 
 (0.040) (0.048) (0.040) 
Close to a party 1.015*** 1.016*** 1.047*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.088) 
Educ. Attainment*Young candidates (t, %) -0.0110**   
 (0.004)   
Political interest*Young candidates (t, %)  0.00544  
  (0.008)  
Close to a political party*Young candidates (t, %)   -0.00554 
   (0.015) 
Female 0.0735* 0.0745* 0.0687+ 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Unemployed -0.415*** -0.421*** -0.431*** 
 (0.078) (0.077) (0.078) 
In education -0.0985 -0.102 -0.101 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) 
Working 0.0843 0.0817 0.0760 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) 
Trust in parliament 0.335*** 0.333*** 0.343*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.0462*** 0.0473*** 0.0478*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Constant 0.0138 0.00911 0.0162 
 (0.076) (0.076) (0.077) 
L2 RI 0.0742*** 0.0809*** 0.0801*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
L1 RS 0.00619*** 0.0257*** 0.254*** 
 (0.002) (0.010) (0.038) 
Covariance 0.385 -0.503 -0.427* 
 (0.294) (0.280) (0.178) 
N/N groups 19845/44 19845/44 19845/44 
Log. likelihood -10641.3 -10646.3 -10610.3 
AIC 21441.0 21450.9 21378.9 
BIC 21314.7 21324.6 21252.5 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L2: Level 2; L1: Level 
1; RI: random intercepts; RS: random slope at individual level; individual level residual variance fixed 
at π2/3. 
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Table C. 9: Robustness Test 3b): Descriptive representation among MPs and young 
citizens’ electoral participation – Enfranchised citizens under the age of 35 




*Close to a 
political party 
Young candidates (t, %) -0.0266** -0.0289*** -0.0281*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Young MPs (t-1, %) -0.0133 0.00141 -0.00512 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) 
Educ. attainment 0.414*** 0.420*** 0.424*** 
 (0.025) (0.019) (0.019) 
Political interest 0.811*** 0.823*** 0.826*** 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) 
Close to a party 1.015*** 1.016*** 1.047*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.087) 
Educ. Attainment*Young MPs (t-1, %) 0.0100   
 (0.009)   
Political interest*Young MPs (t-1, %)  -0.0559***  
  (0.016)  
Close to a political party*Young MPs (t-1, %)   -0.0180 
   (0.033) 
Female 0.0750* 0.0743* 0.0689+ 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Unemployed -0.415*** -0.420*** -0.431*** 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) 
In education -0.0992 -0.100 -0.101 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) 
Working 0.0844 0.0815 0.0761 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) 
Trust in parliament 0.333*** 0.335*** 0.343*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Turnout >30 (%) 0.0462*** 0.0478*** 0.0480*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Constant 0.00682 0.00132 0.0163 
 (0.075) (0.076) (0.077) 
L2 RI 0.0705*** 0.0759*** 0.0799*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) 
L1 RS 0.00895*** 0.00314 0.250*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.038) 
Covariance 0.259 -0.645 -0.422* 
 (0.284) (1.204) (0.179) 
N/N groups 19845/44 19845/44 19845/44 
Log. likelihood -10644.3 -10641.3 -10610.2 
AIC 21446.9 21441.0 21378.7 
BIC 21320.6 21314.6 21252.4 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L2: Level 2; L1: Level 
1; RI: random intercepts; RS: random slope at individual level; individual level residual variance fixed 
at π2/3. 
  




Figure C. 5: The marginal effects of educational attainment, political interest, and being close to a 
political party as the descriptive representation among candidates (A) and members of 
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Table C. 10: Robustness Test 4: Descriptive representation and old citizens’ electoral participation – 
Enfranchised citizens over the age of 30 












Young candidates (t, %)   -0.0188*  -0.0183* -0.0149 
   (0.008)  (0.008) (0.009) 
Young MPs (t-1, %)    0.0149 0.0119 0.0171 
    (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
Young candidates (t, %)*Young MPs (t-1, %)      0.00354 
      (0.004) 
Educ. attainment  0.233*** 0.233*** 0.233*** 0.233*** 0.233*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Political interest  0.885*** 0.886*** 0.885*** 0.886*** 0.886*** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Close to a party  1.296*** 1.297*** 1.296*** 1.297*** 1.297*** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Female  0.183*** 0.183*** 0.183*** 0.183*** 0.183*** 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Unemployed  -0.699*** -0.700*** -0.699*** -0.700*** -0.700*** 
  (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
In education  -0.754*** -0.753*** -0.754*** -0.752*** -0.752*** 
  (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) 
Working  -0.0643** -0.0641** -0.0643** -0.0641** -0.0640** 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Trust in parliament  0.366*** 0.368*** 0.366*** 0.368*** 0.368*** 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Turnout <30 (%)  0.0409*** 0.0394*** 0.0405*** 0.0392*** 0.0387*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 1.654*** 0.605*** 0.618*** 0.600*** 0.614*** 0.614*** 
 (0.125) (0.052) (0.049) (0.052) (0.049) (0.049) 
L2 RI 0.682+ 0.0927*** 0.0799*** 0.0903*** 0.0783*** 0.0762*** 
 (0.074) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) 
N/N groups 97213/44 97213/44 97213/44 97213/44 97213/44 97213/44 
Log. likelihood -43857.2 -38380.7 -38378.1 -38380.3 -38377.9 -38377.6 
AIC 87737.5 76887.6 76894.1 76898.4 76905.1 76915.9 
BIC 87718.5 76783.3 76780.3 76784.6 76781.8 76783.2 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L2: Level 2; L1: Level 1; RI: random intercepts; RS: 
random slope at individual level; individual level residual variance fixed at π2/3. 
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Table C. 11: Robustness Test 4: Descriptive representation among candidates and old 
citizens’ electoral participation – Enfranchised citizens over the age of 30 




*Close to a 
political party 
Young candidates (t, %) -0.0182* -0.0281** -0.0139 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Young MPs (t-1, %) 0.0182 0.0147 0.0149 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Educ. attainment 0.238*** 0.231*** 0.234*** 
 (0.017) (0.009) (0.009) 
Political interest 0.883*** 0.851*** 0.891*** 
 (0.021) (0.044) (0.021) 
Close to a party 1.295*** 1.296*** 1.277*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.069) 
Educ. Attainment*Young candidates (t, %) -0.00253   
 (0.003)   
Political interest*Young candidates (t, %)  0.0195**  
  (0.007)  
Close to a political party*Young candidates (t, %)   -0.0149 
   (0.012) 
Female 0.185*** 0.185*** 0.186*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Unemployed -0.689*** -0.701*** -0.701*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
In education -0.754*** -0.755*** -0.749*** 
 (0.111) (0.111) (0.110) 
Working -0.0608** -0.0632** -0.0638** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Trust in parliament 0.368*** 0.370*** 0.381*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Turnout <30 (%) 0.0384*** 0.0389*** 0.0388*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Constant 0.609*** 0.621*** 0.630*** 
 (0.050) (0.053) (0.055) 
L2 RI 0.00700*** 0.0571*** 0.173*** 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.022) 
L1 RS 0.0781*** 0.0908*** 0.0986*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) 
Covariance -0.314 -0.313 -0.434* 
 (0.208) (0.181) (0.165) 
N/N groups 97213/44 97213/44 97213/44 
Log. likelihood -38351.1 -38326.3 -38230.7 
AIC 76885.9 76836.3 76645.2 
BIC 76734.1 76684.6 76493.5 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L2: Level 2; L1: Level 
1; RI: random intercepts; RS: random slope at individual level; individual level residual variance fixed 
at π2/3. 
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Table C. 12: Robustness Test 4: Descriptive representation among MPs and old citizens’ 
electoral participation – Enfranchised citizens over the age of 30 




*Close to a 
political party 
Young candidates (t, %) -0.0198* -0.0205* -0.0188* 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Young MPs (t-1, %) 0.0138 0.0117 0.0178 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) 
Educ. attainment 0.232*** 0.231*** 0.234*** 
 (0.016) (0.009) (0.009) 
Political interest 0.883*** 0.865*** 0.891*** 
 (0.021) (0.048) (0.021) 
Close to a party 1.295*** 1.296*** 1.268*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.070) 
Educ. Attainment*Young MPs (t-1, %) 0.00905   
 (0.006)   
Political interest*Young MPs (t-1, %)  0.00752  
  (0.018)  
Close to a political party*Young MPs (t-1, %)   -0.00832 
   (0.026) 
Female 0.185*** 0.185*** 0.186*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Unemployed -0.690*** -0.701*** -0.701*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
In education -0.753*** -0.755*** -0.749*** 
 (0.111) (0.111) (0.110) 
Working -0.0606** -0.0631** -0.0639** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Trust in parliament 0.367*** 0.369*** 0.381*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Turnout <30 (%) 0.0383*** 0.0388*** 0.0388*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Constant 0.610*** 0.617*** 0.633*** 
 (0.049) (0.053) (0.055) 
L2 RI 0.00643*** 0.0714*** 0.179*** 
 (0.001) (0.010) (0.022) 
L1 RS 0.0777*** 0.0925*** 0.0994*** 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) 
Covariance -0.331 -0.338+ -0.439* 
 (0.206) (0.186) (0.167) 
N/N groups 97213/44 97213/44 97213/44 
Log. likelihood -38350.4 -38329.3 -38231.5 
AIC 76884.6 76842.4 76646.7 
BIC 76732.8 76690.7 76494.9 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; L2: Level 2; L1: Level 








Figure C. 6: The marginal effects of educational attainment, political interest, and being close to a political 
party as the descriptive representation among candidates (A) and members of parliament (MPs) 
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Appendix D – Data sources and operationalisation of variables 
Table D. 1: Operationalisation of individual level variables (corresponding questions and coding in the European Social Surveys) and context level variables26 




ESS Question ESS coding 
Individual level and ESS based variables 
Political participation 
Vote Voted in the last national 
election (dummy variable) 
0: Not voted 
(abstained)  
vote Some people don't vote 
nowadays for one reason or 
another. Did you vote in the last 
[country] national election in 
[month/year]? 
2: No 












0: No  mnactic Main activity, last 7 days. All 
respondents. Post coded 
3: Unemployed, looking for job  
4: Unemployed, not looking for 
job  
1: Yes 1: Paid work     
2: Education 5 Permanently sick 
or disabled  
6: Retired    
7: Community or military service  
8: Housework, looking after 
children, others    
9: Other  
Work Being currently employed 0: No  mnactic Main activity, last 7 days. All 
respondents. Post coded 
1: Paid work  
1: Yes 2: Education 
3: Unemployed, looking for job  
4: Unemployed, not looking for 
job 
5 Permanently sick or disabled  
6: Retired    
7: Community or military service  
8: Housework, looking after 
children, others    
9: Other  
In education Being currently in 
education 
0: No  mnactic Main activity, last 7 days. All 
respondents. Post coded 
2: Education 
                                                          
26  Categories not reported in the ESS coding column, e.g. refusal or not applicable, were recoded to missing and, hence, not considered in the analysis. Further, all information 
pertains on enfranchised individuals in a specific country. Source: ESS (2013). 
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1: Yes 1: Paid work  
3: Unemployed, looking for job  
4: Unemployed, not looking for 
job 
5 Permanently sick or disabled  
6: Retired    
7: Community or military service  
8: Housework, looking after 
children, others    
9: Other  
Educational attainment Highest level of education 
achieved 
0 edulvla (ESS 1-3) 
edulvlb (ESS 4-7) 
What is the highest level of 
education you have achieved? 
1: Less than lower secondary 
education (ISCED 0-1)  
1 2: Lower secondary education 
completed (ISCED 2)  
2 3: Upper secondary education 
completed (ISCED 3) 
3 4: Post-secondary non-tertiary 
education completed (ISCED 4) 
4 5: Tertiary education completed 
(ISCED 5-6) 
Sex Female respondent 0: No gndr Respondent is male 1 
1: Yes Respondent is female 2 
Trust in parliament High trust in parliament 0: No  trstprl please tell me on a score of 0-
10 how much you personally 
trust [country]’ parliament 
0: No trust at all  
1-6 
1: Yes 7-9 
10: Complete trust 
Political interest Being interested in politics 0: No  polintr How interested would you say 
you are in politics? 
Hardly interested (3)  
Not at all interested (4) 
1: Yes Very interested (1) 
Quite interested (2)  
Close to a political party Feeling close to a political 
party 
0: No  clsprty Is there a particular political 
party you feel closer to than all 
the other parties? 
2: No 
1: Yes 1: Yes 
Voter turnout Turnout among old 
citizens (aged 30 and 
more); aggregated values 




vote Some people don't vote 
nowadays for one reason or 
another. Did you vote in the last 





Citizenship 0: No  ctzcntr Are you a citizen of [country]? 2: No 
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Respondent is citizen of 
the country / enfranchised 
1: Yes 1: Yes 
Age group Age group dummy for 
young and old 
enfranchised citizens 





agea Age of responded, calculated Continuous measure of age in 
years 
Identifying variables  
Countries   cntry Country Country name 
Election years Year of election Year  Day/Month/Year of the 
interview 
Based on administrative 
variables: 
- Day of month of interview 
(inwdds/inwdde/inwdd) 
- Month of interview 
(inwmms/inwmme/inwmm) 
- Year of interview 
(inwyys/inwyye/inwyr) 
 
Context level variables Description Coding Source 
Descriptive representation - Candidates 
Young candidates Percentage of candidates under the age of 30 Percentage See  
Table D. 2 
Young candidates, weighted Percentage of candidates under the age of 30 
weighted by the population percentage of 
young people 
Percentage ratio See  
Table D. 2 
Descriptive representation – Members of parliament 
Young members of parliament Percentage of members of parliament under 
the age of 30 
Percentage See  
Table D. 2 
Young members of parliament, 
weighted 
Percentage of members of parliament under 
the age of 30 weighted by the population 
percentage of young people 
Percentage ratio See  
Table D. 2 
Others 
Young population Young people as percentage of the population 
in a given year 
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Table D. 2: Descriptive representation among candidates and members of parliament - Sources 














Czech Statistical Office (2013): Poslanecká sněmovna Parlamentu ČR . http://www.volby.cz/index.html (15.8.2013). X X 
Denmark 1998 






















Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon (2013a): RK2011. Kandidaadid. http://www.vvk.ee/riigikogu-valimised-2011/kandidaadid2011/?id=12655 
(14.9.2013) 
X  
Estonia 2011 Riigikogu (2013a): Members of XII Riijikogu. http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?id=34625 (14.9.2013).  X 
Estonia 2007 Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon (2013b): Riigikogu Valimine. Kandideerimine. http://www.vvk.ee/varasemad/?v=r07/ (14.9.2013) X  
Estonia 2007 Riigikogu (2013b): XI Riigikogu. Members. http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?id=68182 (14.9.2013)  X 
Estonia 2003 Riigikogu (2013c): X Riigikogu. Members. http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?id=42699 (14.9.2013)  X 
Estonia 2003 Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon (2013c): Riigikogu Valimine. Kandideerimine. http://www.vvk.ee/varasemad/?v=r03/ (14.9.2013) X  
Estonia 1999 Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon (2013d): Riigikogu Valimine. Kandideerimine. http://www.vvk.ee/varasemad/?v=r99/ (14.9.2013) X  
Estonia 1999 Riigikogu (2013d): http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?id=35326 (14.9.2013).  X 
France  2002, 2007 
IFOP (2012): IFOP FOCUS No66: Analyse sur le profil des candidats aux élections législatives 2012. 
http://www.ifop.com/?option=com_publication&type=publication&id=460 (20.09.2013). 
X  
France 1997, 2002 
Assemblée Nationale (2013): Base de données des députés français depuis 1789. http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/sycomore/ 
(27.12.2013). 
 X 






Der Bundeswahlletier (2013a): Bundestagswahlen. http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/de/bundestagswahlen/ (30.10.2013) X  
Germany 2009 














Deutscher Bundestag (2013d): Abgeordnete der 14. Legislatur (1998-2002). Abgeordnete in Zahlen. Altersgliederung. 
http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/cgi/show.php?fileToLoad=215&id=1041 (10.12.2013) 
 X 
Iceland 2003, 2009 
Statistics Iceland (2013): General Elections. Candidates/Elected Members. http://www.statice.is/Statistics/Elections/General-elections 
(22.9.2013) 
X X 
Iceland 1999 Wikipedia (2013a): Kjörnir alþingismenn 1999. http://is.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kj%F6rnir_al%FEingismenn_1999 (26.12.2013)  X 
Ireland 2011 




Gallagher, Michael (2011): Ireland's Earthquake Election: Analysis of the Results. In: Gallagher, Michael and Marsh, Michael (Eds.): 
How Ireland Voted 2011: The Full Story of Ireland's Earthquake Election. New York: Palgrave McMillan, 139-171.  
X  
Ireland 2011 Wikipedia (2013b): members of the 31st Dáil. http://adriankavanaghelections.org/2011/01/03/candidates-aged-21-35/ (20.12.2013).  X 
Ireland 2011 
Oireachtas (2013): Dáil Éireann Members Database. http://www.oireachtas.ie/members-
hist/default.asp?housetype=0&HouseNum=31&disp=mem (20.12.2013) 
 X 
Ireland 2011, 2007 Elections Ireland (2013): Elections in Ireland. http://electionsireland.org/index.html (15.08.2013) X  
Italy 2001 




















The Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania (2008): Elections to the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania 2008. Lists 















Statistics Norway (2013): Elections. Storting election, candidates. Candidates at storting election, by party/electoral list, sex and age (per 
cent). 
https://www.ssb.no/statistikkbanken/selectvarval/Define.asp?subjectcode=&ProductId=&MainTable=ListStortValg01&nvl=&PLanguage
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IPU (2013e): Poland. Sejm. Historical Archive. http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2255_arc.htm (15.11.2013)  X 
Poland 2007 




















Statistics Sweden (2013): Nominated, elected and not elected candidates in the election to the Riksdag by ex, party and age. Number and 








Die Bundesversammlung - Das Schweizer Parlament (2013a): Wahlen 1999. Nationalrat - Resultate. http://www.parlament.ch/d/wahlen-
abstimmungen/parlamentswahlen/nationalratswahlen/wahlen-1999/Seiten/wa-nr-nach-kantonen-resultate-1999.aspx (20.09.2013) 
X X 
Switzerland 2003 Confederatio Helvetica (2013): Nationalratswahlen 2003. http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/nrw03/list/kt_index.html (20.09.2013) X X 
Switzerland  2007 
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To vote or to protest? 
 
Descriptive representation and young 
citizens’ participation repertoire 
 
  




Young citizens’ absence from ballot boxes has raised concerns about their indifference to the decision 
making process, and thus the legitimacy and the functioning of the democratic political system 
(Kimberlee 2002; Lijphart 1997; O’Toole et al. 2003; Quintelier 2007). Parallel to the decline in 
electoral participation, young citizens’ involvement in non-electoral forms of political participation, 
i.e. protest, has increased (Marien, Hooghe, and Quintelier 2010; O’Toole et al. 2003; Quintelier 
2007) and hints at the unattractiveness of elections for young citizens (Kimberlee 2002). To reconcile 
these two trends, I propose to take a closer look at the relationship between young citizens and 
electoral institutions and political actors. A first descriptive account of young citizens’ participation 
repertoire contradicts their image as apolitical individuals because, they display a higher engagement 
in non-electoral forms than older citizens, which in turn appears to be context dependent (see Figure 
B. 1 and Figure B. 2 in Appendix B).1 
The political participation and behaviour literature, so far, has turned to political apathy (Franklin 
2004; Wattenberg 2006) and changing citizenship norms (Dalton 2008; Norris 2002) to explain these 
two trends. Accordingly, the decreasing political interest among young citizens accounts for their low 
and declining turnout. Whereas, changing citizenship norms and expectations have led young citizens 
to seek expression in more individualistic, active, and direct participation forms.  
In doing so, however, previous research has followed two separate research paths, disregarding both 
the link between participation forms and the multifaceted nature of young citizens’ motivations for 
political participation, as well as young citizens’ embedding in the political context.  
The paper addresses these gaps by developing a micro-macro model of young citizens’ participation 
repertoire. Departing from a participation concept focused on levels of engagement, the paper argues 
that electoral and non-electoral participation forms are interlinked and part of a broader participation 
repertoire (Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Meyer, 2004; Warren, 2002). The linkage rests on the strategic 
component underlying political engagement. While performed in different arenas – electoral and non-
electoral – both participation forms aim at influencing the same addressee: the political decision 
making process, and ultimately, government (Van Deth 2014; Warren 2002). Furthermore, the 
                                                 
1  Descriptively analysing the participation in voting (electoral participation) and protesting (non-electoral participation) 
among respondents of the European Social Survey (2013) suggests that depending on the elections the differences in 
participation between young and older citizens are moulded by contextual factors (see Figure B. 2 in Appendix B). 
The differences in the use of electoral and non-electoral forms of participation between young and older citizens are 
more pronounced in some elections and countries than others. For instance, differences were smaller for protesting 
than for voting in Switzerland (1999). The opposite was true in Sweden (2002) and Austria (2008). The latter election 
saw a striking difference in protesting participation but an average voting gap between the two age groups. On the 
other end of the spectrum, the Slovakian youth was less likely to protest than their counterparts.  
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correlation in the use of the two forms found by previous research (Dalton 2007; Norris 2002) hints 
at an expansion of participation rather than at a withdrawal from politics.  
In analysing the reasons for the (non-)participation of young citizens, previous research has focused 
mainly on reasons and factors located at the individual level. This paper argues for an approach 
moving beyond the individual and including the political system and its institutions because political 
alienation plays an important role in shaping young citizens’ participation repertoire (Henn, 
Weinstein, and Forrest 2005; Kimberlee 2002; O’Toole et al. 2003). To this end, this paper develops 
a four-fold typology of young citizens and focuses on individual – political efficacy – and context – 
descriptive representation – determinants of political alienation to theoretically derive their 
participation repertoire. Expanding on the contextual cue theory (Atkeson 2003; Atkeson and Carrillo 
2007) and the political empowerment hypothesis (Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004; Bobo and 
Gilliam 1990; Karp and Banducci 2008), the paper locates the source of differences in the 
participation repertoire of young citizens at the level of responsiveness of the political system, and 
identifies descriptive representation as the key factor shaping its perception. The objective of the 
paper is to analyse to what extent descriptive representation directly and indirectly affects young 
citizens’ political participation repertoire. 
The paper contributes theoretically, methodologically, and empirically to the field of political 
participation and the study of young citizens’ political behaviour. Theoretically, the paper develops 
a micro-macro model of political participation by bridging the gap between individual accounts of 
political disaffection and the role played by descriptive representation at the context level. In doing 
so, it proposes a joint explanation of the participation repertoire of young citizens, and speaks to and 
brings research on electoral and non-electoral participation into the dialogue. Methodologically, the 
multinomial approach allows for an analysis of the participation style of young citizens rather than 
the levels of their participation. Furthermore, empirically the analysis relies on an original dataset on 
the descriptive representation of young citizens among members of parliament (MPs) in national 
elections in Europe. The dataset comprises information from 36 elections and covers 19 European 
democracies in the period between 1999 and 2008. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. The first section reviews previous research 
and presents the micro-macro model of young citizens’ participation repertoire. The second 
introduces the research design and the methodological approach of the paper. The third presents the 
empirical results of the multilevel multinomial analysis, while the fourth and concluding section 
critically discusses the results. 
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2. Young citizens’ political participation repertoire and descriptive 
representation 
Young citizens’ reliance on non-electoral participation forms cannot be reduced to the mere 
expression of political apathy, as proposed by youth focused explanations (Kimberlee 2002). The 
very characteristics of non-electoral participation forms run counter to such an assessment. 
Non-electoral participation forms, by definition, allow for the expression of political needs and 
preferences outside the electoral arena. While executed outside the electoral arena, like electoral ones, 
non-electoral participation forms aim at influencing the same addressee, namely the government (Van 
Deth 2014), and at increasing its responsiveness towards participants’ own interests and needs (Craig 
and Maggiotto 1981). What sets them apart from electoral participation forms is their lack of a direct 
link to the institutions and the functioning of the electoral decision making process (Klingemann and 
Fuchs 1995), and the fact that their rules are not set by the political system itself (Hooghe & Marien, 
2014). Non-electoral forms offer an alternative participation outlet which forgoes supporting the 
existing regime and political actors, while allowing participants to take on a more elite-challenging 
approach (Barnes & Kaase, 1979).  
In light of these differences between electoral and non-electoral forms, young citizens’ absence from 
ballot boxes appears related to young citizens’ contention with the political system and its actors 
(Kimberlee 2002), and calls for an assessment of the relationship between them and the political 
system. Concretely, assessing this relationship requires the identification of the reasons for young 
citizens to have turned to elite-challenging forms of participation in order to pursue influence and 
elicit responsiveness from the political system.  
The paper contends that such reasons can be found both at the individual level, in the change in 
citizenship norms (Dalton 2008; Norris 1999), the rise of political alienation (Barnes and Kaase 1979; 
Braun and Hutter 2016; Craig 1980; Gamson 1968), and at the context level, namely in the descriptive 
representation of young citizens among political actors (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Dermody, Hanmer‐
Lloyd, and Scullion 2010; Harris and Gillion 2010; Phillips 1998). Differences in the descriptive 
representation of young citizens among political actors nurture differences in the participation 
repertoire of young citizens, leading them to rely more on protest as an alternative or complement to 
voting (Craig 1980; Dermody, Hanmer‐Lloyd, and Scullion 2010; Harris and Gillion 2010). In 
contrast, high levels of descriptive representation signal higher responsiveness by the political system 
(Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Phillips 1998; Uhlaner 2012), and assuage the need to employ non-electoral 
forms of political participation whilst fostering young citizens’ participation in elections.  
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2.1 Individual level determinants of young citizens’ participation repertoire 
At the individual level two main reasons for such a change in the participation repertoire can be 
singled out: changes in citizenship norms and an increase in political alienation among young citizens.  
One strand of literature points at the change in citizenship norms and the correlated expectations 
towards citizens’ roles (Almond and Verba 1963; Dalton 2008). The changes in the participation 
repertoire were set in motion by the emergence of “engaged citizens” (Dalton 2008), or “critical 
citizens” (Norris 1999), to complement so called “duty citizens” (Dalton 2008). While the latter type 
of citizen adheres to social order and expresses citizenship by means of electoral participation, the 
former is guided by more libertarian values. It is the accompanying rise in these values that has led 
“critical citizens”, predominantly young people (Dalton 2011), to seek more active, individualistic, 
and direct participation forms, i.e. non-electoral participation forms (Dalton 2008). Critical 
citizenship norms have been found to be predominant among young citizens (Dalton 2011), and to 
overlap considerably with the self-expression values identified by Inglehart (1990, 2007). 
Another strand of literature puts the emphasis on political attitudes as individual level determinants 
of young citizens’ participation repertoire (Braun and Hutter 2016; Gamson 1968; Henn and Foard 
2012; Hooghe and Dassonneville 2013; Kaase 1999; Marien, Hooghe, and Quintelier 2010; 
Southwell 2003). According to this line of enquiry, political alienation guides young citizens’ 
aversion to electoral participation forms (Barnes & Kaase, 1979). Political alienation can be broadly 
conceived of as “a person’s estrangement from politics and government of his society” (Lane 1962, 
161), as discontent with the political system, its institutions, and (policy) outputs. Past research has 
further specified political alienation as encompassing two political attitudes: political trust and 
political efficacy (Lane 1962; Miller 1974b; Southwell 2003). While political trust refers to a positive 
affective stance towards political institutions and groups of people (Citrin 1974; Lane 1962; Miller 
1974b), political efficacy refers to the “feeling that an individual political action does have or can 
have an impact upon the political process” (Campbell, Gurin, and Warren 1954, 187). 
The link between discontent and political participation gave rise to a substantial theoretical debate. A 
minimum level of political trust is generally understood to be the minimal requirement for becoming 
politically active (Almond and Verba 1963), and political efficacy has also been deemed conducive 
to political participation (Campbell et al. 1960; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).  
Opinion differences, however, arise in the debate surrounding the question of which combination of 
political attitudes is most conducive to elite-challenging forms of participation (non-electoral 
engagement). The approach proposed by Gamson (1968, 1971) stresses the combination of low trust 
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and high political efficacy as being the most favourable one. Accordingly, mistrustful and discontent 
citizens are most likely to embrace non-electoral forms of political participation.  
Revisions of Gamson's (1968) hypothesis, however, pointed at the greater importance of political 
efficacy for the use of non-electoral participation forms. Political discontent, thus, is expected to rise 
in response to the political system’s failure to elicit feelings of responsiveness (political efficacy) 
from citizens (Craig, 1980). The revisions pointed at Gamson's (1968) failure to distinguish between 
internal (self as attitude object) and external efficacy (system as attitude object) (Coleman and Davis 
1976). While internal efficacy identifies the individual as the object of efficacy, namely the 
individual’s appraisal of her own political capabilities, external efficacy refers to her personal 
judgement of the responsiveness of the political system to her own interest and needs (Campbell et 
al. 1960; Campbell, Gurin, and Warren 1954). Thus, political discontent arises from a negative 
appraisal of the system responsiveness rather than of personal capabilities (internal efficacy). It is 
external efficacy which leads individuals to use elite-challenging forms of participation in order to 
elicit a higher responsiveness from political actors and institutions, especially, but not exclusively, if 
combined with high levels of internal political efficacy (Craig 1980; Craig and Maggiotto 1981). 
Non-electoral forms of political participation are indeed perceived as being less supportive of the 
elites (Barnes and Kaase, 1979). Furthermore, a general decline in the diffuse support of the political 
system is not necessarily a precondition for non-electoral participation. Elite-challenging behaviour 
arises also due to external inefficacy about more specific and narrowly defined goals and interests. 
Thus, non-electoral behaviour might also be consistent with high levels of political support for 
democracy and the regime on a more abstract level (Craig 1980). Current cohorts of young citizens 
have reported lower levels of political efficacy, and especially of external political efficacy (Garcia-
Albacete 2014, 123–25). While low levels of internal efficacy may be related to young citizens’ status 
as new entrants to the political decision making process and their relatively low experience with 
elections (Kimberlee 2002), generational patterns may be influencing the lower and declining level 
of external political efficacy. Generational patterns inform preferences and interests, which leads to 
a different perception of the responsiveness of political actors – overwhelmingly older in age – and 
the efficacy of participating in elections (Henn, Weinstein, and Forrest 2005; O’Toole et al. 2003; 
Wring, Henn, and Weinstein 1999).  
Accordingly, while participation per se is fostered by internal and external efficacy, the increased 
non-electoral behaviour among young citizens is a function of diminished external efficacy and a 
negative assessment of the responsiveness of the political system. 
H1a: The higher the internal efficacy of a young citizen, the more likely she will participate 
politically. 
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H1b: The higher the external efficacy of a young citizen, the more likely she will include electoral 
participation forms in her participation repertoire. 
H1c: The higher the external efficacy of a young citizen, the less likely she will include non-electoral 
participation forms in her participation repertoire.  
2.2 Context level determinants of young citizens’ participation repertoire 
At the context level, the decision of whether and how to participate is influenced by young citizens’ 
perception of, and their level of estrangement from, the political system and its actors (Harris and 
Gillion 2010). Electoral and non-electoral participation forms are employed in reaction to the 
(perceived) influence opportunities provided by, and the responsiveness of, the political system. 
Young citizens use and combine participation forms in order to best exert influence and to have their 
own interests and needs included in the political decision making process (Barnes & Kaase, 1979; 
Harris & Gillion, 2010; Kriesi, 1995; Landmann, 2008). Accordingly, non-electoral participation 
forms would be chosen by young citizens over electoral ones if the (perceived) chances of influencing 
politics and of having their own interests and needs represented by means of electoral participation 
are low. Higher chances of having their own message represented are provided by actors and electoral 
institutions more likely to lend a sympathetic ear to young citizens. 
Descriptive representation influences the perception of influence opportunities and responsiveness 
provided by the political system to a specific social group (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1998; Pitkin 
1967). Descriptive representation represents one of the four pillars of political representation, as 
defined by Pitkin (1967, p. 60). It refers to a situation of representation in which representatives and 
the represented share ascriptive characteristics, e.g. age. Representative systems achieve descriptive 
representation if representatives mirror the distribution of characteristics, e.g. ethnicity, age, gender, 
as it is present in the population (Atkeson, 2003; Barnes & Burchard, 2013).  
Descriptive representation’s prerogative lies in its potential for better representation and the belief 
that group members are better suited and equipped to represent the interests of a specific political 
minority in the political decision making process, and to cater to their needs (Phillips 1995; Pitkin 
1967). Proponents of the contextual cue theory (Atkeson 2003; Atkeson and Carrillo 2007) and the 
empowerment hypothesis (Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004; Bobo and Gilliam 1990) argue that 
descriptive representation carries cues and information about the openness, receptivity, and 
responsiveness of the political system to the needs and interests of a specific politically 
underrepresented group (Atkeson 2003; Atkeson and Carrillo 2007; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; 
Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1998; Rocha et al. 2010). These responsiveness cues, in turn, influence 
the (perceived) efficacy of the underrepresented political group and their participation repertoire 
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(Phillips 1998). The presence of members of parliament mirroring young citizens’ age characteristic 
increases the latter’s perception of a common ground and a shared experience between citizens and 
representatives. Conversely, low levels of representation constitute both psychological and systemic 
hurdles for political minorities. Changes made to the level of descriptive representation may tackle 
precisely these hurdles (Atkeson 2003; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).  
To summarise, young citizens’ participation repertoire and the growth of non-electoral participation 
forms are the result of a combination of individual level political affinities and context level 
(perceived) opportunities to influence the political system. It is the combination of these aspects that 
gives rise to different modes of political participation (Dermody, Hanmer‐Lloyd, and Scullion 2010), 
and is reflective of the existence of different outlooks among young citizens. 
2.3 A typology of young citizens and their participation repertoire 
Based on the individual and context level determinants discussed above, I develop a four-fold 
typology of young citizens; uninterested, involved, critical, and disaffected young citizens (see Figure 
1, italics). Each group is characterized by specific individual characteristics, and a particular stance 
towards the political system and its institutions, and implies different consequences for the 
participation repertoire of young citizens (Figure 1, bold). 
  Context level 
 Descriptive representation 
Low High 
Individual level 













Figure 1: Types of young citizens (italics) and their participation repertoire (bold) 
Uninterested young citizens (bottom-right quadrant in Figure 1) are characterized by their passive 
stance towards the political system and its institutions. Members of this group are mostly uninterested 
in politics (Putnam 2000) and have no close relationship with institutions of electoral politics, e.g. 
political parties (Kimberlee 2002), but implicitly trust the political system and do not contest its 
output (Gamson 1971; Seligson 1980). This detachment arises from their individual characteristics 
and life-cycle position (Henn, Weinstein, and Forrest 2005; Kimberlee 2002; Nie, Verba, and Kim 
1974). On the one hand, the socioeconomic background influences young citizens’ cognitive and 
resource capabilities to deal with politics and the decision making process. For instance, low levels 
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of political knowledge and low levels of internal efficacy could hamper the ability and willingness to 
become politically involved (Henn, Weinstein, and Forrest 2005). On the other hand, the lifestyle 
currently associated with young people entails a lower socio-political embedding of young citizens, 
e.g. through higher mobility and individualisation (Nie, Verba, and Kim 1974). In addition, in the last 
few decades, young people have experienced a delay in their transition to adulthood (Garcia-Albacete 
2014; Smets 2008; Spannring 2008), accentuated by the recent economic crisis, which postponed 
their integration in the labour market and their economic and political stakes.  
Involved young citizens (upper-right quadrant in Figure 1) are characterized by a close link to the 
political system and electoral institutions. Interested in politics and better equipped in terms of 
socioeconomic resources and cognitive capabilities than uninterested young citizens, members of this 
group have a more trustful and supportive attitude towards electoral institutions. They can identify 
with the political establishment, are externally efficient, and engage exclusively in electoral forms of 
participation. The involved young citizen type embodies the citizenship norm described by Dalton ( 
2008) as “civic duty”. 
The supportive attitude and the attachment to electoral institutions, however, are lower in the two last 
types of young citizens, the critical and the disaffected. 
The critical youth (upper-left quadrant in Figure 1), is a citizen interested in politics and who, in light 
of changing citizenship perceptions and an increasing critical stance towards the political system and 
its institutions, has grown less supportive of the electoral system (Dalton 2008). Critical citizens 
perceive the political system and actors to be only partially responsive to their interests, and locate 
the potential to increase their political chances in other participation forms (Norris 1999, 22–25). A 
critical citizen’s sceptical stance towards political actors and institutions results in an expanded 
political participation encompassing both electoral and non-electoral forms of political participation. 
However, the critical stance towards the political system does not prevent critical young people from 
participating in election primarily because of their internal efficacy and the importance they attribute 
to elections (Dalton 2008; Dermody, Hanmer‐Lloyd, and Scullion 2010). 
The sense of estrangement from the political system and electoral institutions reaches its peak among 
the last group of young citizens. 
Disaffected young citizens (bottom-left quadrant in Figure 1) grow increasingly distant from the 
political system because of their perception of the political system’s performance both in its input as 
well as its output. In contrast to disinterested young citizens, disaffected young people have political 
stakes, are politically engaged, and comparatively more resourceful. Their rejection of the electoral 
system stems from their negative assessment of the working of the political system. On the one hand, 
taking the perspective of socio-economic grievances into account, disaffected young citizens perceive 
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the electoral system to be biased in favour of more affluent citizens, thus effectively nullifying any 
attempt at influencing politics by means of elections (Gamson 1968; Snow and Soule 2009). On the 
other hand, perceptions of unresponsiveness on the part of parties and political actors and the growing 
distrust towards the latter leads disaffected young citizens to express their political concerns 
exclusively in an alternative outlet: non-electoral participation forms, i.e. protest (Craig 1979; 
Gamson 1968; Kimberlee 2002).  
2.4 Descriptive representation and young citizens’ participation repertoire 
The discussion of the types of young citizens has highlighted how their perception of the political 
system affects their political repertoire – the combination of their electoral and non-electoral 
participation forms. Electoral and non-electoral participation forms are employed in reaction to the 
(perceived) responsiveness and influence opportunities provided by the political system (Barnes & 
Kaase, 1979; Harris & Gillion, 2010; Kriesi, 1995; Landmann, 2008). Individuals who are closer to 
decision-makers will likely select electoral tools of participation. On the contrary, less efficacious 
and more estranged individuals will more likely employ non-electoral engagement forms (Harris and 
Gillion 2010). However, the types of young citizens and their respective participation repertoire are 
not to be interpreted as static allocation but rather as a function of the responsiveness of the political 
system. The typology of young citizens reveals that the main reason for young citizens to be active 
by means of non-electoral participation forms lies in their lower assessment of the political system’s 
responsiveness and their own political efficacy. The theoretical discussion above identifies the 
activation of political capabilities, such as efficacy and a positive assessment of the goodwill and 
responsiveness of institutions and political actors as a critical juncture determining young people’s 
participation repertoire. These, in turn, are established in iteration with, and in reaction to, young 
citizens’ interaction with the political system (Citrin 1974; Miller 1974a). 
The interconnectedness between descriptive representation and this critical juncture has theoretical 
implications for the types of young citizens and, as a consequence, for their participation repertoire. 
At the very basic level, descriptive representation delivers political capabilities which activate young 
citizens, their political interest, and stakes in politics. The presence of young representatives, 
moreover, influences the participation mode used because it alters young people’s perception of the 
opportunities available to have their message heard. 
Three out of the four types of young citizens identified above refrain from exclusively participating 
in elections because of their disaffection with the political system and their inefficaciousness. For 
inefficient young citizens (uninterested young citizens), descriptive representation has the potential 
to increase their political efficacy. For uninterested young citizens, higher descriptive representation 
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fosters their efficacy by providing easier access to information but also by fostering their political 
empowerment and the perception that the political system will be responsive to their interests and 
needs. As a consequence, uninterested young citizens will judge political participation, and electoral 
participation in particular, as an efficacious form of political engagement.  
H2a: The higher the descriptive representation of young citizens, the higher their propensity to use 
electoral participation forms.  
For estranged young citizens (critical and disaffected young citizens), descriptive representation has 
the potential to increase their satisfaction with and perception of the responsiveness of the political 
system. Critical young citizens, on the other hand, are characterized by their cynical stance towards 
the political system. Descriptive representation, however, has the potential to increase their 
satisfaction with the political system while decreasing their need to use non-electoral forms of 
participation in addition to electoral ones.  
H2b: The higher the descriptive representation of young citizens, the lower their propensity to 
complement electoral with non-electoral forms of political participation. 
For disaffected young citizens, descriptive representation has the potential to improve both their 
efficacy in using electoral forms of participation as well as their perception and assessment of the 
system’s responsiveness by having someone like them on the inside. 
H2c: The higher the descriptive representation of young citizens, the lower their propensity to 
exclusively use non-electoral participation forms.  
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3. Research design 
Young citizens’ decisions on how to participate, and thus which combination of participation forms 
(participation repertoire) prevails depends on their descriptive representation, and more precisely, on 
the presence of young members of parliament (MPs).2 To investigate this relationship, the analysis 
combines individual level data provided by four waves of the European Social Survey (2013) with an 
original dataset on the descriptive representation of young citizens elected to parliament (MPs). The 
analysis was carried out for 15180 enfranchised citizens under the age of 30 in 36 elections in 19 
European countries, in which voting occurs on a voluntary basis.3,4 Citizens under the age of 30 were 
defined as young because, following Plutzer (2002), the habit of voting is established within the first 
two to three elections after enfranchisement. Assuming a mean legislative term of 4 years and an 
enfranchisement age of 18, citizens are considered to be young until they reach the age of 30.5  
The next subsection informs on the operationalization of the dependent, independent, and control 
variables. The subsequent subsection presents the methodological approach of the analysis. 
3.1 Operationalization 
Dependent variable6 
The dependent variable - political repertoire - is located at the individual level and based on 
information provided by survey respondents on two participation forms: having voted (electoral 
participation) and having taken part in a lawful demonstration in the last 12 months (non-electoral 
participation). The combination of these two participation forms leads to a political repertoire 
comprising four participation styles or modes: not having participated at all (uninterested young 
citizens), having only voted (involved young citizens), having only protested (disaffected young 
citizens), and having both voted and protested (critical young citizens).7 
The choice to focus on protest as an exemplification of non-electoral participation forms was 
informed by the scope, topic, and hurdles associated with it. Protest, understood as taking part in a 
lawful demonstration, presents participants with slightly higher hurdles than voting while not 
                                                 
2  In bicameral systems the focus lies on the lower chamber. 
3  Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland. 
4  As opposed to countries implementing compulsory voting. 
5  The exception being Austria where the enfranchisement age was lowered to 16 in 2007 (Bundeskanzleramt 
Österreich 2007).  
6  If not otherwise stated, the variables were operationalized based on data provided by the European Social Survey 
(2013). 
7  Summary statistics can be found in Table A. 1 in Appendix A. Further information on the operationalization of the 
variables can be found in Table D. 1 in Appendix D. 
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systematically excluding persons because of it being an unlawful behaviour. Protest, furthermore, 




At the individual level internal and external efficacy are expected to influence the participation 
repertoire of young citizens. Internal efficacy was measured by applying exploratory factor analysis 
to two items measuring individuals’ self-assessment of the politics being too complicated to 
understand (“never”-“frequently), and their difficulty making up their own mind about politics (“very 
difficult”-“very easy”) on a five-answer-scale (see Table A. 2 in Appendix A).8 
External efficacy was measured by applying exploratory factor analysis to two items reporting the 
self-assessed satisfaction of respondents with the national government, and how democracy works in 
the specific country on a ten-answer-scale, ranging from “extremely dissatisfied” to “extremely 
satisfied” (see Table A. 2 in Appendix A). These represent indirect measures of individuals’ external 
efficacy, but are believed to latently capture the perceived responsiveness of the political system 
(Craig 1979; Craig and Maggiotto 1981; Emmenegger, Marx, and Schraff 2015). 
Context level 
Young citizens’ descriptive representation is the main explanatory factor in the analysis and its effect 
on young citizens’ participation repertoire is assessed by means of the percentage of MPs (in the 
previous legislature, t-1) under the age of 30. The information about the age distribution among MPs 
relies on an original dataset compiled from official electoral and parliamentary sources.9 
Control variables 
Previous studies have shown that additional factors affect political participation (Brady, Verba, and 
Schlozman 1995; Gamson 1968; Marc Hooghe and Marien 2013; Kaase 1999).10 Socioeconomic 
status was assessed by means of the respondent’s highest educational attainment and dummies 
informing on her current employment status (working, in education, unemployed).11,12 Because they 
                                                 
8  The answer scale for “politics is too complicated” was reversed previous to the analysis. 
9  See Table D. 2 in Appendix D. 
10  Other control variables were tested and subsequently dropped from the analysis because they were not statistically 
significant: competitiveness of the election, modifiability of the ballot (open list proportional representation). 
11  Five response categories informed on the respondent’s highest educational attainment: less than secondary (ISCED 
0-1), completed upper secondary education (ISCED 3), completed post-secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED 4), 
and completed tertiary education and higher (ISCED 5-6). 
12  Three dummy variables assess the occupational status of the respondent based on the respondent’s main activity in 
the seven days preceding the interview: working, unemployment, and in education (other activities serves as a 
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were expected to affect political participation, political interest, political trust, closeness to a political 
party, and gender were introduced as control variables, while the difference in participation levels 
both in voting and in protesting between citizens over and under the age of 30 accounts for overall 
political culture dominant in a specific country and election.13,14  
3.2 Methodology 
To analyse the effect of descriptive representation on young citizens’ participation repertoire, the 
hierarchical structure of the data (Bickel 2007; Hox 2010) and the dependency among individuals in 
the same cluster (Rabe-Heshket and Skrondal 2008) need to be taken into account. Indeed, individual 
respondents are clustered within country-elections units. Furthermore, the multilevel analysis also 
needs to account for the dependent variable comprising four unordered categories (discrete choices) 
(Skrondal and Rabe-Heshket 2003). To test the hypotheses, I estimated multilevel multinomial logit 
models (Rabe-Heshket and Skrondal 2012, 629ff.).15 The analysis focused on the effect of the overall 
descriptive representation and assessed its effect by means of a two-level multinomial logit analysis 
with random intercepts for country-elections observational units.  
  
                                                 
reference category and comprises the following occupational categories: Permanently sick or disabled, community 
of military service, housework, and other). 
13  Political trust ranked respondents’ trust between 0 (distrust) and 10 (complete trust). Political interest was 
operationalized as a dummy informing whether the respondent reported to be very interested or somewhat interested 
in politics, feeling close to a political party as a dummy variable based on respondents’ affirmative answer in the 
questionnaire, and gender as a dummy for female respondents. 
14  Summary statistics can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix and detailed information on the operationalization of 
the variables in Table D. 1 in Appendix D. 
15  All empirical analyses were carried out using Stata 12.1 and the user written command gllamm for the multilevel 
multinomial analysis logit model and gllapred for the predicted probabilities (Rabe-Heshket, Skrondal, and Pickles 
2004). 
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4. Empirical results 
To reconcile declining turnout and increasing protest trends among young citizens, the paper 
investigated the relationship between descriptive representation and the participation repertoire of 
citizens under the age of 30. I expected the use of non-electoral participation (protest) to be a function 
of low levels of descriptive representation. Increased perceived responsiveness from the political 
system would, thus, lower the strategic value of non-electoral participation and increased that of 
voting. The empirical analysis used individual level data provided by the European Social Survey 
(2013) and an original dataset on the level of descriptive representation of young citizens among 
members of parliament (MPs).16 The analysis covered a total of 15180 individuals nested in 36 
national legislative elections covered by the European Social Survey (2013) between 1999 and 2008 
(see Figure 2).17  
Figure 2 depicts young citizens’ participation repertoire over countries and elections (left-hand side 
graph), and the level of descriptive representation of young citizens among parliamentary members 
in the legislative term immediately preceding the election under consideration (right-hand side graph). 
Differences in the political repertoire are quite substantial in the 36 elections under study. With 
respect to the four-fold typology, involved young citizens are generally speaking the most common 
type of young citizen in the European countries under study. Thus, electoral participation remains the 
most common tool of political participation among young Europeans. In terms of commonality, the 
involved young citizens are followed by the uninterested, who withdraw from any form of 
participation. Less common, but still substantial, are young citizens falling into the critical (both 
participation forms) and disaffected (only protesting) types. The differences between countries and 
elections, however, are quite substantial. Protest is the least popular in Lithuania, Romania, and 
Sweden, whereas it is more commonly used in France and Italy.  
                                                 
16  The empirical analysis focuses on MPs as contextual responsiveness cues because exploratory analyses revealed that 
the descriptive representation among candidates did not influence young citizens’ participation repertoire. 
17  Iceland 2003, Italy 2001, Lithuania 2008, France 2002, Switzerland 1999, France 2007, Switzerland 2003, Slovakia 
2002, Austria 2002, Austria 2006, Slovenia 2008, Slovenia 2004, Poland 2005, Estonia 2003, Finland 2007, 
Switzerland 2007, Croatia 2007, Czech Republic 2006, Sweden 2002, Austria 2008, Sweden 2006, Germany 2002, 
Netherlands 2002, Germany 2005, Poland 2007, Romania 2008, Czech Republic 2002, Netherlands 2006, Slovakia 
2006, Denmark 2001, Finland 2003, Netherlands 2003, Latvia 2006, Estonia 2007, Denmark 2007, Denmark 2005.  




Figure 2: Young citizens’ participation repertoire and their descriptive representation among members of parliament (MPs)
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Young citizens rarely constituted more than 10 percent of members of parliament (Figure 2, right 
hand-side graph). The 10-percent threshold was surpassed only by Denmark during the 2001-2005 
legislature, closely followed by the other Danish legislative terms and the Estonian legislature. 
Switzerland, in contrast, did not fair quite so well, with less than 5 percent of the National Council 
was made up of citizens aged 30 or less. Representation among MPs was even lower in the Italian, 
French and Lithuanian parliaments, in which no young citizen was elected to parliament.18 
Turning to the empirical analysis, Table 1 (below) details the results of the multilevel multinomial 
logistic analysis. The estimates report the multinomial log-odds of a citizen under 30 choosing a 
specific participation mode over the reference category (voting). A positive coefficient indicates a 
higher propensity of choosing a given participation mode over voting, whereas a negative one implies 
that voting is more likely to occur than the participation mode under consideration.  
Models 1 to 3 inform on the individual level determinants of young citizens’ participation 
repertoire – internal and external efficacy. Internal efficacy (models 1 and 3) exhibits a positive effect 
on the participation mode “both”, indicating that, all else being equal, internally more efficient young 
citizens added protest to voting in their participation repertoire. While internal efficacy did not 
significantly affect protesting as a standalone participation mode, it negatively impacted on the 
participation mode “none”. Internally efficient young citizens were more likely to engage in voting 
than to abstain from political participation, in accordance with hypothesis 1a.  
Models 2 and 3 inform on external efficacy as a determinant of young citizens’ participation 
repertoire. The negative coefficients for the participation modes “both” and “protest” indicate a 
decreasing likelihood of using non-electoral forms of participation over voting. Similarly, the 
negative coefficient for “none” identifies external inefficacy as the driving force of abstention (in line 
with hypotheses 1b and 1c).  
Model 4 in Table 1 informs on the effect of descriptive representation on young citizens’ participation 
repertoire. The presence of young MPs exerted a consistently negative effect on young citizens’ 
participation repertoire (in line with hypotheses 2a through 2c). In a country with a higher share of 
MPs under the age of 30, a young person was less likely to protest and to abstain than in a country 
with a less descriptively representative legislative. 
  
                                                 
18 For detailed information on the descriptive representation among MPs, please consult Figure B. 3 in Appendix B. 
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Table 1: Descriptive representation and young citizens’ participation repertoire - 
Multinomial multilevel estimation results (short) 
 M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 
Fixed effects      
BOTH      
DR (% MPs <= 30 at t-1)     -0.0575** 
     (0.018) 
Internal efficacy  0.148***  0.131** 0.115** 
  (0.041)  (0.041) (0.042) 
External efficacy   -0.445*** -0.433*** -0.401*** 
   (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
[…]      
Constant -2.055*** -2.928*** -3.366*** -2.931*** -3.679*** 
 (0.042) (0.095) (0.092) (0.094) (0.196) 
PROTEST      
DR (% MPs <= 30 at t-1)     -0.107*** 
     (0.023) 
Internal efficacy  -0.0177  -0.0244 -0.0241 
  (0.050)  (0.050) (0.051) 
External efficacy   -0.287*** -0.284*** -0.267*** 
   (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
[…]      
Constant -2.557*** -3.081*** -3.491*** -3.067*** -5.225*** 
 (0.049) (0.107) (0.105) (0.107) (0.267) 
NONE      
DR (% MPs <= 30 at t-1)     -0.0304* 
     (0.013) 
Internal efficacy  -0.174***  -0.173*** -0.183*** 
  (0.021)  (0.021) (0.021) 
External efficacy   -0.0187 -0.0200 -0.0285 
   (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
[…]      
Constant -0.171*** 0.322*** -0.0407 0.351*** -0.872*** 
 (0.028) (0.047) (0.041) (0.046) (0.115) 
Random effects      
Constant 0.385*** 0.429*** 0.418*** 0.410*** 0.369*** 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.019) (0.026) (0.024) 
Observations 15180/36 15180/36 15180/36 15180/36 15180/36 
Log-likelihood -14768.6 -13137.8 -13121.0 -13086.3 -12752.1 
Standard errors in parentheses; Reference outcome: Voted in the last national elections; + p < 0.10, * p < 
0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; […] control variables not displayed (see Table A. 3 in Appendix A). 




Figure 3: Predicted probabilities – Young citizens’ participation repertoire as descriptive 
representation changes 
Figure 3 shows the predicted probabilities of an average young citizen in an average country-election 
choosing a specific style of participation as the level of representation among MPs (t-1) increased.19 
The predicted probabilities inform on the relative relevance of each style of participation. For 
instance, the majority of citizens under 30 either chose to vote or to abstain. Only a minority either 
complemented voting with protest or solely relied on protest as a form of political engagement. Non-
electoral participation does not substitute for electoral participation forms. 
Nevertheless, younger citizens do make use of non-electoral forms of participation in established 
democracies, and descriptive representation plays a significant role in shaping their participation 
repertoire.  
As represented in Figure 4, increasing levels of representation among MPs increase the probability 
of voting among citizens under 30, thus supporting hypothesis 2a. Conversely, the use of non-
electoral forms of participation, either as complementary to voting, or as a stand-alone engagement 
                                                 
19  Predicted probabilities based on the estimation results from Model 4 in Table 1. The predicted probabilities were 
estimated for the case of a male respondent with average educational attainment and trust in parliament who is 
employed and not close to a political party nor interest in politics, whose internal and external political efficacy is low, 
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form, decreased significantly in countries with higher levels of descriptive representation. The 
presence of MPs under 30 thus has a negative effect on young citizens’ choosing protest or both forms 
over voting. 
 
Figure 4: Detailed predicted probabilities – Young citizens’ participation repertoire as descriptive 
representation changes 
The empirical analysis revealed that, at the individual level, political efficacy steers young citizens’ 
participation repertoire, in line with the theoretical argument. Political apathy, thus, cannot be 
considered the sole driver of non-electoral participation forms among young citizens. While young 
citizens’ own judgement of their political capacities – internal efficacy – pushes them to become 
politically active, it is their assessment of the system’s responsiveness towards their own needs and 
interests which pushes them to complementing or entirely substitute voting with protest entirely. It is 
disaffection with the political institutions and actors, which leads them to seek a different outlet for 
their political participation. Turning to the context determinants of young citizens’ participation 
repertoire, descriptive representation – measured as the percentage of MPs under the age of 30 in the 
previous legislature – does indeed shape young citizens’ preferred mode of participation by positively 
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the inside of the political decision making process, thus, increases the perception of having a chance 
to align representatives with young citizens’ interests and needs. 
Robustness checks 
The empirical results underwent several robustness checks. To test the sensitivity of the results to the 
definition of young citizens, I employed two alternative samples of young citizens, one analysing the 
participation repertoire of enfranchised citizens under 25, and one for under-35s (see Table C. 1 and 
Table C. 2 in Appendix C, and Figure C. 1 and Figure C. 2, respectively). In both cases the results 
proved largely robust to the alternative specification of young citizens. Only among citizens under 
the age of 25 did the effect of descriptive representation on the use of both forms of participation 
differ to the original analysis. In this case, higher levels of representation encouraged young citizens 
to engage in protest as an additional form of engagement rather than dissuade them from it. In 
addition, to test the specificity of the effect of descriptive representation on young citizens, I analysed 
its effect on the participation repertoire of citizens older than 30 (see Table C. 3 in Appendix C). The 
participation repertoire of older citizens proved immune to the descriptive representation of young 
citizens. Whilst not actively promoting their participation in elections, the descriptive representation 
of young citizens had no negative consequences for the remaining enfranchised population. 
Responsiveness effects elicited by descriptive representation remain concentrated on young citizens, 
and thus would represent an optimal mechanism to specifically target young citizens and their 
inclusion in the electoral decision making process.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper reconciles two opposing trends in young citizens’ political participation witnessed in the 
last decades. This paper brings the declining electoral and increasing non-electoral participation 
together as part of a broader participation repertoire of young citizens. The participation model 
proposed in the paper goes beyond political apathy and changing citizenship norms, and focusses on 
political alienation, the perceived responsiveness of the political system, and descriptive 
representation to explain the occurrence of differences in the participation repertoire of younger 
generations of citizens.  
This paper addresses young citizens’ participation repertoire by developing a four-fold typology 
of young citizens (uninterested, involved, critic, and disaffected) which contended that a particular 
combination of electoral and non-electoral participation is the expression of political efficacy and the 
perceived responsiveness of the political system. The latter, in turn, is a function of the level of 
descriptive representation of young citizens. Descriptive representation thus plays an important role 
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in shaping young citizens’ participation repertoire because it carries information and cues about the 
openness and responsiveness of the political system to the needs and interests of young citizens, 
descriptive representation has the potential to increase voting and decrease protest among young 
citizens.  
To test these hypotheses, I carried out a multinomial multilevel analysis logit by combining individual 
level information provided by the European Social Survey (2013) with an original dataset of young 
citizens’ descriptive representation among parliament members in 36 elections in 19 European 
countries between 1999 and 2008. 
Consistent with theoretical expectations, the analysis finds that perceived responsiveness (external 
efficacy) and descriptive representation drive young citizens’ use of protest (non-electoral 
participation) as a complement, or as an alternative, to voting (electoral participation). Young citizens 
are both less likely to abstain and less likely to use protest as a complement (participation mode 
“both”), or as a substitute (participation mode “protest”), in countries whose parliaments were fairly 
representative of young citizens, i.e. had more young citizens in their parliaments’ ranks.  
The implications of the paper for the study of the political participation of young citizens are 
twofold.  
First, the analysis of the participation repertoire of young citizens hints at an expansion rather than 
a substitution effect of non-electoral participation, in line with previous investigations (Nový 2014; 
Strømsnes 2009). The empirical analysis indicates that when faced with the current political situation, 
young citizens strategically use different forms and combinations of political participation to pursue 
their political goals. Electoral (voting) and non-electoral (protesting) forms of participation are not 
mutually exclusive, but part of a broader participation repertoire. The use of protest as a complement 
of or substitute for electoral participation comes as a consequence of young citizens’ alienation from 
the political system.  
Second, the inability to elicit a responsive answer from the political system prompts young citizens 
to enlist alternative forms of participation. However, the motivations to participate and how a young 
citizen participates are not entirely located at the individual level. Descriptive representation 
influences the perceived responsiveness of the political system. Higher levels of descriptive 
representation among members of parliament reassure young citizens about the responsiveness of the 
political system – and not only to older citizens – and dissuade them from taking recourse to non-
electoral participation forms or abstaining all together. The presence of young parliamentarians gives 
young citizens an ingress for their preferences, which might significantly diverge from the rest of the 
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citizenry. As such, a political system more open to young citizens’ interests and needs also influences 
young citizens’ willingness to make use of electoral participation forms.  
This paper has political-practical implications for political actors. The alleged rise in non-electoral 
participation stems from a discontent with the political system. This discontent, however, can be 
managed by fostering the inclusion of young citizens in the political system. The question remains of 
how to break this cycle of non-inclusion (low descriptive representation) and failed, or biased, 
participation. To date, formal provisions to include young citizens in the ranks of politics are rarely 
if ever implemented. Including young citizens in the decision making process could represent a viable 
opportunity to bring young citizens back to the polls and ensure the future of the democratic process 
in its current form. Thus, political efforts to engage young citizens in elections might be more 
successful if directed towards having more young citizens elected to office.  
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Appendix A – Tables 
Table A. 1: Summary statistics 
 Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Voted 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Both 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Protest 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
None 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Female 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Educational attainment (centered) -0.00 1.00 -2.24 1.76 
Trust in parliament (centered) -0.00 2.44 -4.62 5.38 
Unemployed 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
In education 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Close to political party 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Political interest 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Internal efficacy -0.00 1.00 -2.26 2.39 
External efficacy -0.00 1.00 -2.33 2.41 
Descriptive representation - MPs <30 years (%) 3.95 2.44 0.00 10.30 
Difference in voting (>30 vs. <30) 16.28 6.32 6.61 32.55 
Difference in protest (>30 vs. <30) -4.08 3.91 -12.88 1.45 
n/N 15180 / 36    
 
 
Table A. 2: Varimax rotated factor loadings 
Variable Factor Uniqueness 
 
Internal efficacy 
Politics is too complicated to understand (reversed) 0.8445 0.2868 
Difficult to make up mind about politics 0.8445 0.2868 
 
External efficacy 
Satisfaction with national government 0.8989 0.1920   
Satisfaction with how democracy works in [country] 0.8989 0.1920 
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Table A. 3: Descriptive representation and young citizens’ participation repertoire - 
Multinomial multilevel estimation results (complete) 
 M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 
Fixed effects      
BOTH      
DR (% MPs <= 30 at t-1)     -0.0575** 
     (0.018) 
Internal efficacy  0.148***  0.131** 0.115** 
  (0.041)  (0.041) (0.042) 
External efficacy   -0.445*** -0.433*** -0.401*** 
   (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Internal efficacy * DR      
      
External efficacy * DR      
      
Female  0.0738 -0.00221 0.0422 0.0278 
  (0.074) (0.073) (0.075) (0.076) 
Educational attainment  0.00154 0.00414 -0.00239 0.0582 
  (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) 
Trust in parliament  -0.0494** 0.0684*** 0.0655** 0.0207 
  (0.016) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Unemployed  0.464 0.414 0.416 0.391 
  (0.293) (0.294) (0.295) (0.296) 
In education  0.823*** 0.854*** 0.839*** 0.760*** 
  (0.078) (0.079) (0.079) (0.080) 
Close to a political party  0.423*** 0.456*** 0.443*** 0.415*** 
  (0.079) (0.079) (0.080) (0.080) 
Political interest  0.774*** 0.834*** 0.755*** 0.685*** 
  (0.086) (0.083) (0.086) (0.088) 
Vote diff.     -0.00634 
     (0.007) 
Protest diff.     -0.168*** 
     (0.011) 
Constant -2.055*** -2.928*** -3.366*** -2.931*** -3.679*** 
 (0.042) (0.095) (0.092) (0.094) (0.196) 
PROTEST      
DR (% MPs <= 30 at t-1)     -0.107*** 
     (0.023) 
Internal efficacy  -0.0177  -0.0244 -0.0241 
  (0.050)  (0.050) (0.051) 
External efficacy   -0.287*** -0.284*** -0.267*** 
   (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
Internal efficacy * DR      
      
External efficacy * DR      
      
Female  0.0205 0.0118 0.00238 -0.00631 
  (0.093) (0.092) (0.093) (0.095) 
Educational attainment  -0.565*** -0.570*** -0.568*** -0.616*** 
  (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
Trust in parliament  -0.0788*** -0.00660 -0.00627 -0.0346 
  (0.020) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) 
Unemployed  0.693* 0.672* 0.669* 0.569+ 
  (0.327) (0.328) (0.328) (0.333) 
In education  1.508*** 1.523*** 1.526*** 1.557*** 
  (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.099) 
Close to a political party  0.0178 0.0191 0.0261 0.00562 
  (0.096) (0.096) (0.097) (0.097) 
Political interest  0.0664 0.0464 0.0569 0.0244 
  (0.102) (0.097) (0.102) (0.104) 
Vote diff.     0.0798*** 
     (0.009) 
Protest diff.     -0.180*** 
     (0.014) 
Constant -2.557*** -3.081*** -3.491*** -3.067*** -5.225*** 
 (0.049) (0.107) (0.105) (0.107) (0.267) 
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     continued 
NONE      
DR (% MPs <= 30 at t-1)     -0.0304* 
     (0.013) 
Internal efficacy  -0.174***  -0.173*** -0.183*** 
  (0.021)  (0.021) (0.021) 
External efficacy   -0.0187 -0.0200 -0.0285 
   (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Internal efficacy * DR      
      
External efficacy * DR      
      
Female  -0.141*** -0.0843* -0.143*** -0.142*** 
  (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) 
Educational attainment  -0.525*** -0.544*** -0.527*** -0.531*** 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Trust in parliament  -0.0845*** -0.0850*** -0.0831*** -0.0742*** 
  (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Unemployed  0.470*** 0.501*** 0.478*** 0.521*** 
  (0.135) (0.136) (0.136) (0.136) 
In education  0.649*** 0.627*** 0.651*** 0.659*** 
  (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Close to a political party  -0.742*** -0.784*** -0.757*** -0.753*** 
  (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) 
Political interest  -0.564*** -0.660*** -0.563*** -0.552*** 
  (0.045) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) 
Vote diff. (%)     0.0605*** 
     (0.004) 
Protest diff. (%)     -0.0108 
     (0.008) 
Constant -0.171*** 0.322*** -0.0407 0.351*** -0.872*** 
 (0.028) (0.047) (0.041) (0.046) (0.115) 
Random effects      
Constant 0.385*** 0.429*** 0.418*** 0.410*** 0.369*** 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.019) (0.026) (0.024) 
Observations 15180/36 15180/36 15180/36 15180/36 15180/36 
Log-likelihood -14768.6 -13137.8 -13121.0 -13086.3 -12752.1 
Standard errors in parentheses; Reference outcome: Voted in the last national elections; + p < 0.10, * p < 
0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Figure B. 1: Participation repertoire – Age group comparison 
 
Figure B. 2: Comparison of differences in voting and protesting behavior between young 
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Appendix C – Robustness checks 
Robustness check 1a: Alternative definition of young citizens: Enfranchised 
citizens under the age of 25  
Table C. 1: Descriptive representation and young citizens’ participation repertoire – 
Robustness check 1a – Enfranchised citizens <=25 
 M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 
Fixed effects      
BOTH      
DR (% MPs <=30 at t-1)     -0.00335 
     (0.022) 
Internal efficacy  0.151**  0.133* 0.118* 
  (0.054)  (0.054) (0.054) 
External efficacy   -0.501*** -0.492*** -0.434*** 
   (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) 
Female  0.176+ 0.0977 0.140 0.120 
  (0.097) (0.096) (0.098) (0.100) 
Educational attainment  -0.0179 -0.0512 -0.0358 0.0278 
  (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.053) 
Trust in parliament  -0.0424* 0.0798** 0.0780** 0.0348 
  (0.021) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Unemployed  0.677* 0.601+ 0.638+ 0.642+ 
  (0.331) (0.334) (0.334) (0.337) 
In education  0.586*** 0.606*** 0.603*** 0.585*** 
  (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.100) 
Close to a political party  0.537*** 0.542*** 0.529*** 0.511*** 
  (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.105) 
Political interest  0.764*** 0.837*** 0.751*** 0.664*** 
  (0.111) (0.107) (0.112) (0.114) 
Vote diff. (%)     -0.00662 
     (0.010) 
Protest diff. (%)     -0.149*** 
     (0.013) 
Constant -2.157*** -3.280*** -3.112*** -3.039*** -3.830*** 
 (0.050) (0.123) (0.124) (0.123) (0.248) 
PROTEST      
DR (% MPs <=30 at t-1)     -0.0895*** 
     (0.025) 
Internal efficacy  -0.0267  -0.0311 -0.0320 
  (0.057)  (0.057) (0.058) 
External efficacy   -0.376*** -0.380*** -0.324*** 
   (0.067) (0.067) (0.068) 
Female  0.00907 0.00165 -0.00964 -0.00890 
  (0.105) (0.103) (0.105) (0.108) 
Educational attainment  -0.706*** -0.736*** -0.722*** -0.797*** 
  (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) 
Trust in parliament  -0.0487* 0.0364 0.0371 0.0140 
  (0.022) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Unemployed  0.593 0.539 0.559 0.421 
  (0.391) (0.393) (0.393) (0.402) 
In education  1.241*** 1.252*** 1.259*** 1.314*** 
  (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.116) 
Close to a political party  0.0906 0.0739 0.0794 0.0675 
  (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.111) 
Political interest  0.0415 0.0235 0.0365 0.000878 
  (0.115) (0.110) (0.115) (0.118) 
Vote diff. (%)     0.0819*** 
     (0.010) 
Protest diff. (%)     -0.155*** 
     (0.015) 
Constant -2.341*** -3.049*** -2.866*** -2.800*** -4.837*** 
 (0.054) (0.124) (0.125) (0.125) (0.295) 
     continued 
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NONE      
DR (% MPs <=30 at t-1)     -0.0305* 
     (0.014) 
Internal efficacy  -0.184***  -0.176*** -0.177*** 
  (0.027)  (0.027) (0.027) 
External efficacy   -0.0168 -0.0272 -0.000454 
   (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Female  -0.112* -0.0496 -0.106* -0.107* 
  (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) 
Educational attainment  -0.682*** -0.718*** -0.692*** -0.714*** 
  (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Trust in parliament  -0.0427*** -0.0546*** -0.0524*** -0.0391** 
  (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Unemployed  0.454** 0.481** 0.479** 0.459** 
  (0.176) (0.177) (0.177) (0.177) 
In education  0.500*** 0.469*** 0.493*** 0.491*** 
  (0.053) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) 
Close to a political party  -0.651*** -0.718*** -0.693*** -0.660*** 
  (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
Political interest  -0.536*** -0.632*** -0.530*** -0.525*** 
  (0.057) (0.054) (0.057) (0.057) 
Vote diff. (%)     0.0572*** 
     (0.005) 
Protest diff. (%)     0.0227** 
     (0.008) 
Constant -0.120*** 0.175** 0.420*** 0.454*** -0.438*** 
 (0.030) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.125) 
Random effects      
Constant 0.563*** 0.603*** 0.427*** 0.482*** 0.455*** 
 (0.029) (0.039) (0.025) (0.030) (0.034) 
Observations 9102/44 9102/44 9102/44 9102/44 9102/44 
Log-Likelihood -9221.4 -8296.1 -8280.0 -8251.2 -8014.1 
Standard errors in parentheses; Reference outcome: Voted in the last national elections; + p < 0.10, * p < 
0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 




Figure C. 1: Detailed predicted probabilities – Young citizens’ participation repertoire as descriptive 
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Robustness check 1b: Alternative definition of young citizens: Enfranchised 
citizens under the age of 35  
Table C. 2: Descriptive representation and young citizens’ participation repertoire – 
Robustness check 1b – Enfranchised citizens <=35 
 M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 
Fixed effects      
BOTH      
DR (% MPs >30 at t-1)     -0.123*** 
     (0.016) 
Internal efficacy  0.175***  0.160*** 0.138*** 
  (0.035)  (0.035) (0.035) 
External efficacy   -0.542*** -0.532*** -0.470*** 
   (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) 
Female  0.0985 0.00994 0.0649 0.0484 
  (0.063) (0.062) (0.063) (0.064) 
Educational attainment  -0.00737 0.00235 -0.00620 0.0333 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) 
Trust in parliament  -0.0360** 0.0949*** 0.0914*** 0.0488** 
  (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Unemployed  0.348 0.264 0.271 0.205 
  (0.269) (0.270) (0.271) (0.272) 
In education  0.901*** 0.943*** 0.925*** 0.854*** 
  (0.071) (0.071) (0.072) (0.072) 
Close to a political party  0.425*** 0.484*** 0.465*** 0.439*** 
  (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068) 
Political interest  0.692*** 0.752*** 0.658*** 0.587*** 
  (0.072) (0.070) (0.073) (0.074) 
Vote diff. (%)     0.00347 
     (0.006) 
Protest diff. (%)     -0.143*** 
     (0.009) 
Constant -2.295*** -3.082*** -3.238*** -3.230*** -3.681*** 
 (0.032) (0.077) (0.076) (0.077) (0.173) 
PROTEST      
DR (% MPs >30 at t-1)     -0.172*** 
     (0.021) 
Internal efficacy  0.0120  0.00781 0.0152 
  (0.046)  (0.046) (0.047) 
External efficacy   -0.315*** -0.313*** -0.278*** 
   (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
Female  -0.0496 -0.0674 -0.0649 -0.0803 
  (0.086) (0.084) (0.086) (0.087) 
Educational attainment  -0.477*** -0.473*** -0.472*** -0.520*** 
  (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) 
Trust in parliament  -0.0799*** -0.0115 -0.0120 -0.0405+ 
  (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Unemployed  0.972*** 0.943*** 0.943*** 0.880** 
  (0.280) (0.280) (0.280) (0.285) 
In education  1.751*** 1.778*** 1.776*** 1.831*** 
  (0.089) (0.089) (0.090) (0.091) 
Close to a political party  -0.00777 0.0122 0.00949 -0.0188 
  (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.089) 
Political interest  -0.0155 -0.0299 -0.0380 -0.0825 
  (0.093) (0.089) (0.093) (0.095) 
Vote diff. (%)     0.0846*** 
     (0.008) 
Protest diff. (%)     -0.159*** 
     (0.012) 
Constant -2.980*** -3.369*** -3.483*** -3.482*** -5.309*** 
 (0.043) (0.094) (0.093) (0.093) (0.250) 
     continued 
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NONE      
DR (% MPs >30 at t-1)     -0.0927*** 
     (0.010) 
Internal efficacy  -0.157***  -0.156*** -0.162*** 
  (0.018)  (0.018) (0.018) 
External efficacy   -0.0480* -0.0497* -0.0488* 
   (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Female  -0.171*** -0.119*** -0.172*** -0.174*** 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
Educational attainment  -0.459*** -0.474*** -0.456*** -0.466*** 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Trust in parliament  -0.0914*** -0.0960*** -0.0949*** -0.0858*** 
  (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Unemployed  0.597*** 0.633*** 0.607*** 0.635*** 
  (0.117) (0.116) (0.117) (0.118) 
In education  0.823*** 0.810*** 0.830*** 0.842*** 
  (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Close to a political party  -0.782*** -0.806*** -0.788*** -0.789*** 
  (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) 
Political interest  -0.631*** -0.731*** -0.644*** -0.635*** 
  (0.038) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) 
Vote diff. (%)     0.0677*** 
     (0.004) 
Protest diff. (%)     0.00233 
     (0.006) 
Constant -0.476*** 0.0710* 0.00450 -0.0263 -0.992*** 
 (0.019) (0.035) (0.032) (0.034) (0.111) 
Random effects      
Constant 0.415*** 0.464*** 0.413*** 0.411*** 0.355*** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.019) 
Observations 22026/44 22026/44 22026/44 22026/44 22026/44 
Log-Likelihood -20422.6 -18065.2 -18026.8 -17968.2 -17583.1 
Standard errors in parentheses; Reference outcome: Voted in the last national elections; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 




Figure C. 2: Detailed predicted probabilities – Young citizens’ participation repertoire as 
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Robustness check 2: Enfranchised citizens over the age of 30  
Table C. 3: Descriptive representation and the participation repertoire of enfranchised 
citizens over 30 – Robustness check 2 
 M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 
BOTH      
DR (% MPs >30 at t-1)     -0.0425*** 
     (0.011) 
Internal efficacy  0.201***  0.205*** 0.176*** 
  (0.021)  (0.021) (0.021) 
External efficacy   -0.526*** -0.527*** -0.463*** 
   (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Female  0.0146 -0.0657+ -0.000804 0.00817 
  (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) 
Educational attainment  0.209*** 0.242*** 0.214*** 0.231*** 
  (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
Trust in parliament  -0.0179* 0.108*** 0.105*** 0.0638*** 
  (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Unemployed  0.562*** 0.470** 0.470** 0.389* 
  (0.165) (0.165) (0.166) (0.168) 
In education  0.534** 0.494** 0.482* 0.396* 
  (0.188) (0.190) (0.190) (0.190) 
Close to a political party  0.497*** 0.545*** 0.523*** 0.520*** 
  (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Political interest  0.635*** 0.770*** 0.656*** 0.565*** 
  (0.047) (0.046) (0.048) (0.048) 
Vote young (%)     0.00745*** 
     (0.002) 
Protest young (%)     0.0585*** 
     (0.004) 
Constant -2.556*** -3.272*** -3.043*** -3.380*** -4.728*** 
 (0.019) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053) (0.128) 
PROTEST      
DR (% MPs >30 at t-1)     -0.0202 
     (0.029) 
Internal efficacy  0.0693  0.0736 0.0925+ 
  (0.055)  (0.055) (0.055) 
External efficacy   -0.209** -0.211*** -0.177** 
   (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) 
Female  -0.332** -0.356*** -0.334*** -0.326** 
  (0.101) (0.100) (0.101) (0.102) 
Educational attainment  0.139** 0.160*** 0.148*** 0.142** 
  (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) 
Trust in parliament  -0.122*** -0.0780** -0.0791** -0.0910*** 
  (0.021) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Unemployed  0.858** 0.829* 0.835* 0.911** 
  (0.325) (0.326) (0.326) (0.327) 
In education  2.447*** 2.434*** 2.425*** 2.491*** 
  (0.235) (0.235) (0.235) (0.240) 
Close to a political party  -0.480*** -0.473*** -0.481*** -0.528*** 
  (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) 
Political interest  -0.428*** -0.374*** -0.415*** -0.436*** 
  (0.110) (0.106) (0.110) (0.111) 
Vote young (%)     -0.0409*** 
     (0.005) 
Protest young (%)     0.0727*** 
     (0.010) 
Constant -4.637*** -3.930*** -3.621*** -3.971*** -2.571*** 
 (0.049) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.252) 
     continued 
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NONE      
DR (% MPs >30 at t-1)     -0.00883 
     (0.008) 
Internal efficacy  -0.113***  -0.108*** -0.106*** 
  (0.012)  (0.012) (0.012) 
External efficacy   -0.131*** -0.130*** -0.131*** 
   (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
Female  -0.168*** -0.132*** -0.164*** -0.177*** 
  (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
Educational attainment  -0.103*** -0.112*** -0.0921*** -0.121*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Trust in parliament  -0.112*** -0.0918*** -0.0905*** -0.0801*** 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Unemployed  0.640*** 0.638*** 0.633*** 0.636*** 
  (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.082) 
In education  0.815*** 0.779*** 0.793*** 0.868*** 
  (0.124) (0.123) (0.123) (0.125) 
Close to a political party  -1.123*** -1.141*** -1.130*** -1.116*** 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Political interest  -0.761*** -0.809*** -0.750*** -0.756*** 
  (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
Vote young (%)     -0.0256*** 
     (0.001) 
Protest young (%)     -0.00919* 
     (0.004) 
Constant -1.265*** -0.274*** 0.0834** -0.308*** 1.023*** 
 (0.011) (0.024) (0.025) (0.022) (0.072) 
Random effects      
Constant 0.353*** 0.275*** 0.329*** 0.341*** 0.189*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) 
Observations 66677/44 66677/44 66677/44 66677/44 66677/44 
Log. Likelihood -45085.3 -40727.4 -40605.0 -40436.8 -39797.7 
Standard errors in parentheses; Reference outcome: Voted in the last national elections; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
To vote or to protest? Chapter 4 Karima S. Bousbah 
224 
 
Appendix D – Data sources and operationalisation of variables 
Table D. 1: Operationalisation of individual level variables (corresponding questions and coding in the European Social Surveys) and context level variables20 




ESS Question ESS coding 
Individual level and ESS based variables 
Political participation 
Vote Voted in the last national 
election (dummy variable) 
0: Not voted 
(abstained)  
vote Some people don't vote 
nowadays for one reason or 
another. Did you vote in the last 
[country] national election in 
[month/year]? 
2: No 
1: Voted 1: Yes  
Protest Having participated in a 
legal demonstration (in the 
last 12 months) 
0: No  pbldmn There are different ways of 
trying to improve things in 
[country] or help prevent things 
from going wrong. During the 
last 12 months, have you done 
any of the following? Firstly ... 
Taken part in a lawful public 
demonstration 
2: No 












0: No  mnactic Main activity, last 7 days. All 
respondents. Post coded 
3: Unemployed, looking for job  
4: Unemployed, not looking for 
job  
1: Yes 1: Paid work     
2: Education 5 Permanently sick 
or disabled  
6: Retired    
7: Community or military service  
8: Housework, looking after 
children, others    
9: Other  
In education Being currently in 
education 
0: No  mnactic Main activity, last 7 days. All 
respondents. Post coded 
1: Paid work  
3: Unemployed, looking for job  
4: Unemployed, not looking for 
job 
5 Permanently sick or disabled  
                                                 
20  Categories not reported in the ESS coding column, e.g. refusal or not applicable, were recoded to missing and, hence, not considered in the analysis. Further, all 
information pertains on enfranchised individuals in a specific country. Source: ESS (2013). 
To vote or to protest? Chapter 4 Karima S. Bousbah 
225 
 
6: Retired    
7: Community or military service  
8: Housework, looking after 
children, others    
9: Other  
1: Yes  2: Education 
Educational attainment Highest level of education 
achieved 
0 edulvla (ESS 1-3) 
edulvlb (ESS 4-7) 
What is the highest level of 
education you have achieved? 
1: Less than lower secondary 
education (ISCED 0-1)  
1 2: Lower secondary education 
completed (ISCED 2)  
2 3: Upper secondary education 
completed (ISCED 3) 
3 4: Post-secondary non-tertiary 
education completed (ISCED 4) 
4 5: Tertiary education completed 
(ISCED 5-6) 
Sex Female respondent 0: No gndr Respondent is male 1 
1: Yes Respondent is female 2 
Political affinity and awareness 
Trust in parliament High trust in parliament 0: No  trstprl please tell me on a score of 0-
10 how much you personally 
trust [country]’ parliament 
0: No trust at all  
1-6 
1: Yes 7-9 
10: Complete trust 
Political interest Being interested in politics 0: No  polintr How interested would you say 
you are in politics? 
Hardly interested (3)  
Not at all interested (4) 
1: Yes Very interested (1) 
Quite interested (2)  
Close to a political party Feeling close to a political 
party 
0: No  clsprty Is there a particular political 
party you feel closer to than all 
the other parties? 
2: No 
1: Yes 1: Yes 
 2: No 
Political efficacy 
Make up mind about politics Feeling it difficult to make 
up one’s mind about 
politics 
0: No  poldcs How difficult or easy do you 
find it to make your mind up 
about political issues? 
3 Neither difficult nor easy  
4 Easy     
5 Very easy 
1: Yes 1 Very difficult    
2 Difficult 
Politics is complicated Feeling that politics is too 
complicated to understand 
0: No  polcmpl 1: Never     
2: Seldom  
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How often does politics seem so 
complicated that you can't really 
understand what is going on? 
3: Occasionally  
1: Yes 4: Regularly  
5: Frequently 
Satisfaction with national 
government 
Being satisfied with the 
national government 
0: No  stfdem Now thinking about the 
[country] government, how 
satisfied are you with the way it 
is doing its job? 
0: Extremely dissatisfied 
1-6 
1: Yes 7-9 
10: Extremely satisfied 
Satisfaction with democracy Being satisfied with 
democracy 
0: No  stfdem And on the whole, how satisfied 
are you with the way democracy 
works in [country]? 
0: Extremely dissatisfied 
1-6 
1: Yes 7-9 
10: Extremely satisfied 
Selection variables 
Citizenship Respondent is citizen of 
the country / enfranchised 
0: No  ctzcntr Are you a citizen of [country]? 2: No 
1: Yes 1: Yes 
Age group Age group dummy for 
young and old 
enfranchised citizens 





agea Age of responded, calculated Continuous measure of age in 
years 
Identifying variables  
Countries   cntry Country Country name 
Election years Year of election Year  Day/Month/Year of the 
interview 
Based on administrative 
variables: 
- Day of month of interview 
(inwdds/inwdde/inwdd) 
- Month of interview 
(inwmms/inwmme/inwmm) 
- Year of interview 
(inwyys/inwyye/inwyr) 
Context level variables (ESS) 
Difference in voting Turnout difference 
between old (aged 31 and 
more) and young (aged 30 
or less); aggregated values 




vote Some people don't vote 
nowadays for one reason or 
another. Did you vote in the last 
[country] national election in 
[month/year]? 
1: Yes 
Difference in protest Difference in protest 
between old (aged 31 and 
more) and young (aged 30 
or less); aggregated values 





pbldmn There are different ways of 
trying to improve things in 
[country] or help prevent things 
from going wrong. During the 
last 12 months, have you done 
any of the following? Firstly ... 
Taken part in a lawful public 
demonstration 
1: Yes 




Context level variables Description Coding Source 
Descriptive representation – Members of parliament 
Young members of parliament Percentage of members of parliament under 
the age of 30 
Percentage See Table D. 2 
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Table D. 2: Descriptive representation among candidates and members of parliament - Sources 
Country Year Source 
Austria 1998, 2002, 
2006 






Czech Statistical Office (2013): Poslanecká sněmovna Parlamentu ČR . http://www.volby.cz/index.html (15.8.2013). 
Denmark 1998 IndenrigsMinisteriet (1999): Folketingsvalget den 11. Marts 1998. http://www.sum.dk/Aktuelt/Publikationer/Publikationer_IN/~/media/Filer-
Publikationer-IN/Valg/1999/FTvalg-1998/FTvalg-1998.ashx (10.12.2013). 
Denmark 2001 IndenrigsMinisteriet (2003): Folketingsvalget den 20. November 2011. http://www.sum.dk/Aktuelt/Publikationer/Publikationer_IN/~/media/Filer-
Publikationer-IN/Valg/2003/FTvalg-2001/FTvalg-2001.ashx (10.12.2013). 
Denmark 2005 Inderigs- og Sundhedsministeriet (2006): Folketingsvalget den 8. februar 2005. http://valg.oim.dk/media/452243/ftv-2005.pdf (10.12.2013). 
Denmark 2007 Inderigs- og Sundhedsministeriet (2008): Folketingsvalget den 13. november 2007. http://www.im.dk/~/media/Filer-Publikationer-
IN/Valg/2009/FTvalg-2007/FTvalg-2007.ashx (10.12.2013). 
Denmark 2011 Inderigs- og Sundhedsministeriet (2012): Folketingsvalget den 15. september 2011. http://www.dst.dk/pukora/epub/upload/17989/ftvalg.pdf 
(10.12.2013). 
Estonia 2011 Riigikogu (2013a): Members of XII Riijikogu. http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?id=34625 (14.9.2013). 
Estonia 2007 Riigikogu (2013b): XI Riigikogu. Members. http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?id=68182 (14.9.2013) 
Estonia 2003 Riigikogu (2013c): X Riigikogu. Members. http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?id=42699 (14.9.2013) 
Estonia 1999 Riigikogu (2013d): http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?id=35326 (14.9.2013). 
France 1997, 2002 Assemblée Nationale (2013): Base de données des députés français depuis 1789. http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/sycomore/ (27.12.2013). 
Germany 2009 Deutscher Bundestag (2013a): Abgeordnete der 17. Legislatur (2009-2013). Abgeordnete in Zahlen. Altersgliederung. 
http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/cgi/show.php?fileToLoad=2855&id=1215 (10.12.2013) 
Germany 2005 Deutscher Bundestag (2013b): Abgeordnete der 16. Legislatur (2005-2009). Abgeordnete in Zahlen. Altersgliederung. 
http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/cgi/show.php?fileToLoad=1365&id=1118 (10.12.2013) 
Germany 2002 Deutscher Bundestag (2013c): Abgeordnete der 15. Legislatur (2002-2005). Abgeordnete in Zahlen. Altersgliederung. 
http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/cgi/show.php?fileToLoad=215&id=1041 (10.12.2013) 
Germany 1998 Deutscher Bundestag (2013d): Abgeordnete der 14. Legislatur (1998-2002). Abgeordnete in Zahlen. Altersgliederung. 
http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/cgi/show.php?fileToLoad=215&id=1041 (10.12.2013) 
Iceland 2003, 2009 Statistics Iceland (2013): General Elections. Candidates/Elected Members. http://www.statice.is/Statistics/Elections/General-elections (22.9.2013) 
Iceland 1999 Wikipedia (2013a): Kjörnir alþingismenn 1999. http://is.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kj%F6rnir_al%FEingismenn_1999 (26.12.2013) 
Ireland 2011 Wikipedia (2013b): members of the 31st Dáil. http://adriankavanaghelections.org/2011/01/03/candidates-aged-21-35/ (20.12.2013). 
Ireland 2011 Oireachtas (2013): Dáil Éireann Members Database. http://www.oireachtas.ie/members-hist/default.asp?housetype=0&HouseNum=31&disp=mem 
(20.12.2013) 
Italy 2001 Camera dei Deputati (2013): XIV Legislatura. Statistiche relative ai deputati. Distinzione dei deputati per età e sesso. 
http://legxiv.camera.it/deputatism/248/lista.asp (10.09.2013) 
Italy 1996 IPU (2013a): Italy. Parliamentary Chamber: Camera dei Deputati. Elections held in 1996. http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2157_96.htm 
(10.09.2013). 
Latvia 2002 IPU (2013b): Latvia. Parliamentary Chamber: Saeima. Elections held in 2002. http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2177_02.htm (17.12.2013). 
Lithuania 2004 The Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania (2004): Members of the Seimas 2004-2008. 
http://www3.lrs.lt/rinkimai/2004/seimas/rezultatai/rez_isrinkti_e_20_2.htm (15.12.2013). 
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Norway 2001, 2003, 
2005, 2009 
IPU (2013c): Norway. Stortinget (Parliament). Historical Archive of Parliamentary Election Results. http://www.ipu.org/parline-
e/reports/2239_arc.htm (12.12.2013) 
Poland 2001 IPU (2013d): Poland. Parliamentary Chamber: Sejm. Elections held in 2001. http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2255_01.htm (15.11.2013). 
Poland 2001, 2005, 
2007 
IPU (2013e): Poland. Sejm. Historical Archive. http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2255_arc.htm (15.11.2013) 
Poland 2011 National Electoral Commission (2013c): Wybory 2011 do Sejmu I Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Poskliej. Statystyki ogólnokrajowe. 
http://wybory2011.pkw.gov.pl/kom/pl/statystyka.html (15.11.2013) 
Slovakia 1998, 2002, 
2006, 2012 
Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (2013): Parlamentné voľby. http://portal.statistics.sk/showdoc.do?docid=4490 (18.12.2013). 
Slovenia 2000, 2004, 
2008, 2010 
Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (2013): Elections in the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia. 
http://pxweb.stat.si/pxweb/Database/General/General.asp (18.12.2013). 
Sweden 1998, 2002, 
2006, 2010 
Statistics Sweden (2013): Nominated, elected and not elected candidates in the election to the Riksdag by ex, party and age. Number and percent. 
Year of election. Election to the Riksdag 1991-2010. http://www.scb.se/en_/Finding-statistics/Statistical-Database/Select-
variables/?px_tableid=ssd_extern%3aME0107T27&rxid=0197f843-3da2-4dff-bf47-ac9d77453e0b (1.12.2013). 
Switzerland 1995 IPU (2013f): Switzerland, Parliamentary Chamber; Nationalrat - Conseil national - Consiglio nazionale. Elections held in 1995. 
http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2305_95.htm (22.9.2013). 
Switzerland 1999 Die Bundesversammlung - Das Schweizer Parlament (2013a): Wahlen 1999. Nationalrat - Resultate. http://www.parlament.ch/d/wahlen-
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